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Abstract: 
This deliverable deals with the modelling and analysis of interdependencies between  critical 
infrastructures, focussing attention on two interdependent infrastructures studied in the 
context of CRUTIAL: the electric power infrastructure and the information infrastructures 
supporting management, control and maintenance functionality. The main objectives are: 1) 
investigate the main challenges to be addressed for the analysis and modelling of 
interdependencies, 2) review the modelling methodologies and tools that can be used to 
address these challenges and support the evaluation of the impact of interdependencies on 
the dependability and resilience of the service delivered to the users, and 3) present the 
preliminary directions investigated so far by the CRUTIAL consortium for describing and 
modelling interdependencies. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past 40 years, the electric power grid in several countries all over the world 
experienced multiple cascading failures that affected the power supply to millions of 
customers. The most recent one occurred on November 4 this year in Western Europe when 
a shutdown of a high-voltage line in Germany resulted in massive power outages in France 
and Italy as well as in parts of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, and 
even extended as far as Morocco. About 10 million customers in Europe were affected by 
this failure. Similar major blackouts with even more severe consequences have occurred in 
the summer 2003 in the United States, in Canada and in Italy [US-Canada 2004, Pourbeik et 
al. 2006]. These events highlight the vulnerability of the electric grid infrastructures and their 
interdependencies. The large geographic extension of power failures effects is related to the 
high interconnectivity of power grid transmission and distribution infrastructures and the 
multiple interdependencies existing between these infrastructures and the information 
infrastructures supporting the control, the monitoring, the maintenance and the exploitation of 
power supply systems. Clearly there is a need to analyze and model critical infrastructures in 
the presence of interdependencies in order: i) to understand how such interdependencies 
may contribute to the occurrence of large outages and blackouts and ii) to develop 
architectural solutions that are well suited to improve the dependability and resilience of 
power grid infrastructures.  
The CRUTIAL project aims to address these objectives focussing attention on two 
interdependent infrastructures: the electric power infrastructure and the information 
infrastructures supporting management, control and maintenance functionality. Starting from 
the existing electric power infrastructure, the project aims to investigate new approaches that 
are well suited to cope with the recent market deregulation in the context of distributed and 
renewable energy resources, the dramatic increase of power demand, and the advent on 
new threats caused in particular by the increased openness of the information infrastructures 
and the multiplication of actors and stakeholders in the management and exploitation of the 
system [Amin 2005]. 
There is a consensus in the literature on critical infrastructures that interdependency 
analyses and models constitute a necessary step [Rinaldi et al. 2001]. The International CIIP 
Handbook 2004 [Wenger et al. 2004] is a comprehensive collection of information about the 
various initiatives undertaken by the different countries on the theme of Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), mainly at governmental level. The CIIP Handbook underlines 
the need of developing methodologies for analyzing interdependencies and guiding the 
protection of critical information infrastructures.  
This deliverable focuses on the modelling and analysis of interdependencies. The main 
objectives are: 1) investigate the main challenges to be addressed for the analysis and 
modelling of interdependencies, 2) review the modelling methodologies and tools that can be 
used to address these challenges and support the evaluation of the impact of 
interdependencies on the dependability and resilience of the service delivered by power 
system infrastructures, and 3) present the preliminary directions investigated so far by the 
CRUTIAL consortium for describing and modelling interdependencies. 
The structure of the deliverable is as follows. Section 2 discusses the problems and 
challenges raised by interdependencies from the assessment and evaluation perspectives. 
Section 3 reviews existing model-based methodologies, techniques and tools that can be 
useful to address the challenges reported in Section 2, and summarizes related work and 
cooperative projects dealing with the modelling and evaluation of interdependent critical 
infrastructures in general, and power system infrastructures in particular. Preliminary 
directions about the approach followed in CRUTIAL for interdependencies modelling are 
discussed in Section 4. This section is organised into two subsections. The first 
subsection 4.1 presents qualitative models for describing the typical failures that are 
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characteristic of interdependent infrastructures, i.e., cascading, escalating and common-
cause failures. The infrastructure interdependencies are modelled globally without explicitly 
describing their component behaviours. The detailed modelling of the infrastructures taking 
into account their internal structure is discussed in subsection 4.2 where a preliminary 
hierarchical modelling framework is presented based on the architectural descriptions and 
scenarios presented in [Brasca et al. 2006, CESI RICERCA 2006b, Leuven 2006]. Finally, 
Section 5 of this deliverable presents the main conclusions and indications for future work. 
2 INTERDEPENDENCIES - BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES 
Interdependencies give rise to numerous challenges that need to be taken into account to 
build useful models that reflect the complex phenomena affecting the dependability and the 
resilience of the infrastructures under investigation. In this section, we review some of these 
challenges, starting with the definition of concepts and terminology related to 
interdependencies, based in particular on the seminal work presented in [Rinaldi et al. 2001]. 
For dependability concepts, the reader is referred to [Avizienis et al. 2004]. 
2.1 Interdependencies definitions and concepts 
Critical infrastructures are complex collections of interacting systems and components 
communicating through multiple heterogeneous networks. The interactions between these 
components and systems need to be analyzed carefully to understand and characterize the 
interdependencies. 
An interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which 
the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other. More 
generally, two infrastructures are interdependent if each is dependent on the other.  
Infrastructure interdependencies can be categorized according to various dimensions in 
order to facilitate their identification, understanding and analysis. Six dimensions have been 
identified in [Rinaldi et al. 2001] (see Figure 1). They include the type of interdependencies 
(physical, cyber, geographic, and logical), the infrastructure environment (technical, 
business, political, Legal, etc.), c) the couplings among the infrastructures and their effects 
on their response behaviour (loose or tight, inflexible or adaptive), and d) the infrastructure 
characteristics (organisational, operational, temporal, spatial), the state of operation (normal, 
stressed, emergency, repair), the degree to which the infrastructures are coupled, the type of 
failure affecting the infrastructures (common-cause, cascading, escalating). 
In the following, we briefly discuss the key factors covered by these different dimensions, 
focussing on the type of interdependencies, the infrastructures characteristics, the types of 
failures and threats, and finally the service modes and operation states. 
 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 3  
 
Figure 1: Interdependencies dimensions (source [Rinaldi 2004]) 
2.1.1 Types of interdependencies  
Four classes of interdependencies have been distinguished in [Rinaldi et al. 2001]: Physical, 
cyber, geographic, and logical. 
- Physical interdependencies arise from physical linkages or connections among 
elements of the infrastructures. In this context disruptions and perturbations in one 
infrastructure can propagate to other infrastructures. 
- Cyber interdependencies occur when the state of an infrastructure depends on 
information transmitted through the information infrastructure. Such 
interdependencies result from the increased use of computer-based information 
systems such as SCADA systems, to support control, monitoring and management 
activities  
- Geographic interdependencies exist between two infrastructures when a local 
environmental event can create state changes in both of them. This generally 
occurs when the elements of the infrastructures are in close spatial proximity.  
- Logical interdependencies gather all interdependencies that are not physical, cyber 
or geographic, caused for example by regulatory, legal or policy constraints. 
The four types of interdependencies are not mutually exclusive, although each of them has 
its own characteristics. Other classifications have also been proposed in the literature 
[Masera 2002, Lee et al. 2004, Pederson et al. 2006]. For example, the classification 
proposed in [Masera 2002] looks at both the involved systems and their potential 
interconnections that are characterized by two key factors: 
- the character of the link that identifies which elements of the systems are affected: 
physical, logical, human/organizational; 
- the layer of interaction: structural, functional, behavioural. 
This classification has been used in the paper as a basis for discussing the problem of 
interdependencies among systems and their impact on dependability assessment, taking as 
an example the interconnections between power and communication infrastructures. 
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2.1.2 Infrastructure characteristics   
In the analysis of interdependencies, several characteristics of the infrastructures under 
investigation need to be examined. These concern in particular the structural composition of 
the infrastructures and their temporal dynamics.  
The infrastructures are generally composed of a large number of interconnected systems 
and components with multiple interactions between them. Clearly, it is not recommended to 
examine the infrastructures at a high level of detail due to the complexity of these 
infrastructures. It is necessary to find the right level of detail and abstraction at which the 
interdependencies should be examined. The right level can be determined by the types of 
behaviours one would like to look at, the quantitative measures to be evaluated, and the 
information available to characterize the relevant phenomena that have the most significant 
impact on the dependability of the interdependent infrastructures, in particular with respect to 
the occurrence of cascading, escalating or common cause failures.   
The study of the temporal dynamics of the infrastructures might also be important for the 
analysis of interdependencies. Indeed, the activities supported by the infrastructures to 
accomplish the required services and to react to error conditions and failures can span a vast 
temporal range. Some phenomena may be pertinent to the analysis of interdependencies 
only if they occur and persist beyond a given period of time. For instance, some error 
propagation scenarios between infrastructures might occur only if the effects of some failures 
cannot be confined and recovered very quickly. Time scales have also implications on the 
modelling, especially when a large variation exists between the order of magnitudes of some 
parameters included in the models (see Section 2.2 for further discussion).  
2.1.3 Types of failures and threats 
Interdependencies increase the vulnerability of the corresponding infrastructures as they give 
rise to multiple error propagation channels from one infrastructure to another that make them 
more prone to exposure to accidental as well as to malicious threats. Consequently the 
impact of infrastructure components failures and their severity can be exacerbated and are 
generally much higher and more difficult to foresee, compared to failures confined to single 
infrastructures. As an example, most major power grid blackouts that have occurred in the 
past are initiated by a single event (or multiple related events such as an equipment failure of 
the power grid that is not properly handled by the SCADA system) that gradually leads to 
cascading outages and eventual collapse of the entire system [Pourbeik et al. 2006]. 
Three types of failures are of particular interest when analyzing interdependent 
infrastructures: 1) cascading failures, 2) escalating failures, and 3) common cause failures. 
- Cascading failures occur when a disruption in one infrastructure causes the failure 
of one or more component(s) in a second infrastructure. 
- Escalating failures occur when an existing failure in one infrastructure exacerbates 
an independent disruption in another infrastructure, increasing its severity or the 
time for recovery and restoration from this failure. 
- Common cause failures occur when two or more infrastructures are affected 
simultaneously because of some common cause. 
Besides analyzing the types of failures, it is important to understand the different causes that 
might lead to the occurrence of such failures. As discussed in [Avizienis et al. 2004], faults 
and their sources are very diverse. They can be classified according to different criteria: the 
phase of creation (development vs. operational faults), the system boundaries (internal vs. 
external faults), their phenomenological cause (natural vs. human-made faults), the 
dimension (hardware vs. software faults), the persistence (permanent vs. transient faults), 
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the objective of the developer or the humans interacting with the system (malicious vs. 
nonmalicious faults), their intent (deliberate vs. non-deliberate faults), or their capability 
(accidental vs. incompetence faults).  
Considering the case of electricity infrastructures, historically, attention has been mainly 
focussed on nonmalicious faults caused by physical (hardware) phenomena or by human-
made faults. However, the recent evolution of the electric energy architectures, due to the 
new economic and organizational models of national deregulated energy markets, with the 
migration from isolated power utility information systems towards inter and intra connected 
ICT systems, highlighted the need to focus attention as well on the cyber threats and 
malicious faults. Malicious faults (such as intrusions, Trojan horses, logic or timing bombs, 
viruses, worms or zombies) are generally introduced with the objective to alter the 
functioning of the system during use by: 1) disrupting or halting service, causing denials of 
service; 2) accessing confidential information; or 3) improperly modifying the system.  
Figure 2, including data from [Gao 2004, Schainker et al. 2006] and other sources, reports 
some incidents and attacks that affected electricity and other critical utilities during the last 
decade. It is noteworthy that a due to the high sensitivity of such data, a complete historical 
data base of these events is not publicly available (and probably it will never be in the future). 
Nevertheless, these examples show that the threat is real and it will be increasing due to 
market deregulation and the increased complexity and openness of the future ICT 
architectures for power infrastructures. This is confirmed also by the results of the study from 
the University of British Columbia reported in [Rahman & Besnosov 2006] concerning the 
identification of sources of failures and their propagation in critical infrastructures, based on 
public domain reports covering a 12 year period between 1994 and 2005. 
Actually, several working groups and initiatives dedicated to the analysis and assessment of 
security related vulnerabilities and threats in the context of power system infrastructures and 
the proposal of appropriate solutions to mitigate them have been created recently. A review 
of emerging standards addressing these issues is presented in [Dondossola et al. 2004]. 
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Year Reported successful cyber attacks 
1994 Salt River Project: A water facility in Arizona was breached by a cyber attack. The 
hacker trespassed in critical areas that could have caused significant damage. 
1997 A teenager remotely disabled part of the public switching network in Massachusetts, 
which shutdown telephone service to 600 customers. 
2000 A disgruntled employee of an Australian company used his laptop car computer to 
remotely hack into the controls of a sewage treatment system, which caused 264,000 
gallons of raw sewage to be released into public waterways of Australia over a period of 
two months. This caused marine life to die and creek water to turn black, producing an 
unbearable stench to nearby residents, among other impacts. 
2000 On October 13, the Control System of Ertan Hydro Station received unexpected 
signals, then they reduced generation 900MW within 7 seconds, almost causing 
Sichuan power system to collapse. 
2001 Hackers attacked the California Independent System Operator managing the electricity 
supply of California. The Los Angeles Times reported that the cyber hackers “got close” 
to disrupting power flow during the California rolling blackouts in May 2001. 
2001 October 1, many Fault Recorders dysfunctions were caused by a Timer Logical Bomb, 
this type of device had been installed on 146 sets in China 
2003 The SQL Slammer worm infected and disabled internal systems at a nuclear power 
plant in Ohio. Safety was never compromised, but a safety parameter display system 
and the plant process control computer were knocked off-line by the cyber worm for 
several hours. 
2003 On December 30, several viruses were found in the control systems of 3 HVDC convert 
stations (Longquan, Zhengping, Ercheng), which transfer total 6000 MW from Three 
Gorge to East and South of China 
2006 May   18/17/15 --Malware Infection Leaks Japanese Power Plant Data 
A malware infection has being blamed for the leak of sensitive Japanese power plant 
information onto the Internet. The information included key facility location and 
operation procedures for the Chubu Electric Power Company's thermal power plant in 
Owase, Mie Prefecture; some employee data were also compromised. A sub-
contractor's use of file sharing software is suspected to have caused the malware 
infection. 
Figure 2: Chronology of reported cyber attacks on electric and other utilities 
2.1.4 Service modes and operation states 
In order to analyse the dependability of interdependent infrastructures, it is necessary to 
understand how the different infrastructures depend on each other taking into account the 
different operation states of each infrastructure that are relevant to the analysis. An 
infrastructure generally features several performance levels and thus, several modes of 
service can be distinguished, ranging from full capacity to emergency situation. Actually, 
these modes of service depend on the workload and level of stress of the system, the 
different error and failure conditions that might occur and their severity, and the error 
recovery and restoration actions that can be applied to cope with these failures. 
Considering the case of power systems, several theories and models on power systems 
operating conditions have been published in the literature (see e.g., the summary provided in 
[Fink & Carlsen 1978, Amin 2005]). A power system is generally characterized as having 
multiple states or “modes”, during which specific operational and control actions are taking 
place. For example the model in Figure 3 proposed in [Fink & Carlsen 1978]1, distinguished 
five states: 1) Normal, 2) Alert, 3) Emergency, 4) In Extremis  and 5) Restorative. 
                                               
1
  This model is also used in WP1 for the description of control scenarios (See deliverable D2) 
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In the Normal state, all constraints are satisfied, indicating that the power generation is 
adequate to supply the existing total load demand, and that no equipment is being 
overloaded. In this state reserve margins (for power transmission as well as for power 
generation) are sufficient to provide an adequate level of power with respect to the level of 
stress to which the system may be subjected. If this level falls below some threshold, or if the 
probability of disturbance increases, then the system enters the Alert state. In this state, 
preventive actions can be taken to restore the system to the normal state. If a sufficiently 
severe disturbance takes place before such preventive actions can be applied, the system 
enters the Emergency state. In this state, emergency control actions could be initiated in 
order to restore the system to at least the Alert state. If these measures are not taken in time, 
or are ineffective, and if the initiating disturbance is severe enough to overstress the system, 
then system islanding might occur leading the system to the In Extremis State where major 
portions of the system load would be lost. In this state, load shedding and controlled 
islanding actions would be needed to prevent total system collapse. Once the collapse had 
been halted, the system could enter the Restorative state to restore all lost load and 
reconnect the system. Then, the system could move either to the Alert state or to the Normal 
state depending on circumstances. 
 
Normal
maximise conomy and minimise the effect of uncertain contingencies
Reduction in reserve margins and/or
Increased probability of disturbance
Emergency
Overloads 
Undervoltages
UnderfrequencyProtectionsSystem splitting
Load shedding
In Extremis
Partial or Total 
service interruption
Restorative
Resynchronisation, 
Load pick-up
Alert
Tradeoff of Preventive 
vs. Corrective control
Violation of inequality
constraints
 
Figure 3: Power system state model (source [Fink & Carlsen 1978]) 
 
This example illustrates the need to take into account the progressive degradation of the 
power systems capability to achieve the expected level of service due to the accumulation of 
failures, in the electricity infrastructure or the information and control infrastructure, and the 
ineffective application of restoration and control actions.  
2.2 Modelling objectives and challenges 
This section summarizes several challenges that need to be addressed when dealing with 
the modelling of interdependencies and the evaluation of their impact on the dependability of 
the studied infrastructures. These challenges are directly related to the critical issues 
identified in Section 2.1 and the multiple dimensions that need to be considered for analysing 
interdependencies.  
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There is a wide consensus that developing comprehensive modelling frameworks for 
understanding interdependencies among critical infrastructures and analysing their impact is 
a necessary step for building largely interconnected infrastructures on which a justified level 
of confidence can be placed with respect to their robustness to potential vulnerabilities and 
disruptions. Modelling can provide useful insights into of how components failures might 
propagate and lead to cascading, or escalating failures in interdependent infrastructures, and 
assess the impact of these failures on the service delivered to the users. 
Two complementary methods can be used: 
- Qualitative analysis methods aimed at the identification of failure scenarios, the analysis 
of their impact and their ranking according to severity and criticality criteria.  
- Quantitative evaluation methods based on stochastic processes aimed at quantifying the 
impact of failure and recovery scenarios on the behaviour of the infrastructures and the 
dependability and trustworthiness of the delivered service. Both analytical and simulation 
model-based techniques can be used. 
Model-based techniques are well suited to support the dependability analysis of systems 
taking into account various failure and recovery scenarios. In particular, the modelling and 
comparative analysis of alternative architectural solutions is useful to identify design 
bottlenecks and select the fault tolerance and maintenance strategies providing the best 
tradeoffs from the dependability point of view.  
There has been extensive work on the modelling of individual infrastructures and various 
methods and tools have been developed to predict the consequences of potential disruptions 
within an individual infrastructure. However, the modelling and evaluation of interdependent 
infrastructures is still at an exploratory stage. 
The modelling framework that will be explored during the project is aimed at addressing the 
multiple dimensions of interdependencies described in Section 2.1, taking into account in 
particular on: a) the three types of failures that are characteristic of interdependent 
infrastructures (cascading, escalating, and common-cause failures), b) various classes of 
faults that can occur, including accidental as well as malicious threats, c) the temporal and 
structural characteristics of the power and information  infrastructure investigated. This raises 
a number of challenging issues from the modelling point of view that are outlined in the 
following. 
Modelling interdependencies related failures. Although the modelling of cascading and 
escalating failures has received increasing interest in the last years after the large blackouts 
of electric power transmission systems in 1996 and 2003, this problem is still open and 
further developments are needed to model such failures and analyse how they contribute to 
blackouts. The analysis of such types of failures requires the use of models that are able to 
describe stochastic dependencies and to take into account non-stationary phenomena that 
result for example from the combined impact of component failures and performance 
degradations due to overloads. In this case, exponential distributions and Markov modelling 
may not be appropriate. Hence the need to explore non-Markovian models that are more 
suited to deal with non stationary phenomena. 
Addressing complexity and scalability. A major difficulty in the project lies in the 
complexity of the modelled infrastructures in terms of largeness, multiplicity of interactions 
and types of interdependencies involved. To address this problem, a number of abstractions 
and appropriate approaches for composition of models will be necessary. The aim is 
therefore to produce, from conceptual analyses, generic models that can be refined, 
instantiated and composed according to hierarchical modelling approaches. Resorting to a 
hierarchical approach brings benefits under several aspects, among which: i) facilitating the 
construction of models; ii) speeding up their solution; iii) favouring scalability; iv) mastering 
complexity by handling smaller models through hiding at one hierarchical level some 
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modelling details of the lower one. Important issues are how to abstract all the relevant 
information of one level to the upper one and how to compose the derived abstract models. 
Also, composition rules should be defined to build the models describing each level of the 
hierarchy from the integration of small generic building blocks describing the models 
components and their interactions. 
Integrated modelling of accidental and malicious threats. Another difficult issue that 
needs to be addressed when dealing with the resilience assessment of interdependent 
infrastructures concerns the evaluation of the impact of malicious threats. Traditionally, only 
accidental faults in software and hardware components have been taken into account in the 
evaluation of quantitative dependability measures. On the other hand the evaluation of 
security has been mainly based on qualitative evaluation criteria. Such criteria are widely 
recognized to be insufficient for analyzing and assessing the impact of malicious attacks and 
vulnerabilities on the security of systems in operation, or to support the design of intrusion-
tolerant systems. The definition of a quantitative evaluation approach based on probabilistic 
modelling is a promising research direction aimed at filling this gap. The ultimate objective 
that will be pursued during the project on this topic will be the definition of a comprehensive 
framework for the modelling and evaluation of resiliency taking into account malicious threats 
as well as accidental faults.  
Modelling of different time scales and phases. Another relevant issue that needs to be 
carefully addressed in the modelling concerns the description of scenarios that involve 
variables with different orders of magnitudes leading to the well known stiffness problem. 
Such a problem can be alleviated by the use of hierarchical modelling and aggregation 
techniques. Also, we need to address the problem of modelling interdependencies in a 
context where the studied infrastructures have different operation phases and regimes with 
different configurations and behaviours. Such changes might have a significant impact on the 
parameters describing the occurrence of failures and their propagation.  
Hybrid modelling of discrete and continuous variables. The characterization of 
interdependencies between infrastructures and the description of the system dynamics might 
lead to the need to combine into a single modelling framework continuous and discrete 
variables. This typically happens when we need to explicitly model the transitions between 
system operation states as a function of the time variation of some continuous variables that 
characterize the system dynamics (i.e., transition occurs when the values of some variables 
exceed some acceptable limits). The approach to this problem can be based on hybrid 
automata or fluid stochastic Petri nets. 
Combination of heterogeneous models and formalisms. An additional line of complexity 
will raise from the potential need of combining different formalisms to describe the various 
components of a system and their dependencies, as well as extension of existing formalisms 
to deal with peculiar features raising from our application context, such as the finite support 
of stochastic distribution necessary to deal with real-time aspects, the non determinism to 
describe and verify randomized distributed protocols that could be used in future 
architectures, and interval mathematics to deal with only partially defined system parameters. 
3 STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
This section reviews existing modelling approaches, techniques and tools that can be useful 
to address the challenges reported in Section 2, and summarizes related work and 
cooperative projects dealing with the modelling and evaluation of interdependent critical 
infrastructures in general, and power system infrastructures, in particular.  
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 10  
3.1 Model-based evaluation methodologies and tools 
Dependability evaluation based on analytical modelling requires the description of the failure 
and repair behaviour of system components taking into account various interactions between 
them. The complexity of the models depends on the dependability measures to be evaluated, 
the modelling level of detail, and the stochastic dependencies among the components.  
Section 3.1.1 presents the model types used for the analysis of stochastic systems. Some 
examples of modelling approaches that have been developed during the past 15 years to 
master the largeness of state-space models, based in particular on stochastic Petri nets and 
their extensions, are reviewed in Section 3.1.2. Section 3.1.3 gives an overview on the 
available tools that can support the dependability evaluation activity, focusing in particular on 
the multi-formalism/multi-solution tools. As described in Section 2.2, the quantitative 
evaluation activity inside CRUTIAL involves several challenges strictly related to the system 
characteristics, like: a) the need to cope with the complexity of the target infrastructures 
(scalability problem), b) the need to address continuous and discrete phenomena (that leads 
to the definition of heterogeneous models) and c) the presence of accidental and malicious 
threats. A survey of the existing literature dealing with such types of issues is addressed in 
the last part of the Section. In particular, Section 3.1.4. outlines some of the traditional and 
emerging approaches focussing on the analysis of the dependability and vulnerability of 
interconnected systems described as a graph, using network models. Section 3.1.5 deals 
with the existing heterogeneous modelling approaches, and finally Section 3.1.6 discusses 
the available modelling and evaluation techniques with respect to malicious threats. 
3.1.1 Model types 
Model types used in the analysis of stochastic systems can be divided in three broad 
categories:  
1) combinatorial models,  
2) models with conditional local dependencies (belief networks)  
3) and state-space based models. 
In the sequel, we provide a short overview of the modelling formalisms and techniques 
corresponding to these categories and combined models of different categories.  
3.1.1.1 Combinatorial models 
Combinatorial models like reliability block diagrams, fault trees and reliability graphs are easy 
to use and allow for concise system description and inexpensive solution methods. However, 
a major drawback of these techniques is that they rely on the assumption of independence 
among components failures and repairs. Such assumption is not always reasonable as 
different kinds of dependencies can arise in dependability modelling of complex systems 
[Kanoun & Borrel 2000]: functional, structural, related to the fault tolerance strategies, the 
maintenance policies, the system mission phase, or the correlation between the system 
failure behaviour and its workload and performance characteristics.  
Among combinatorial models, fault trees have become very popular in the dependability 
analysis of large safety-critical systems. The goal of fault trees is to represent the 
combination of elementary causes that lead to the occurrence of an undesired catastrophic 
event (the top event). The main restrictive assumptions in fault trees are: i) components are 
modelled as binary objects (up and down); ii) components are statistically independent; iii) 
interactions are described by means of boolean AND/OR gates (even if extensions of the 
formalism to NOT and related gates are available). 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 11  
In order to improve the fault trees modelling power, several extensions to the fault trees 
formalism were proposed in the literature; we mention Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) [Bechta-
Dugan et al. 1992], Parametric Fault Trees (PFT) [Bobbio et al. 2003] and Repairable Fault 
Trees (RFT) [Codetta Raiteri et al. 2004]. In DFT, the addition of dynamic gates allows the 
modelling of dependencies between the events and the component states. In PFT, 
redundancies and symmetries in the system can be modelled in a compact (parametric) way. 
In RFT the use of a modelling primitive called repair box is aimed at the modelling of repair 
processes. In each case, the addition of new modelling primitives requires the study of new 
solution methods. In particular, DFT and RFT need the state space based solution instead of 
the BDD (Binary Decision Diagrams) based combinatorial solution applied to fault trees and 
PFT. 
In [Bobbio & Codetta Raiteri 2004], DFT, PFT and RFT formalisms have been integrated in a 
unique formalism: DRPFT. The analysis of DRPFT models consists of the use of both the 
combinatorial solution and the state space based analysis and a software framework for the 
quantitative analysis of DRPFT has been set up. The quantitative analysis of DRPFT 
typically requires to locate minimal modules of non-independent subtrees of the fault tree and 
to expand the minimal modules into their state space.  
The modelling possibilities offered by fault trees can be extended by relying on Bayesian 
Networks (BN) [Bobbio et al. 2001]. With BN, some constraints that are typical of fault trees 
can be relaxed, such as the hypothesis that elementary events are always modelled as 
binary objects (working/failed), are probabilistically independent, and interact just through 
Boolean AND/OR connections. In [Bobbio et al. 2001], it has been shown how fault trees can 
be directly mapped into BN, and that the basic inference techniques on the latter may be 
used to obtain classical parameters computed from the former. In addition, local 
dependencies can be represented and both predictive and diagnostic reasoning can be 
performed. In [Montani et al. 2005] it is shown how BNs can provide a unified framework in 
which also DFT can be represented.    
3.1.1.2 Belief networks 
Belief Networks (or Bayesian Networks - BN) have become a widely used formalism for 
representing uncertain knowledge in probabilistic systems and have been applied to a variety 
of real-world problems [Heckermann et al. 1995]. The main feature of BN is that it is possible 
to include local conditional dependencies, by directly specifying the causes that influence a 
given effect. BN are defined by a directed acyclic graph in which discrete random variables 
are assigned to each node, together with the conditional dependence on the parent nodes. 
Root nodes are nodes with no parents, and marginal prior probabilities are assigned to them. 
The quantitative analysis of a BN may proceed along two lines. A forward (or predictive) 
analysis, in which the probability of occurrence of any node of the network is calculated on 
the basis of the prior probabilities of the root nodes and the conditional dependence of each 
node. A more standard backward (diagnostic) analysis that concerns the computation of the 
posterior probability of any given set of variables given some observation (the evidence) 
represented as instantiation of some of the variables to one of their admissible values. The 
inclusion of local dependencies in a BN may avoid a complete state-space description, 
making the formalism an appealing candidate for dependability modelling and analysis of 
stochastic systems. 
3.1.1.3 State-space approaches 
State-space approaches rely on the enumeration of the set of meaningful states of the 
system and on the specification of the possible transitions among them. In principle, since 
each system state encodes a complete description of the state of each component, the 
stochastic behaviour of each component may depend on the state of all the other 
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components. This extreme flexibility is very seldom exploited in practice since it is very rare 
to encounter applications in which each component changes its stochastic behaviour 
according to the state of all the other components. Hence, the state space description 
appears in some cases overspecified with respect to the real modelling needs. Moreover, in 
order to make state-space approaches analytically feasible, the dynamic behaviour of the 
system over its state space must be mapped into a suitable stochastic process. If all the 
transition times are exponentially distributed the system behaviour in time is mapped into a 
continuous time homogeneous Markov chain.  
The main disadvantage of the state space approaches is the well-known state explosion 
problem, due to the circumstance that the dimension of the state space grows exponentially 
with the number of parts. Moreover, the direct specification of the infinitesimal generator of 
the underlying process may be unfeasible due to its huge size, and some intermediate 
(higher level) specification languages must be appointed for the scope. Higher-level 
formalisms such as Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) and their extensions have been widely 
recognized as an effective means to facilitate the specification and generation of state-space 
models, since they: a) allow a compact representation of the behavior of systems involving 
synchronization, concurrency and conflict phenomena, b) provide some structural verification 
of the model, and c) can be automatically converted into continuous time Markov chains 
[Ajmone Marsan et al. 1995]. Such characteristics are actually shared by the more general 
class of SPNs including GSPNs, ESPNs, Stochastic Reward nets, Stochastic Activity 
Networks, and stochastic well formed nets. 
Significant progress has been obtained during the last 15 years for addressing the state 
explosion problem at the model construction and model solution levels. Examples of 
modelling approaches aimed at addressing this problem are presented in Section 3.1.2. 
3.1.2 Modelling approaches for mastering complex state-space models 
There are two general approaches for dealing with the state explosion problem: largeness 
avoidance and largeness tolerance [Nicol et al. 2004]. Largeness avoidance techniques try to 
circumvent the generation of large models using for example, state truncation methods 
[Muppala et al. 1992, Chen et al. 2002], state lumping techniques [Kemeny & Snell 1959, 
Buchholz 1994, Obal 1998, Derisavi et al. 2003], hierarchical model solution methods 
[Buchholz 1995c, Lanus et al. 2003], model decomposition and approximate solution 
techniques [Courtois 1977, Bobbio & Trivedi 1986, Buchholz 1995c, Lanus et al. 2003, Daly 
et al. 2004], etc. 
However, these techniques may not be sufficient as the resulting model may still be large. 
Thus, largeness tolerance techniques are needed to provide practical modelling support to 
facilitate the generation of large state-space models through the use of structured model 
composition approaches. The basic idea is to build the system model from the composition of 
submodels describing system components and their interactions. Generic rules are defined 
for the elaboration of the submodels and their interconnection. Usually, higher-level 
modelling formalisms such as SPNs and their extensions, are used to support these 
approaches and generate automatically the Markov chain.  
It is worth noting that the two categories of techniques (largeness avoidance and largeness 
tolerance) are complementary and, most of the time, both of them are used when detailed 
and large dependability models need to be generated and processed, putting more emphasis 
on one or the other. For example, even though largeness avoidance, in the sense that the 
whole system model is not generated and processing is performed on the sub-models, is not 
the prime concern of largeness tolerance techniques, state-space reduction constitutes a real 
concern. Generally, in most of the largeness tolerance techniques, rules for model 
generation are also defined in such a way that they generate the less superfluous states by 
construction. On the other hand, largeness avoidance relying for instance on the truncation 
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of the least important states (i.e., states with very small probabilities) can be used to 
complement efficiently largeness tolerance techniques as in [Muppala et al. 1992]. As other 
examples of work combining largeness avoidance and largeness tolerance techniques, we 
can mention [Haddad & Moreaux 1995, Haddad & Moreaux 1996, Delamare et al. 2003] 
which combine sub-model  state lumping and Kronecker based continuous time Markov 
chain representation and solution for models obtained by synchronous or asynchronous 
composition of (lumpable) submodels (see Section 3.1.2.3). 
In the following, we present a survey of modelling approaches based on largeness tolerance 
and largeness avoidance techniques that can be profitably used in CRUTIAL. Section 3.1.2.1 
focuses on compositional approaches based in particular on stochastic Petri nets and their 
extensions. An overview of the existing works generating stochastic models from High-level 
design descriptions is presented in Section 3.1.2.2. Section 3.1.2.3 outlines related work 
dealing with largeness avoidance techniques based on decomposition/aggregation 
approaches. Finally, Section 3.1.2.4 presents some efficient techniques that can be used to 
cope with large models at the solution level.  
3.1.2.1 Compositional modelling approaches 
Several model composition techniques have been developed to support the systematic 
construction and validation of state-based models characterizing the dependability of large 
systems involving multiple interactions and dependencies between their components. In 
addition, model composition is very helpful in supporting models reuse. A brief overview is 
presented in the sequel. 
Research on process algebra [Milner 1989] has inspired efforts to introduce compositionality 
into Petri nets. Composition of Petri Net consists in constructing PN models from a set of 
building blocks by applying suitable operators of places and/or transition superposition. An 
example is the Box-calculus approach presented in [Best et al. 1992] where composition 
operators for un-timed Petri Nets are defined, like operators for synchronous/asynchronous 
communication. Compositionality approaches have been also investigated for stochastic 
extensions of Petri nets. For example, [Buchholz 1995a] explored composition in the context 
of SPNs. The work presented in [Donatelli & Franceschinis 1996] proposes a systematic 
approach to the construction of parallel hardware-software models through the definition of 
three Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) model levels (the process level, the service 
level and the resource level) and of composition rules to combine them into a complete 
integrated GSPN model of the whole system. The GSPN composition rules are  based on the 
concept of matching labels, that is transitions and places of a GSPN are labelled and pairs of 
transitions (or places) with matching labels, each one belonging to a different operand, i.e., 
GSPN component, are superposed. 
[Rojas 1996, Ballarini et al. 2000] defined a complete set of composition operators for the 
generation of Stochastic Well-formed Nets (SWN) of a system, (i.e., GSPNs permitting the 
identification of symmetry by means of a symmetric reachability graph) from the SWN of its 
components. These operators preserve the functional structure of the model and support 
several types of communications between components. This approach is intended to support 
the modelling of distributed and parallel systems where both synchronous and asynchronous 
communications are required. However, it addresses only a class of systems that can be 
modelled by SWN. 
Compositional modelling is also used in the context of Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN). In 
[Meyer & Sanders 1993], two composition operators are defined (join and replicate) to 
compose system models based on SANs. The Join operator takes as input a) a set of sub-
models and b) some shared places belonging to different sub-models of the set, and 
provides as output a new model that comprehends all the joined sub-models elements 
(places, arcs, activities) but with the shared places merged in a unique one. The Replicate 
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operator combines multiple identical copies of a sub-model, which are called replicates. 
[Obal 1998] introduces a graph composition approach that extends the replicate/join 
formalism and also combines models by sharing a portion of the state of each sub-model, 
reducing the total state-space size. Contrarily to the replicate/join formalism that requires the 
use of a special operation, the graph composition detects all the symmetries exposed at the 
composition level and uses them to reduce the underlying state space.  
The composition techniques discussed above are very helpful to cope with the models 
complexity, in particular when the models exhibit symmetries. However, they are not 
sufficient in particular when the modelled systems exhibit various dependencies that need to 
be explicitly described in the dependability models. These dependencies may result from 
functional or structural interactions between the components or from interactions due to 
global system fault-tolerance, reconfiguration and maintenance strategies. Various modelling 
approaches have been proposed to facilitate the construction of large dependability models 
taking into account such dependencies. Examples of such modelling approaches are briefly 
discussed in the sequel. 
The block modelling approach defined in [Kanoun & Borrel 2000] provides a generic 
framework for the dependability modelling of hardware and software fault-tolerant systems 
based on GSPNs. The proposed approach is modular: generic GSPN submodels are defined 
to describe the behaviour of the system components and of the interactions between them. 
The system model is obtained by composition of these GSPNs. The GSPNs of the 
components and interactions are called block nets. Composition rules are defined and 
formalised through the identification of the interfaces between the component and interaction 
block nets. In addition to modularity, the formalism brings flexibility and re-usability thereby 
allowing for easy sensitivity analysis with respect to the assumptions that could be made 
about the behaviour of the components and the resulting interactions. The main advantage of 
this modelling approach lies in its efficiency for modelling several alternatives for the same 
system as illustrated for example in [Kanoun et al. 1999].  
The efficiency of the block modelling approach can be further improved by using an 
incremental and iterative approach for the construction and validation of the models as 
suggested in [Fota et al. 1999]. At the initial iteration, the behaviour of the system is 
described taking into account the failures and recovery actions of only one selected 
component, assuming that the others are in an operational nominal state. Dependencies 
between components are taken into account progressively at the following iterations of the 
modelling process. At each iteration, a new component is added and the GSPN model is 
updated by taking into account the impact of the additional assumptions on the behaviour of 
the components that have been already included in the model. Similarly to the block 
modelling approach, sub-models are defined for describing the components behaviours and 
specific rules and guidelines are defined for interconnecting the submodels taking into 
account their interactions.  
An iterative dependability modelling approach has been also proposed in [Betous-Almeida & 
Kanoun 2004a] where the construction and validation of the GSPN dependability model is 
carried out progressively following the system development refinement process, to facilitate 
the integration of dependability modelling activities in the system engineering process. Three 
main steps are distinguished. The first step is dedicated to the construction of a functional-
level model describing the system functions, their states and their interdependencies. In the 
second step, the functional level model is transformed into a high-level dependability model 
based on the knowledge of the system’s structure. A model is generated for each pre-
selected candidate architecture. The third step is dedicated to the refinement of the high-
level dependability model into a detailed dependability model for each selected architecture. 
Formal rules are defined to make the successive model transformations and refinements as 
easy and systematic as possible taking into account three complementary aspects: i) 
component decomposition, ii) state/event fine-tuning, and iii) stochastic distribution 
adjustments. This approach allows the integration of various dependencies at the right level 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 15  
of abstraction: functional dependency, structural dependency and those induced by non-
exponential distributions. A case study is described in [Betous-Almeida & Kanoun 2004b]. 
Actually, the approach presented in [Betous-Almeida & Kanoun 2004a] can be seen as a 
special case of the more general class of techniques based on layered and multi-level 
modelling methods, where the modelled system is structured into different levels 
corresponding to different abstraction layers, with a model associated to each level. Various 
modelling approaches based on this idea have been proposed in the literature, see e.g., 
[Donatelli & Franceschinis 1996, Bondavalli et al. 2001, Bernardi 2003, Bernardi & Donatelli 
2003, Kaâniche et al. 2003, Rabah & Kanoun 2003, Lollini et al. 2005]. For example, the 
multilevel modelling approach proposed in [Kaâniche et al. 2003] for evaluating the user 
perceived availability of web-based applications distinguishes four abstraction levels, namely, 
user, function, service and resource levels. The highest level (user level) describes the 
availability of the application as perceived by the users. Intermediate levels describe the 
availability of functions and services provided to the users. The lowest level (resource level) 
describes the availability of the component systems on which functions and services are 
implemented. Another example is the PSR layered approach originally presented in 
[Donatelli & Franceschinis 1996] and then extended to dependability aspects in [Bernardi 
2003, Bernardi & Donatelli 2003] which structures the system into three levels: 1) resources, 
2) services, and 3) processes. Resources are at the bottom level and they provide operations 
for the services, where a service is basically a complex pattern of use of the resources. 
Services are then requested by the application model placed at the highest level, called 
process level. This approach has been used in the context of the DepAUDE project for 
modelling the dependability of automation systems. 
Generally, layered and multilevel modelling approaches rely on the hierarchical composition 
and solution of the submodels corresponding to the different abstraction levels. Different 
modelling techniques can be used to describe the submodels and to combine their results  
(combinatorial models, state-based models). The selection of the right technique mainly 
depends on the kind of dependencies between the elements of the corresponding submodels 
and on the quantitative measures to be evaluated. It is noteworthy that hierarchical modelling 
approaches combining different types of models are supported automatic tools, e.g., 
SHARPE modelling tool [Sahner & Trivedi 1987][Sahner et al. 1996] (see Section 3.1.3 for 
an overview of modelling tools). These approaches belong to the more general class of 
model decomposition and aggregation approaches presented in Section 3.1.2.2. Some 
application examples of hierarchical modelling and solution are also presented in this 
section. 
3.1.2.2 Overview of decomposition/aggregation modelling approaches 
In this Section we focus the attention on the decomposition/aggregation modelling 
approaches, that is a type of largeness avoidance technique that tries to circumvent the 
generation of large models using model decomposition and aggregation of the partial results. 
The basic idea is the following: the overall model is decoupled in simpler and more tractable 
sub-models, and the measures obtained from the solution of the sub-models are then 
aggregated to compute those concerning the overall model.  
Among the existing works adopting a decomposition/aggregation approach, in the following 
we select some of them focusing on those that could be more profitably applied to deal with 
CRUTIAL challenges like largeness, multiplicity of interactions and types of 
interdependencies involved, models stiffness, the need to describe multiple phases with 
different characteristics, including some works proposed by CRUTIAL partners. 
The proposed decomposition and aggregation techniques depend on the type of measures 
to be evaluated (steady-state or transient) and the modelling formalism. Generally 
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approximate solutions are provided for the composition of the results derived from the 
submodels.  
A decomposition and aggregation theory  for steady state analysis of general continuous 
time Markov Chains has been proposed in [Courtois 1977]. The quality of the approximation 
is related to the degree of coupling among the blocks into which the Markov chain matrix is 
decomposed. In [Bobbio & Trivedi 1986] the authors present an extension of this technique 
specifically addressed to the transient analysis of large stiff Markov chains, where stiffness is 
caused by the simultaneous presence of “fast” and “slow” rates in the transition rate matrix. 
The set of all states is classified into fast and slow states, and an algorithm proceeds by 
further classifying fast states into fast recurrent subsets and a fast transient subset. The fast 
subsets are separately analyzed, and each fast recurrent subset is replaced by a single slow 
state while the fast transient subset is replaced by a probabilistic switch. The resulting 
Markov chain is small and non-stiff, and then it can be solved using standard techniques. 
The results produced by the algorithm are asymptotically exact with respect to the 
aggregation of fast transient states, while the asymptotic accuracy for fast recurrent subsets 
depends on the degree of coupling between the fast subset and the remaining states.  
The key idea of time-scale based decomposition has been applied to Non-Markovian 
stochastic systems as in [Haddad & Moreaux 2004], and also to GSPN models of systems 
containing activities whose durations differ by several orders of magnitude. For example, In 
[Ammar & Rezaul Islam 1989] the given GSPN model is decomposed into a hierarchical 
sequence of aggregated sub-nets each of which is characterized by a certain time scale. 
Then these smaller sub-nets are solved in isolation, and their solutions are combined to get 
the solution of the whole system. The aggregation at each level is done by assuming that the 
transitions included in the lower level are immediate transitions. At each level of the 
hierarchy, the current marking of an aggregated sub-net determines the number of tokens in 
the sub-net at the lower level, which are then analyzed to determine the rate of transitions in 
the aggregated sub-net. 
Another interesting extension of the decomposability theory presented in [Courtois 1977] is 
the decomposition approach for the solution of large stochastic reward net models proposed 
in [Ciardo & Trivedi 1993]. In this work the overall model consists of a set of submodels 
whose interactions are described by an import graph; each node of the graph corresponds to 
a parameterized stochastic reward net submodel and an arc from submodel A to submodel B 
corresponds to a parameter value that B must receive from A. The authors show that the 
probability that a subnet is in a state satisfying a given condition, the average time a given 
condition remains satisfied, and the expected time until the subnet satisfies a given condition 
are three quantities that suffice for intercommunication among subnets for the net structure 
types that they define. 
The decomposition approach proposed by [Daly 2001, Daly & Sanders 2001] is based on a 
new set of connection formalisms that reduce state-space size and solution time by 
identifying submodels that are not affected by the rest of a model, and solving them 
separately. The result from each solved submodel is then used in the solution of the rest of 
the model. The authors develop four abstractions that can be used to make connection 
models, and they involve passing a continuous-time random process, a discrete-time random 
process, a random variable, and an average value between the models. When these 
abstractions are applied, each submodel should have a smaller state space and fewer time 
scales than the complete model. 
Decomposition approaches are also relevant for the modelling of multiphased systems. In 
CRUTIAL, the studied infrastructures have different operation phases and regimes with 
different configurations and behaviours, and such changes might have a significant impact 
on the parameters describing the occurrence of failures and their propagation within an 
infrastructure or between different infrastructures (interdependencies). Therefore, one 
research direction will be to investigate the use of stochastic models for multi-phased 
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systems. In the literature, several approaches have been proposed for the analytical 
dependability modelling of Phased Mission Systems (PMS), all based on a hierarchical 
structure of the models. PMS are characterized by a sequence of phases in which the 
system configuration can change during operations. The existence of phases is a 
consequence of: i) diverse tasks to be performed, and ii) diverse environmental conditions, in 
different periods of system lifetime.  
In [Bondavalli et al. 1999b, Mura et al. 1999], the model of a PMS is seen as composed of 
two logically separate Petri nets: the System Net (SN), representing the system (its 
components, their interactions and their failure/repair behaviour) as a GSPN, and the Phase 
Net (PhN), a deterministic and Stochastic Petri Net - DSPN, representing the control part and 
describing the phase changes. In the SN, a single model is built for the whole mission, 
characterized by a set of phases without detailing the behaviour of the system inside each 
phase. This allows easy modelling of a variety of mission scenarios by sequencing the 
phases in appropriate ways. The parameter values to be used in the SN model are obtained 
by solving the PhN models. This approach has been generalized in [Mura & Bondavalli 2001] 
in which the authors proposed a new methodology based on a Markov Regenerative 
Stochastic Petri Nets (MRSPN) approach. The key point is that the state space of the Markov 
regenerative process is never generated and handled as a whole, but rather the various 
subordinate intra-phase processes are separately generated and solved. As a consequence, 
the computational complexity of the analytical solution is reduced to the one needed for the 
separate solution of the different phases, as demonstrated in [Bondavalli & Filippini 2004]. 
In [Lollini 2005] it is proposed a decomposition/aggregation approach that operates at the 
system-level, rather than the model level. Using this approach, “entities” (or sub-systems) are 
created that can work in isolation or can interact with each other through a set of 
“dependency relations”. The relations state how the behaviour of each entity affects the 
others. The structure, together with the notion of a phased mission, allows one to solve each 
submodel in isolation, and then pass results between submodels as needed. Such 
formulation can be applied to many models, and reduces the complexity of solving models 
that can be expressed in this framework. This generic decomposition/aggregation approach 
has been applied to study a GPRS mobile telephone infrastructure that takes into account 
the congestion that can occur following service outages and the subsequent impact of this 
congestion on user-perceived quality of service. 
The approach introduced in [Balakrishnan & Trivedi 1995] is aimed at solving reliability 
models for systems with repairable components. A submodel is built for each component, 
and the reliability of the whole system is derived from the sub-model solutions. The sub-
model for a given component must contain system-state information to ensure that the repair 
process is active only for the system up states. A natural construction procedure is to identify 
if the component in question is up or down, and to augment the sub-model with the system 
up/down information. This leads to a four-state sub-model having two absorbing states. Each 
sub-model state is an aggregate of system states. Three examples illustrating this approach 
have been presented, including n-Component parallel redundant systems and n-component 
systems with general structure.   
The technique presented in [Woodside et al. 1995] has been developed for the modelling of 
synchronous distributed software using Stochastic Rendezvous Networks (SRNs). SRNs 
consist of tasks that take a random amount of time and may require the services of other 
tasks in order to complete. In [Woodside et al. 1995], a logical decomposition modelling 
approach has been presented for SRNs: each task is modelled separately, with the 
dependencies between tasks specified, and the tasks communicate by messages in a 
request-wait-reply sequence (which models a ‘rendezvous’). Queueing and synchronization 
involving inter-task messages are implicit in the SRN framework, so a given model can be 
stated much more compactly with respect to Petri nets.  
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A modular and hierarchical decomposition modelling approach applied to a railway 
interlocking system has been defined in [Nelli et al. 1996, Bondavalli et al. 2001]. The system 
is modelled at the various levels of the hierarchy, and each layer has been structured for 
producing some results while hiding implementation details and internal characteristics. Then 
the output values from one layer are used as parameters of the next higher layer, and the 
different layers can be modelled using different tools and methodologies. 
Finally, in [Lollini et al. 2005], a dependability analysis for a class of hierarchical control 
systems has been carried out. The functionalities of the whole system are partitioned among 
a number of subsystems working at different levels of a hierarchy, and the dependability of 
the whole system is enhanced considering, at each level, both internal checks and interface 
checks. A proper modelling methodology based on a decomposition approach has been 
defined, able to reduce the system complexity. They first decompose a model starting from 
its functional specification and applying a stepwise refinement to decompose it in small sub-
models. Then, modular model solution is carried out in a bottom-up fashion.  
3.1.2.3 Derivation of dependability models from high-level specifications 
Besides the modelling approaches presented in the previous sections that are aimed at 
mastering the complexity of dependability models at the state level or at higher-level model 
representations such as at the GSPN level, further improvements can be obtained by 
generating the dependability models from the transformation of design descriptions enriched 
with dependability related information. The literature presents several approaches to 
generating performance and dependability models from UML designs and in [Balsamo et al. 
2004] a survey of the main contributions is presented. Some examples of contributions from 
CRUTIAL partners are briefly presented in the following. 
The work presented in [Bernardi et al. 2002] proposes a method that generates a GSPN 
model from a UML performance annotated design. The UML specification includes state 
machines (SMs) and sequence diagrams (SDs). The proposed approach exploits GSPNs’ 
compositional features, to master complexity in both defining and implementing the 
generation process, which consists of three main steps. First, the approach involves 
translating SMs separately into GSPN models characterized by labelled places and 
transitions. Labelled places represent mailboxes associated with event types, whereas 
labelled transitions can represent event generation or event consumption. The second step 
translates the SD into a GSPN model with labelled transitions, capturing the causal relations 
between the represented scenario’s events as well as the message transmission delays. The 
last step presents two choices: 1) compose the SM GSPN models over labelled places to 
produce the performance model of the system, SysModel; 2) compose SysModel with the SD 
GSPN model, over labelled SD transitions, to obtain a performance model for a system 
scenario, ScenarioModel. During the translation steps, the performance annotations 
specified in the UML diagrams are used to define the GSPN model’s input parameters.  
Although the approach proposed in [Bernardi et al. 2002] is not focused on dependability 
analysis, it has been used for the QoS assessment of fault tolerance strategies of software 
systems (see [Bernardi & Merseguer 2006], for example), characterized by both performance 
and dependability requirements. 
Other approaches are instead specifically aimed at the dependability assessment of software 
systems such as [Bondavalli et al. 1999a, Bernardi & Donatelli 2003, Majzik et al. 2003, 
Cortelessa & Pompei 2004]. In [Bondavalli et al. 1999a, Majzik et al. 2003] UML extension 
mechanisms are proposed for annotating dependability properties of software systems on 
UML design models. From the annotated models, Petri Net models can be derived to use in 
the quantitative system evaluation. The nonfunctional properties considered are the reliability 
and the availability. Dependability parameters, that can be both input parameters or 
measured to be derived, can be used to characterize the timing occurrence of faults, the 
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possible error latency for components with an internal state, and the timing of the repair 
process. Error propagation between components is specified by assigning a probability to the 
model elements representing either relations or interactions between such components (such 
as association between software components, communication path between nodes and 
exchanged messages). While dependability parameters can be used to specify component 
failures due to independent fault occurrences, common failure modes can be specified only 
for redundant components belonging to complex fault tolerance structures. Extensions for 
states and events of state machines representing the behaviour of redundancy manager 
components are introduced in order to discriminate normal and failure states and events. 
Such extensions are used to analyze different failure modes of the fault tolerance structures. 
In [Cortelessa & Pompei 2004] a UML annotation for the reliability analysis of component 
based systems is defined. The work is aimed at including the annotation approach presented 
in [Cortelessa et al. 2002], where Bayesian models are derived from UML annotated models 
(Sequence, Communication, Deployment and Use Case diagrams) to compute the system 
failure probability, within the frameworks of the standard UML profiles. 
Finally, the work [Bernardi & Donatelli 2003] considers the problem of building Petri net 
based evaluation scenarios for dependable automation systems and proposes a modelling 
process in which as much information as possible is extracted from a high level description of 
system entities, their relations and its fault tolerance strategies using UML Class diagrams. 
This preliminary description, which is available at the early stages of the application 
development, is then completed with operational specifications of system behaviour. The 
class of nets of reference is that of GSPNs, and their coloured extension Stochastic Well 
Formed Nets (SWN), so that the system under study can be both validated and evaluated. 
Further proposals on extending UML to support dependability analysis of software systems 
can be found in the recent work [Bernardi & Merseguer 2007], where an extensive review of 
the literature has been made. Modelling approaches considering other design languages 
such as AADL are also investigated, see e.g., [Rugina et al. 2006]. 
3.1.2.4 Mastering complexity at the solution level 
In addition to the modelling approaches outlined in the previous subsections, and the solution 
techniques presented in the context of decomposition and aggregation modelling 
approaches, space and time efficient algorithms have been developed to reduce the storage 
requirements of the state space and the generator matrix and to optimize the state space 
exploration, generation and analysis. These model solutions algorithms are generally used in 
combination with the modelling techniques aimed at mastering complexity at the model 
construction level. Many of the recent algorithms that have achieved notable success use 
symbolic data structures like binary or multi-valued decision diagram data structures, matrix 
diagrams or Kronecker representations (see e.g., [Ciardo & Miner 1999, Buchholz et al. 
2000, Miner & Parker 2004]). 
With Kronecker algebra it is possible to develop efficient solution techniques for continuous 
time Markov chains that compute the steady state distribution without generating and storing 
the corresponding infinitesimal generator, Q, explicitly. The idea is to represent Q as a sum 
of Kronecker products of smaller matrices resulting from a high-level model structured into 
submodels. The method has been applied to several high-level formalisms where models are 
described in a compositional way ([Plateau 1985, Donatelli 1993, Donatelli 1994, Kemper 
1996, Scarpa & Bobbio 1998]). In [Haddad & Moreaux 1995, Haddad & Moreaux 1996] and 
[Delamare et al. 2003] the decision diagram and Kronecker representations are combined 
with lumping techniques (for Stochastic Well Formed Nets) for improved efficiency. The 
method can be applied to a subclass of SWN which covers a relevant number of 
applications. It is noteworthy that with Kronecker representation one can describe not only 
large Markov chains but also transition systems [Bobbio & Horváth 2001] and discretization 
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schemes for a set of differential equations describing fluid stochastic Petri nets [Gribaudo & 
Horváth 2002]. 
Since with Kronecker representation, one looks for the solution without explicitly storing the 
infinitesimal generator, solution methods exploiting a Kronecker structure are iterative. The 
basic operation either for steady-state or transient analysis is vector-matrix multiplication. 
There are different ways to carry out this basic operation on a Kronecker structure. A family 
of solution techniques together with references to others can be found in [Buchholz et al. 
2000]. 
Besides providing efficient means for representing the infinitesimal generator of large Markov 
chains, we need also to address the problem of storing the vector of the solution itself. To 
overcome this problem, a technique is suggested in [Horváth 2005] which, starting from the 
Kronecker description, first performs Gaussian elimination of a set of states (resulting in an 
infinitesimal generator whose explicit storage is not necessary) and then performs an 
iterative algorithm. 
In addition to Kronecker algebra, other techniques can be investigated in the context of 
CRUTIAL to optimise the solution of complex stochastic models, for example the Flow 
Equivalent Server (FES) approach and product-form solutions for stochastic Petri nets. The 
FES approach, also called flow equivalent aggregation, was first introduced in [Chandy et al. 
1975] for the analysis of queueing networks. The basic idea is to substitute a submodel by a 
single server that preserves the behaviour of the submodel from some point of view. For this 
purpose, the submodel is analysed in isolation by taking it off the system, “shorting” its 
input/output interfaces, (thus making the submodel closed, according to the terminology of 
the BCMP theorem [Baskett et al. 1975]) and varying the number of costumers in the 
submodel up to the maximum allowed by the whole system. The throughput computed along 
the short-circuit path for the different subsystem populations is used as the load dependent 
service rate of the single server that is used to substitute the submodel in the representation 
of the whole system. 
The approach is exact for arbitrarily connected closed queueing networks with product-form 
solution (i.e. BCMP networks [Baskett et al. 1975]) while it can be applied to approximate 
non-BCMP networks.  In general the approach results in good approximations when the 
behaviour of the subnet depends mainly on the number of its customers and can be 
assumed to be independent of the arrival process. 
Variants of the approach, that set up iteration schemes based on specific application 
structures, are often used to improve the approximations in some cases; see [Marie 1979, 
Jacobson & Lazowska 1981] for examples of these methods. The idea of using the FES 
approach for the solution of non-BCMP networks naturally leads to the application of this 
method to the analysis of models developed with different modelling formalisms, see [Balbo 
et al. 1986, Jungnitz & Desrochers 1991] for application of FES to Petri nets. A more flexible 
approach is when the subnet is substituted not by a single server but by a subnet smaller 
than the original one [Buchholz 1995b].  
The FES approach is particularly useful to support the analysis of hierarchical models. 
However, if the models fall within the category of non-BCMP networks (and this will be 
probably the case of CRUTIAL models), it will be necessary to carefully validate the accuracy 
of the results and devise appropriate improvement schemes if needed. The validation could 
be done by simulation or alternative (more expensive) analytical techniques. 
It is noteworthy that similarly to queueing networks, product-form solutions have been 
explored for computing the steady-state probability distribution of Stochastic Petri Nets 
(SPNs) from the late 1980’s as an attempt to cope with the state explosion problem for SPN 
models [Balbo 1995]. In particular, several studies have focussed on the identification of the 
SPNs properties that are relevant with regard to the existence of a product-form solution. 
Historically, initial proposals have first explored behavioural properties based on an analysis 
of the reachability graph as in [Lazar & Robertazzi 1987], and then progressively introduced 
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more and more structural parameters to ensure a product-form solution as proposed in 
[Henderson et al. 1989][Boucherie 1993][Haddad et al. 2005]. A more detailed discussion of 
these approaches can be found [Haddad et al. 2005]. Computational algorithms were also 
proposed in [Coleman 1993][Sereno & Balbo 1993]. 
3.1.3 Supporting modelling and solution tools 
In this Section we provide a list of available tools that could be profitably used as support for 
the dependability evaluation activity inside CRUTIAL. As detailed in [Sanders 1999], they can 
be grouped in two main classes: the single-formalism/multi-solution tools, and the multi-
formalism/multi-solution tools.  
The single-formalism/multi-solution tools are built around a single formalism and one or 
more solution techniques. They are very useful inside a specific domain, but their major 
limitation is that all parts of a model must be built in the single formalism supported by the 
tool. DSPNexpress [Lindemann et al. 1999], GreatSPN [Chiola et al. 1995, Illié et al. 2004], 
SURF-2 [Béounes et al. 1993], DEEM [Bondavalli et al. 2000], TimeNET [German et al. 
1995a], UltraSAN [Sanders et al. 1995], and HiQPN [HiQPN] are only some examples of 
tools based on Stochastic Petri Nets formalism and its extensions. They all provide 
analytic/numerical solution of a generated state-level representation and, in some cases, 
support simulation-based solution as well. In particular, GreatSPN tool includes the algebra 
software package that implements the composition of GSPN models as well as of their 
colored extension (Stochastic Well Formed Net - SWN)[Bernardi et al. 2001]. 
An expected difficulty to be addressed in CRUTIAL is the heterogeneity of the models, given 
the very different nature of the various components under study. This means that different 
parts of the system could be modelled using different formalisms and then solved using 
appropriate solution techniques, also accounting for their interactions. For this reason, inside 
CRUTIAL the multi-formalism/multi-solution tools seems to have greater potentialities 
than the single-formalism/multi-solution tools, since such tools support multiple modelling 
formalisms, multiple model solution methods, and several ways to combine the models, also 
expressed in different formalisms.  
With respect to the level of integration between modelling formalisms and solution 
techniques, we can identify two different sets of tools.  
• The first set includes tools that try to unify several different single-formalism modelling 
tools into a unique software environment (loose integration). Examples are IMSE 
(Integrated Modelling Support Environment) [Pooley 1991], that is a support environment 
that contains tools for modelling, workload analysis, and system specification, IDEAS 
(Integrated Design Environment for Assessment of Computer Systems and 
Communication Networks) [Fricks et al. 1997], that provides a broad range of modelling 
capabilities without the need to learn multiple interface languages and output formats, 
and FREUD [van Moorsel & Huang 1998], that focuses on providing a uniform interface 
to a variety of web-enabled tools.  
A more recent model design framework is the DrawNet Modelling System (DMS) 
[Franceschinis et al. 2002, Codetta Raiteri et al. 2006] that supports an Object-Oriented 
(OO) design process of system models and provides a graphical front-end (the DrawNet 
GUI) to existing performance tools and a Java library (the DNlib) meant to ease the 
integration in the DMS of new modelling formalisms and interfaces to existing as well as 
new solvers.  The DMS is based on a set of languages that allow to define modelling 
formalisms, model classes and model objects. Among its several OO features we cite the 
inheritance of modelling formalism specifications, that allows the definition of modelling 
formalism hierarchies: new modelling formalisms are  created from existing ones by 
inheriting their elements (nodes and/or edges), and  overriding some of them or 
extending their properties. In a formalism, several aspects  have to be defined, such as 
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the primitives of the formalism, the measure to be computed on the models, and the 
graphical representation of the formalism primitives. An XML format has been defined for 
the concrete storage of formalisms and models. The inheritance mechanism is also the 
basis for multi-formalism models since it is possible to embed a submodel described with 
formalism F1 in a model described with formalism F2. Multi-solution is supported by a set 
of functions in the DNlib, including input/output filters to produce/read solver specific 
input/output files and solver management functions (to ease the link between a formalism 
and a solver and provide the solver invocation methods). Complex multi-solution 
procedures could be supported through a solution process specification language and a 
solution engine able to execute it, much along the line of what has been proposed in 
[Gribaudo et al. 2005]. 
• The second set includes tools in which the new formalisms, composition operators and 
solvers are actually implemented within a unique comprehensive tool (tight integration). 
Among the existing tools having these characteristics, we cite SHARPE [Trivedi 2002], 
that is a tool for specifying and analyzing performance, reliability and performability 
models, SMART [Ciardo & Miner 1996], that is a multi-formalism modelling tool to study 
complex discrete-state systems, DEDS [Bause et al. 1998], that is a toolbox for the 
construction of modular tools for functional and quantitative analysis of discrete event 
dynamic systems, and POEMS [Adve et al. 2000], that is a tool for modelling complex 
parallel and distributed systems.  
MÖBIUS [Daly et al. 2000] is another important multi-formalism/multi-solution tool. It 
supports different formalisms like SAN, PEPA, Buckets and Balls, and Fault Tree, as well 
as the composition of models described using different formalisms. Concerning the 
solution process, it supports both state-based, analytical/numerical techniques (when 
applicable) and discrete event simulation (both transient and steady-state, applicable to 
any model).  
3.1.4 Network models 
Critical infrastructures can be seen as a complex network of interacting systems and 
components, and as a consequence can be analyzed using network models theory. Network 
models have been traditionally used to analyse the dependability and performance of 
systems described as a graph, taking into account their topology and the failures affecting 
the nodes and the links interconnecting them. 
Complex networks display a high degree of tolerance to random failures, errors and attacks 
due to the redundant paths that usually connect the vertices. Network reliability is defined as 
the probability that two specific nodes (a source node and a destination node) are connected 
given the probability of the elements of the network (nodes, edges or both) of being up or 
down. A number of techniques have been developed to tackle this problem. However, with 
the appearance of networks of giant dimensions (e.g., the electric grid, the internet and www) 
the traditional exhaustive searching techniques are no more appropriate. A completely new 
field of research has emerged to study the statistical properties of huge networks, together 
with the study of their robustness to random failures, cascading failures and attacks. 
Exhaustive analysis techniques are intended to provide qualitative and quantitative 
information on the network connectivity, dependability, and vulnerability. A literature survey 
indicates that the approaches, which have been used to compute two-terminal reliability 
could broadly be classified into two paradigms [Bobbio et al. 2006]: 
i) the paradigm in which desired network reliability is directly calculated (series-parallel 
reduction or pivotal decomposition using keystone components [Page & Perry 1988, 
Hardy et al. 2005],  
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ii) and the paradigm in which all possibilities through which the two specified nodes can 
communicate (or not communicate) with each other are first enumerated (path/cut 
set search [Luo & Trivedi 1998, Balan & Traldi 2003]) and then reliability 
(unreliability) expression is evaluated. The use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) 
[Bryant 1986] provides an extraordinarily efficient method to represent complex 
binary structures and algorithms exploiting the direct use of BDDs to model the 
network connectivity, and the level of reachable complexity, needs to be investigated 
more deeply. 
However, the complexity of real world today networks (the internet, the www, the public 
power grid telecommunication networks), can reach millions or even billions of vertices. This 
change of scale forces a corresponding change in the analytic approach. Many of the 
approaches that have been applied in small or medium scale networks, and many of the 
questions that have been answered are simply not feasible in much larger networks. Recent 
years have witnessed a substantial new movement in network research [Albert & Barabasi 
2002b, Dorogovtsev & Mendes 2002, Newman 2003, Boccaletti et al. 2006], with the focus 
shifting away from the analysis of small graphs to consideration of large-scale statistical 
properties of graphs and with the aim of predicting what the behaviour of complex networked 
systems will be on the basis of measured structural properties and the local rules governing 
individual vertices. The shift, experienced in the past few years in the understanding of 
complex networks, was rapid and unexpected. Empirical studies, models and analytic 
approaches have enlightened that real networks display generic organizing principles shared 
by rather different systems. These advances have created a prolific branch of statistical 
mechanics, followed with equal interest by sociologists, biologists and computer scientists. 
Moreover, the structural organization of a complex network influences how the system reacts 
to occasional failures or to intentional attacks [Crucitti et al. 2003], and hence has a direct 
impact on the dependability and security of these structures. Finally, a new area of research 
refers to the propagation of failures in a complex graph due to avalanche of breakdowns 
when node and links are sensitive to overloading. In a power transmission grid, for instance, 
each node (power station) deals with a load of power. The removal of nodes, either by 
random breakdown or intentional attacks, changes the balance of flows and leads to a global 
redistribution of loads over all the network that can be, in some cases, not tolerated and 
might trigger a cascade of overload failures. This problem is usually referred in the literature 
as cascading failures [Crucitti et al. 2004a, Zaho et al. 2004]. A more detailed discussion of 
the state of the art dealing with cascading failure models is presented Section 3.2.1.2. 
3.1.5 Heterogeneous models 
Among the challenges to be addressed in the context of interdependent critical infrastructure 
as listed in Section 2.2, we can mention the need: i) to take into account timing constraints, ii) 
to describe different types of uncertainties concerning the system dynamics and behaviour or 
nondeterministic choices related to system recovery or fault and intrusion tolerance 
strategies, iii) to model both discrete and continuous variables, or iv)) to model non 
exponential distributions. In this subsection we outline potential models in addition to those 
mentioned in the previous sections, that can be used to address these issues.  
A possible categorization of models can be according to the following two main attributes: i) 
the timing specification (stochastic or non-stochastic) and ii) the model state space (discrete 
or continuous or partly discrete and partly continuous). The use of supplementary variables 
in stochastic models converts a discrete state space with any kind of timed transitions into a 
partly discrete and partly continuous state space. Hence, the two main categories above can 
be merged into a single one: heterogeneous models. 
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3.1.5.1 Timing specification and modelling 
 In stochastic models the timing of events is represented by means of random variables, and 
typical fields of application are performance evaluation and reliability analysis. The analysis 
tools are based on the theory of stochastic processes, and the most commonly exploited 
form is when all the timed random variables are exponential so that the underlying stochastic 
process is a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). The obtainable quantitative measures 
are in the form of mean values (or more generally speaking moments) and distributions. 
In timed models the timing of events is represented by constant values or non-deterministic 
intervals. Typical fields of application are protocol or program verification and deadline 
verification in real-time systems. The analysis tools are based on checking the validity of a 
logical expression (according to some specification semantics) or to find a counter example; 
the procedure of specifying a formula and finding its validity is known as model checking. 
The obtainable measures are in the form of reachability properties. 
Two formalisms for describing non-stochastic timed models with discrete state space can be 
considered: Timed Automata (TA) [Alur & Dill 1990, Alur & Dill 1994] and Time Petri Nets 
(TPN) [Merlin & Faber 1976].  
TA extend classical frameworks for the description of the dynamics of the system, such as 
automata and transition systems, and are obtained by equipping a finite graph with a finite 
number of real-valued variables called clocks, which increase at the same rate as real-time.  
The vertices of the graph correspond to control modes in which the system can be in as time 
elapses. At certain points in time, the TA can instantaneously traverse an edge from one 
vertex to another. For any given graph edges, the points in time at which the edge can be 
traversed depend on the current values of the clocks; this dependency is determined by 
clock constraints, which are logical formulae on clock values, and which label graph edges. 
More precisely, the graph is labelled with conditions on clocks, which influence the transitions 
taken between vertices in the graph: for example, clock constraints labelling edges determine 
which values clocks must have for the edge to be traversed; similarly, clock constraints 
labelling vertices determine the values of clocks which, when reached, force the TA to leave 
the vertex (such constraints may be used to describe the expiration of time-outs or deadlines, 
for example). We also note that a set of clocks can be reset to 0 on traversal of an edge.    
TPN extend the basic model of Petri Nets by adding timing constraints on the execution of 
transitions [Merlin & Faber 1976, Berthomieu & Diaz 1991, Bucci & Vicario 1995, Berthomieu 
& Vernadat 2003]. Every transition is associated with a static firing interval, made up of an 
earliest and a latest firing time. When the transition is first enabled, it is associated with a 
clock which is maintained until the transition is enabled with continuity. The transition cannot 
fire before its clock has reached the earliest firing time, neither it can avoid to fire when the 
clock reaches the latest firing time. In general, the logical sequencing of processes and their 
mutual dependencies can be conveniently captured in an operational model, such as a finite 
state machine, a Petri Net, or any kind of automaton. Timing constraints are added to the 
representation by timers and durations constraining the intervals in which model events are 
either prevented or forced to execute. TA and TPN are notable examples layering this timing 
semantics on top of State Transition Systems and Petri Nets, respectively. To encompass 
preemptive process scheduling, the model must be further extended by associating priorities 
to events timed activities [Vicario 2001]. In the analysis of a TPN, state space enumeration 
methods enable verification of properties pertaining both to the logical sequencing of events 
and to their timing. This approach is basically hurdled by the fact that the state of a TPN 
depends not only on the marking but also on timers associated with transitions. 
The TA and TPN formalisms have a common underlying semantic model, and TAs and 
bounded TPNs are equivalent in terms of timed, linear-time properties (such as those 
properties which can be expressed in a linear-time temporal logic). We note that every 
bounded TPN (that is, a TPN with a finite number of reachable markings) can be translated 
into an equivalent TPN. Both TA and bounded TPNs may be verified against reachability or 
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temporal logic properties, which may themselves include timing constraints such as 
deadlines: for example, the property “a response always follows a request within 0.05 
seconds after the request was made”. 
3.1.5.2 Markov Decision Processes 
In some cases it is necessary to model systems with unknown scheduling mechanisms or 
with transitions whose next-state probability distribution is not known with precision. A 
number of models which feature behaviour which can arise from both probabilistic and 
nondeterministic choices, and which can model such systems, have been presented in the 
literature; among these formalisms, Markov Decision Processes (MDP) have been widely 
studied and  used  in a variety of areas, including verification, planning, robotics, automated 
control, economics and in manufacturing [Puterman 2005].  
MDPs were introduced by Bellman and Howard in [Bellman 1957, Howard 1960] in the 
context of operations research and dynamic programming, and are an extension of Markov 
chains (MC). The principal difference is that MDPs make state transitions according to a two-
phase choice: the first phase consists of a nondeterministic choice of an action, while the 
second phase consists of a probabilistic choice according to the probability distribution which 
is associated to the chosen action in that state. The probabilistic choice in the second phase 
determines to which state the system then moves. If only one action is possible from each 
state, or if the action to take is somehow fixed for each state, the MDP reduces to an MC. 
Thus an MDP represents an infinite number of MCs which we can obtain by defining a 
probability distribution on the different actions (corresponding to nondeterministic choices) 
associated with each state. We also note that, for every action in each state, a reward is 
defined. 
MDPs have been used in the context of the verification to model communication protocols 
and randomized, distributed algorithms, such as the Root Contention protocol of the IEEE 
1394 (FireWire) standard [Kwiatkowska & Sproston 2003]. In the context of studies of 
electricity supply, MDPs have been used to analyze bidding strategies [Song et al. 2000]. We 
note that MDPs are a low-level system-description formalism, and therefore higher-level 
languages are used for their description in practice. Potential applications of MDPs in the 
context of CRUTIAL could be the evaluation of recovery strategies or of fault/intrusion 
tolerance strategies 
The solution of a MDP can be expressed as a strategy that selects among the actions 
available for each state, such that some function of the sequence of obtained rewards is 
maximized (or minimized). Formal languages can be defined to express the (quantitative) 
property that we want to be ensured by the strategies of an MDP. For example, probabilistic 
temporal logics can be used to specify properties such as “all strategies of the system reach 
a certain goal state with probability 0.99 or greater”, or “for all strategies, the average 
accumulated reward before the system crashes is less than 10”. Such probabilistic temporal 
logic properties can be considered in probabilistic model-checking analyses of MDP models, 
which rely on classical, efficient solution methods for MDPs. 
3.1.5.3 Non-Exponential models 
By non-exponential models, we identify all the stochastic models whose behaviour in time 
cannot be mapped into a Continuous Time homogeneous Markov Chain (CTMC). A common 
way to specify a non-exponential model is via a Non-Markovian Stochastic PN (or simply 
SPN). In recent years, several classes of SPN models have been developed which 
incorporate some non-exponential characteristics in their definition [Ajmone Marsan et al. 
1989]. With the aim of specifying non-Markovian SPN models that are analytically tractable, 
three main lines of research can be envisaged [Ciardo et al. 1994, Bobbio et al. 1998]:  
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− an approach based on Markov regenerative theory 
− an approach based on the use of supplementary variables 
− an approach based on state space expansion. 
The first line originated from a particular case of non-Markovian SPN, defined in [Ajmone 
Marsan & Chiola 1987], where, in each marking, a single transition is allowed to have 
associated a deterministic firing time with (Deterministic and SPN - DSPN).  It has been 
observed in [Choi et al. 1994] that the marking process underlying a DSPN is a Markov 
Regenerative Process (MRGP) for which equations for the transition probability matrix in 
transient and in steady-state can be derived. A semantic generalization of the previous 
formulation has been considered in [Bobbio et al. 2000]. 
The second line resorts to the use of supplementary variables. The steady-state solution has 
been proposed in [German & Lindemann 1994], while the possibility of applying the 
methodology to the transient analysis has been explored in [Heindl & German 1997].  A 
comparison of numerical methods for the transient analysis of MRGPs applying the Markov 
regenerative theory and the method of the supplementary variables has been presented in 
[German et al. 1995b].  
The third line of research, aimed at affording the solution of non-Markovian SPN, is based on 
the expansion of the reachability graph of the basic PN. In this approach, the original non-
Markovian marking process is approximated by means of a CTMC defined over an 
augmented state space. The expansion technique can be realized by assigning to each PN-
transition a continuous Phase-type (PH) distributed random variable. The merit of this 
approach is the intrinsic flexibility and the possibility of a computer implementation starting 
from the basic specification at the PN level, so that all the solution steps can be hidden from 
the modeler [Cumani 1985]. The drawback of this approach is, of course, the explosion of the 
state space that can be alleviated by resorting to the use of Kronecker operators for 
matrices. A more recent and interesting modification of the expansion technique, resorts to 
the use of discrete PH-type random variables [Ciardo 1995], so that the continuous-time 
marking process is approximated by an expanded discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) 
[Bobbio & Horváth 2001].  
3.1.5.4 Hybrid Discrete-Continuous state space models 
In models with discrete state space, the dynamic evolution of the system in time can be 
represented as a sequence of transitions among discrete states. Paradigmatic models in this 
category are CTMC or models obtained from all the different variations of Petri Nets and 
High-Level Petri Nets with discrete tokens. Hybrid models combine discrete as well as 
continuous variables in the same framework, so that the state space of the model is partly 
discrete and partly continuous. Two main modelling approaches have been recently 
proposed to deal with hybrid systems: Hybrid Automata and Fluid Petri Nets. Typical 
examples of hybrid systems are discrete controllers that control continuous variables. 
 
Hybrid automata - A hybrid automaton [Alur et al. 1995, Alur et al. 1996] is a finite state 
machine whose nodes (called control modes) contain real valued variables with a definition 
of their first derivatives and possible bounds on their values. The edges represent discrete 
events and are labelled with guarded assignments on the real variables. Hence, an hybrid 
automata transition among discrete states is governed by the value of continuous variables. 
Given a hybrid automaton and a legal formula on its variables, the model checking problem 
[Henzinger et al. 1995] asks to compute a region that satisfies the predicate, or to find at 
least one counterexamples that contradicts the predicate. As with TA, properties concerning 
reachability of certain states, or those expressed using temporal logic, are typically of interest 
in the context of hybrid automata. For certain classes of hybrid automata, analysis can take 
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the form of exhaustive exploration throughout the state space of the model (or on an 
abstraction of the hybrid automaton): for models with complex continuous dynamics, such 
exhaustive verification becomes prohibitive, and therefore methods such as simulation 
techniques can be employed. 
 
Fluid Petri Net - Fluid Petri Nets (FPN) were introduced both in non-stochastic [Alla & David 
1998] and stochastic [Trivedi & Kulkarni 1993] settings. The basic stochastic formalism was 
presented in [Trivedi & Kulkarni 1993] and refined in [Horton et al. 1998] and [Gribaudo et al. 
2001]. Fluid stochastic Petri nets (FSPN) are stochastic Petri net based models with hybrid 
state space, in which some places may hold a discrete number of tokens, and some places a 
continuous quantity represented by a non-negative real number.  Places that hold continuous 
quantities are referred to as fluid or continuous places, and the non-negative real number is 
said to represent the fluid level in the place.  
Discrete tokens move along discrete arcs with the enabling and firing rules of standard SPN, 
while the fluid moves along special continuous (or fluid) arcs according to an assigned 
instantaneous flow rate. Fluid levels are changed either by fluid transitions according to fluid 
rate that can depend on the marking of the net or they can be set directly by a set arc to a 
given value when a transition fires. Inhibitor arcs (test arcs) disable (enable) a transition 
when a given number of token or a given quantity of fluid is present in a place. Hence, in the 
single formalism FPN, both discrete and continuous variables can be accommodated and 
their mutual interaction represented. 
The stochastic process underlying an FSPN can be described by the approach of 
supplementary variables [Cox 1955]. In particular it is necessary to associate a 
supplementary variable to every fluid place of the FSPN [Gribaudo et al. 2001]. Having 
introduced the supplementary variables, the stochastic behaviour can be described by a set 
of differential equations.  In general the solution of the set of differential equations describing 
an FSPN is not trivial. In very simple cases (single fluid place and simple dependence 
structure) closed form solutions can be found by spectral decomposition. In more complex 
cases discretization techniques can be applied, see [Horton et al. 1998, Gribaudo & Horváth 
2002, Horváth & Gribaudo 2002]. In case of more than two fluid places the analytical solution 
of the set of differential equations is not feasible and simulation can be applied to get the 
solution [Gribaudo & Sereno 2000]. 
The fact that in a FSPN the firing rate can depend on the actual fluid level of the fluid places 
gives the possibility of implementing non-exponential delays. In particular, it is possible to 
model deterministic delays which can be used to model deadlines. Delays with finite support 
distributions can be implemented as well. Moreover, the continuous quantity may model time 
as well which allows the stochastic marking process associated to the model to have a 
complex time-dependent behaviour giving the opportunity of representing non-Markovian 
processes by means of FSPN [Gribaudo et al. 1999]. 
A comparison of the modelling power of Hybrid automata and FPN is given in [Tuffin et al. 
2001, Gribaudo et al. 2003]. 
3.1.6 Modelling and evaluation wrt to malicious threats 
As discussed in Section 2, malicious faults represent a serious threat to the dependability 
and resilience of the power grid and the corresponding information infrastructure. It is 
necessary to have appropriate methodologies and tools to support the analysis and 
evaluation of their impacts. Four main classes of evaluation methods can be distinguished to 
support these analyses: 1) Security evaluation criteria, 2) Risk assessment, 3) Model-based 
quantitative evaluation, and 4) experimental evaluation. 
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In the sequel, we present each of these methods and briefly summarize the corresponding 
state of the art. 
3.1.6.1 Security evaluation criteria 
The most common approach generally used for evaluating security is based on the 
assumption that a proper design and development process would be sufficient to prevent 
from malicious threats. Accordingly, several security evaluation criteria have been developed 
to assess the security of computer based systems and compare their ability to cope with 
malicious faults. 
The first evaluation criteria are the famous “Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria”, 
also known as TCSEC or “orange book” [TCSEC 1985] published by the Department of 
Defense in the USA. These criteria, based both on lists of security functions to be fulfilled 
and on the techniques used to verify them, lead to seven evaluation levels (in ascending 
order of security: D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1). The main goal of these criteria was primarily to 
meet DoD's requirements, i.e., priority has been initially given to confidentiality rather than 
integrity. Later, new criteria (the federal criteria) have been defined by the NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) and NSA (National Security Agency) [NIST-NSA 
1992], to better take account of the various aspects of security, including confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Evaluation based on these criteria is focused on "products" (isolated 
elements), rather than "systems" (products in their operating environment). Unlike the 
Orange Book, these criteria explicitly separate functional aspects from those related to 
development and from those related to assurance (or verification), each being assessed 
using multiple levels.  
In fact, the idea of separating functionality requirements from assurance ones was already 
adopted in the European standardized criteria or ITSEC (Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria) [ITSEC 1991] where ten functionality classes have been predefined, the 
first five taking up the functionalities of categories C1 to B3 defined in the Orange Book. Five 
other functionality classes were defined for high integrity systems, high availability systems, 
high integrity transmission systems, high confidentiality transmission systems and, finally, 
high integrity and confidentiality networks. However, other functionality combinations could 
be defined (if required) for a specific system or application. With regard to assurance, six 
levels are defined, denoted E1 to E6, from the least to the most demanding. Efficiency 
assurance criteria are also defined to evaluate the pertinence and cohesion of functionalities, 
the resistance of mechanisms, the vulnerability of the implementation as well as criteria 
linked to operation (ease of use, vulnerability in operation). Canada  [CSEGC 1993] and 
Japan [JCSEC 1992] have also published their own evaluation criteria. The Common Criteria 
(CC) [CCIB 1998] represents the harmonization and the alignment of all these efforts. These 
standards have also been published as ISO Standards  ISO/IEC 15408:2005 and ISO/IEC 
18405:2005.  
The CC structure provides great flexibility in the specification of secure products. Consumers 
and other parties can specify the security functionality of a product in terms of standard 
protection profiles, and independently select the evaluation assurance level from a defined 
set of seven increasing Evaluation Assurance Levels, from EAL1 up to EAL7. Depending on 
the chosen levels, different evaluation techniques have to be used by the evaluators. Further 
information on this topic are available in [CC 2006]. 
3.1.6.2 Risk assessment 
The goal of risk assessment approaches is to analyse and determine the likelihood that 
identifiable threats will affect the target system security, weighing their occurrence with the 
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damage they might cause. Damage can be assessed by evaluating the average loss of 
money an attack might cause.  
Risk assessment methodologies generally distinguish three main notions: threats, 
vulnerability and risks: 
1) Threats correspond to the different possibilities that might exist for affecting some security 
objectives and the corresponding probabilities. Threats can be defined according to 
various dimensions: the source of the attack (internal or external to the system), the 
attacker’s motivation, the attack process, the target and the result of the attack 
(consequences of the success of an attack), etc.  
2) Vulnerabilities correspond to system weaknesses generally resulting from design faults, 
malicious or accidental, which enable the completion of a threat or the success of an 
attack. 
3) Risks result from the combination of threats and vulnerabilities. Risks are evaluated either 
to obtain the best tradeoff between security and costs for a given system, or simply to 
compute the insurance premium to cover the risks. 
Most systems have vulnerabilities. However, not every threat results in an attack, and not 
every attack succeeds. Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of 
attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use.  
Risk assessment approaches applied to security are mainly inspired from similar approaches 
commonly used in safety critical systems. Generally, the assessment takes into account the 
risks associated with accidental faults and natural disasters (fires, floods, earthquakes, 
software or erroneous data inputs, etc.) as well as malicious faults (terrorism, fraud, etc.). 
Risk assessment can be qualitative only leading to the identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities and the different possibilities offered to the attackers to break into the target 
systems. Quantitative risk assessment can be carried out if probabilities and cost estimates 
can be associated to the threats taken into account in the analysis.  
In the context of power systems and associated SCADA and ICT systems, several standards 
and working groups are emerging to develop risk assessment methodologies that are suited 
to this context A review of some of such initiatives is presented in [Dondossola et al. 2004, 
Schainker et al. 2006].  
As an example, [Dondossola & Lamquet 2006] outline ongoing work carried by the CIGRE 
working group on “Security for Information Systems and Intranets in Electric Power 
Systems”. They discuss the key aspects that a methodology for the security analysis of 
power utility information systems should cover. They also present a method called EPCSA 
that can be used to support: 1) the correlation of asset vulnerabilities, potential threats, and 
the possibility of attacks; 2) the definition of indexes to compute a qualitative estimate of the 
relevant properties of the system; and finally 3) the exploitation of correlations and indexes 
for scoring security failures and building the system security profile.  
3.1.6.3 Model-based security evaluation 
Security evaluation criteria and risk assessment methodologies are useful to support the 
analysis of security during the development process. However, they are widely recognized to 
be insufficient: a) to assess the impact of malicious attacks and vulnerabilities on the security 
of systems in operation, or b) to support architecture design tradeoffs based on quantitative 
criteria. Model-based evaluation approaches are commonly used in computer dependability 
to fulfil these objectives taking into account accidental faults. During the last decade, 
particular attention has been paid to exploring new approaches for security evaluation based 
on probabilistic models similar to those used in computer dependability. In the sequel we 
provide a short overview of related work addressing this topic. Additional information can be 
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found in [Nicol et al. 2004], in which the authors survey existing model-based techniques for 
evaluating system dependability, and summarize how they are now being extended to 
evaluate system security.  
Early in the 90’s, pioneering studies have been carried out within the framework of the 
ESPRIT PDCS project in an attempt to develop probabilistic methods for security evaluation 
analogous to those used for the evaluation of reliability. The objective was to define 
representative quantitative “measures” characterizing the capacity of a system to resist to 
attacks in operation. In [Littlewood et al. 1993], the authors introduce the concept of effort to 
derive measures such as the mean effort to next failure and others and present a stochastic 
approach to characterize security. An experimental study aiming at validating the feasibility of 
this approach was presented in [Brocklehurst et al. 1994, Jonsson & Olovsson 1997]. 
Controlled experiments where students had been asked to penetrate various systems 
(according to the so-called “tiger team” method) have been carried. In this approach, the 
system is considered as a “black box”, since neither its components, nor the evolution of its 
configuration over time are represented. 
Concurrently and in the context of the same European Project, LAAS-CNRS developed a 
modelling approach, based on a “white box” representation of the target system and its 
configuration, to model the influences of residual vulnerabilities in a system if misused by an 
attacker [Dacier et al. 1993]. The core of the method lies in a the definition of a formal model 
for describing the system vulnerabilities, called privilege graph [Dacier & Deswarte 1994]. 
The privilege graph highlights the various possibilities offered to an intruder to increase his 
privileges thanks to identified vulnerabilities or features of the system he has access to. This 
model is then used to derive attack scenarios characterizing how the attackers might 
navigate through the privilege graph and finally succeed in violating some security objectives. 
A Markov model is generated to derive probabilistic estimations of the ability of a system to 
resist attacks. These estimations are expressed as a mean effort to security failure (METF, 
similar to the MTTF measure for reliability), assessing the effort necessary for an attacker to 
realize a violation of a given security policy. The effort is considered as a multi-dimensional 
variable, taking into account the attacker competence and knowledge, the time needed to 
prepare and perform the attack, the efficiency of the protection mechanisms (e.g., the 
difficulty to guess a given password), etc. A software prototype tool has been developed to 
compute these measures, and has been used for a campaign of more than one year on a 
relatively complex system (a network of several hundred workstations in an academic 
environment). The results have been analyzed in [Ortalo et al. 1999], giving convincing 
arguments on the interest of the method, and the significance of the quantitative measures. 
These measures are not aimed to be interpreted in absolute terms or even used to compare 
the security of different systems: the objective is rather to allow administrators to monitor how 
the security of their system evolves as a function of configuration modifications (creation or 
suppression of users, installing new pieces of software, etc.) and identify the vulnerabilities 
that have the most impact on security. 
Since the definition of the privilege graph, a variety of graph based approaches have been 
developed to support the description of vulnerabilities and attack scenarios (see e.g., [Phillips 
& Swiler 1998, Sheyner et al. 2002, Jajodia et al. 2003]), or to support alerts correlation in 
the context of intrusion detection [Cuppens & Miege 2002, Ning et al. 2002]. For example, 
the attack trees formalism proposed in [Schneier 1999] provides a methodical way, similar to 
fault trees, for representing how an attack can possibly be performed against a system. 
Basically, attacks are represented in a tree structure, with the goal as the root node and 
different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes. There are AND nodes and OR nodes for 
representing the various possibilities and alternatives for reaching the root node from the leaf 
nodes. An adaptation of this approach to take into account dependencies between 
vulnerabilities is proposed in [Balzarotti et al. 2006]. An example of application of attack trees 
to SCADA systems is presented in [Byres et al. 2004], in which the authors identified eleven 
attacker goals and associated security vulnerabilities in the specification and development of 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 31  
typical SCADA systems. Their application was qualitative as the attack tree analysis was 
used only to identify attack scenarios and rank them according to severity of impact, 
probability of detection and level of difficulty.  
Besides the studies mentioned above, other applications of graph based approaches and 
stochastic models to security can be found in [Nicol et al. 2004]. We can mention in particular 
the models proposed in [Madan et al. 2002, Gupta et al. 2003, Wang et al. 2003] targeting 
intrusion-tolerant systems. Generally, a state-based approach using Markov or semi-Markov 
models is used and quantitative measures are associated to particular states identifying 
failures at the system level with respect to high-level properties such as availability, integrity, 
or confidentiality. These models are processed using traditional Markov or Semi-Markov 
chain solution techniques.  
For the sake of completeness, it is also worth to mention other types of stochastic models 
that have been explored in the literature in the context of security. These include e.g., 
epidemiology models or interactive Markov chains for studying malware propagations (see 
e.g., [Staniford et al. 2002, Zou et al. 2002, Garetto et al. 2003, Zou et al. 2005], models 
based on complex network theory to analyse the vulnerability of networked systems to 
cascading attacks [Crucitti et al. 2004b], game theory-based models for characterizing 
attackers behaviours and analyzing impact on security [Lye & Wing 2005, Sallhammar et al. 
2005, Sallhammar et al. 2006]. 
3.1.6.4 Experimental evaluation 
Model-based evaluation approaches rely on assumptions that need to be validated using real 
data collected during controlled experiments or from the field. In recent years, several 
initiatives and experimental studies have emerged for collecting and analyzing real data 
characterizing attacks and malicious activities on the internet. We can mention for example 
the Internet Motion Sensor project [Bailey et al. 2005], darknets [Cymru 2004], network 
telescopes [CAIDA], Dshield [DShield] and CADHo [Ealata et al. 2005].  
The techniques used in the context of the Internet Motion Sensor, darknets and network 
telescopes are based on a similar approach: they use a fraction of unused IP space and 
passively monitor all incoming traffic, which most probably results from malicious activities. 
Dshield centralizes and analyses data collected from firewall logs or by intrusion detection 
systems from different sources all around the world. These projects provide valuable 
information for the identification and analysis of malicious activities on the Internet. 
Nevertheless, such information is not sufficient to model attack processes and analyze their 
impact on the security of the targeted machines.  
The approach adopted by the CADHo project is aimed at addressing this objective, based on 
the deployment of a distributed platform of low-interaction honeypots that gathers data 
suitable to analyze the attack processes targeting a large number of machines connected to 
the Internet. A honeypot is a machine connected to a network but that no one is supposed to 
use. If a connection occurs, it must be, at best an accidental error or, more likely, an attempt 
to attack the machine. As of today, around 40 honeypot platforms have been deployed at 
various sites from academia and industry in almost 30 different countries over the five 
continents. The data gathered from the honeypot platforms include payload of all packets 
sent to or from these honeypots, and additional information to facilitate its analysis, such as 
the IP geographical localization of packets’ source addresses, the OS of the attacking 
machine, the local time of the source, etc. Several analyses and interesting conclusions have 
been derived based on the collected data as detailed e.g., in the publications available at 
[Leurré.com]. Besides carrying out qualitative analyses and identifying trends, preliminary 
stochastic models have been elaborated to capture some characteristics of the attack 
processes observed on the honeypot platforms (see e.g., [Kaâniche et al. 2006]). The first 
results of these analyses offer positive insight regarding the possibility to use such data to 
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model attack processes happening over the Internet. Additional experiments based on high-
interaction honeypots have been also carried out in [Alata et al. 2006] in order to learn about 
the attackers behaviours and activities once they had manage to gain access into a new 
target machine and try to progress into a network to obtain additional privileges. One of the 
objectives of these experiments is to validate the assumptions on attackers behaviours 
elaborated in the model-based evaluation approach discussed in [Ortalo et al. 1999] to 
quantify security.  
The projects discussed above highlight the importance of experimental evaluation 
approaches to understand attackers behaviours and to elaborate realistic assumptions that 
can be used in model-based evaluation approaches aimed at evaluating quantitative 
measures characterizing the capacity of systems to resist to attacks. However, such kinds of 
combined analyses are still at a preliminary stage and need to be further explored, in 
particular in the context of interdependent power systems and information system 
infrastructures. Honeypot-based techniques are one of the popular solutions that are 
currently explored for collecting the data needed to support these analyses. In particular, it is 
worth to mention that there are currently some initiatives aimed at the development of 
honeypots that are well suited to address the vulnerabilities and threats targeting SCADA 
and process control systems. We can mention for example the Scada Honeynet project that 
aims to extend the concept of honeynet to SCADA networks [Pothamsetty & Franz 2005]. 
We can also mention the recent creation in the United-States of US-CERT, for collecting 
incidents and vulnerabilities affecting SCADA and control systems and coordinating defence 
against and response to cyber attacks (http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems). On the 
other hand, the Department of Energy (DoE) in the United-States have launched a national 
SCADA Testbed (NSTB) to identify and remediate SCADA vulnerabilities and recommend 
security standards to protect the critical energy infrastructures. The outputs expected from 
these sources will be useful to support security analysis and evaluation methods in the 
context of interdependent power and information infrastructures. 
3.1.6.5 Discussion 
Model-based and experimental evaluation approaches for quantifying security are still at an 
exploratory stage. There are several challenging issues that must be addressed, including in 
particular the definition of widely accepted metrics that are representative of security 
properties and appropriate models that are able to evaluate such metrics. Also, so far the 
evaluation of dependability properties and security properties have been generally addressed 
separately. Clearly, there is a need for a comprehensive modelling framework that can be 
used to assess the impact of accidental faults as well as malicious threats in an integrated 
way. Generalization and extensions to the context of interdependent information and power 
distribution systems need also to be explored.  
3.2 Interdependencies modelling in critical infrastructures 
This Section provides firstly an overview of work related to the modelling of cascading 
failures and blackouts in the context of power system infrastructures.  Then, it outlines some 
related cooperative research projects and initiatives dealing with the modelling and analysis 
of interdependent critical infrastructures.  
3.2.1 Modelling of cascading failures and blackouts 
In this section, we provide a summary of related work dealing with the modelling of the types 
of failures that are characteristic of interdependent infrastructures, in particular in the context 
of power systems infrastructures. We do not cover modelling studies addressing the 
reliability and availability evaluation of power systems. An extensive source of information on 
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this topic can found in the bibliography available in [Allan et al. 1999, Billinton et al. 2001, 
Bansal et al. 2002]. 
Among the three relevant types of failures in interdependent infrastructures introduced in 
section 2, the modelling of cascading failures has received increasing interest in the past 
years, in particular after the large blackouts of electric power transmission systems in 1996 
and 2003. Several research papers and modelling studies have been published on this topic 
in particular by the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) in the 
United-States [Dobson & Carreras 2005]. In the following we provide a short summary of 
recent work dealing with the modelling of cascading failures based in particular on the work 
carried out by CERTS.    
Published studies on the analysis and modelling of cascading failures and power blackouts 
can be grouped into two categories:  
- Statistical analysis and probability distribution fitting based on historical data collected 
from past blackouts. 
- Development of analytical or simulation models aimed at describing cascading 
failures and studying blackout dynamics 
In the following, we provide a short summary of work for each of these categories. 
3.2.1.1 Statistical analysis of Blackout data 
Using historical data collected on past blackouts several studies have been carried out to 
identify probability distributions that provide a good statistical fit to this data, considering e.g., 
the frequency and the size (amount of unserved energy) of the blackouts. The ultimate 
objective is to develop predictive models that can be used for planning purposes. 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has a documented list summarizing 
the disturbances and major blackouts of the North American power transmission system 
since 1984 [NERC, Adler et al. 1994]). Several statistical analyses of this or similar data exist 
in the literature. The main observation is that the probability distribution of the blackout data 
does not decrease exponentially with the size of the blackout, but rather has a heavy-tail 
distribution that is fairly close to a power law [Chen et al. 2001, Talukdar et al. 2003, 
Carreras et al. 2004b, Hines et al. 2006]. In [Carreras et al. 2004b], the authors argue that 
the power law and the properties of the transmission system indicate the existence of self-
organized criticality [Bak et al. 1987] in the nature of power systems dynamics. [Weron & 
Simonsen 2006] question the appropriateness of applying self-organized criticality models to 
the NERC data set, but confirm the existence of a fatter-than exponential tail in the 
distribution. Moreover, the results presented in [Chen & McCalley 2004] suggest that 
Negative Binomial model provides a better fit to the blackout and transmission line outages 
data than the exponential or power law distributions. Other possible alternative distributions 
are discussed in [Chen et al. 2006].  
3.2.1.2 Cascading failure models 
A large literature has been dedicated recently to the elaboration of analytic or simulation 
based models that are able to capture the dynamics of cascading failures and blackouts. A 
brief review of related research addressing this topic is given hereafter. A more detailed 
state-of-the art can be found   in [Dobson et al. 2004a, Anghel et al. 2007]. In particular, the 
stochastic model introduced in [Anghel et al. 2007], and inspired by [Dobson et al. 2001], 
attempts to provide a comprehensive representation of the complex behaviour of both the 
grid dynamics under random perturbations and the operators response to the contingency 
events.  
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The main objective of the approaches discussed in the sequel is to build analytical or 
simulation models that describe how a sequence of related events might lead to the 
occurrence of cascading failures and the associated probability. 
In [Dobson et al. 2003, Dobson et al. 2005a], the authors present an idealized probabilistic 
model of cascading failures called CASCADE that is simple enough to be analytically 
tractable. It describes a general cascading process in which component failures weaken and 
further load the system so that components failures are more likely. The CASCADE model 
describes a finite number of identical components that fail when their load exceeds a 
threshold. As components fail, the system becomes more loaded, since a fixed amount of 
load is transferred to the other components, and cascading failures of further components 
become likely.  
This cascade model and variants of it have been approximated in [Dobson et al. 2004b, 
Dobson et al. 2005b, Dobson et al. 2006] by a Galton-Watson branching process in which 
failures occur in stages, with each failure giving rise to a Poisson distribution of failures at the 
next stage. Some features of this cascade model are consistent with the simulations 
presented in [Carreras et al. 2004a]. 
The models mentioned above do not take into account the characteristics of power systems.  
Example of cascading failures models for a power transmission system have been proposed 
in [Carreras et al. 2002]. The OPA simulative model represents transmission lines, loads, 
generators and the operating limits on these components. Blackout cascades are essentially 
instantaneous events due to dynamical redistribution of power flows and are triggered by 
probabilistic failures of overloaded lines. The size of blackouts is determined by solving a 
standard LP optimization of the generation dispatch, consistent with the power flow 
equations and operational constraints, and the redistribution of power flows is calculated 
using a linear load flow approximation. 
A simulation procedure is proposed in [Nedic 2003] to search for dangerous event 
developments (represented by an event tree) based on the concept of vulnerability region 
and on voltage stability. This procedure links different static and dynamic models used to 
assess transient stability, frequency response, voltage stability and steady state system 
conditions.  
 
In [Rios et al. 2002] a simulation model is proposed to calculate the expected cost of 
outages, taking into account time-dependent phenomena (TDP) such a cascade tripping of 
elements due to overloads, malfunction of the protection system, potential power system 
instabilities and weather conditions.  
 
Other examples emphasizing different aspects of the problem have been proposed e.g., in 
[Thorp et al. 1998, Bae & Thorp 1999, Chen & Thorp 2002, Chen et al. 2005], in which 
hidden failures of the protection system are represented. Their approach uses a probabilistic 
model to simulate the incorrect tripping of lines and generators due to hidden failures of line 
or generator protection systems. The distribution of power system blackout size is obtained 
using importance sampling and Monte-Carlo simulation.  
Recently, new approaches using complex networks theory [Albert & Barabasi 2002a] have 
been also proposed for modelling cascading failures [Motter & Lai 2002, Watts 2002, Crucitti 
et al. 2004a, Chassin & Posse 2005, Kinney et al. 2005, Sun 2005]. These models are based 
on the analysis of the topology of the network characterizing the system and the evaluation 
of the resilience of the network to the removal of nodes and arcs, due either to random 
failures or to malicious attacks (see Section 3.1.5).  
All the models discussed above adopt a simplified representation of the power system, 
assuming that the overloading of system components eventually leads to the collapse of the 
global system. However, these models do not take into account explicitly the complex 
interactions and interdependencies between the power infrastructure and the ICT 
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infrastructures. Moreover, the modelling of escalating failures is not addressed. Further work 
is needed in these directions.  
3.2.2 Cooperative projects and initiatives 
The vulnerability of critical infrastructures appears to be growing due to a number of factors, 
including growing demand, hectic transactions, growing number of stakeholders, high 
interconnection and interdependencies, complexity of control. Therefore, development of 
integrated interdisciplinary frameworks and related technologies for the provision of 
resilience, dependability and security in complex interconnected and heterogeneous 
communication networks and information infrastructures that underpin our economy and 
society is being promoted by research work programme, both at European and American 
levels. 
Table 1 lists a few projects and initiatives, considered particularly relevant among those 
related to the CRUTIAL research agenda. 
Title Type Start date- 
End date 
Website 
SAFEGUARD – Intelligent Agents 
Organisation to Enhance Dependability 
and Survivability of Large Complex 
Critical Infrastructure. 
EU project - Funded 
under FP5 
01/12/2001 
31/05/2004 
http://www.ist-
safeguard.org/ 
IRRIIS – Integrated Risk Reduction of 
Information-based Infrastructure 
Systems 
EU IP Project – 
Funded under FP 6 
01/02/2006 
31/01/2009 
http://www.irriis.org/ 
GRID: a coordination action on ICT 
vulnerabilities of power systems and 
the relevant defence methodologies 
EU CA Project – 
Funded under FP 6 
01/01/2006 
31/12/2007 
http://grid.jrc.it/ 
CI2RCO - Critical information 
infrastructure research coordination  
EU CA Project – 
Funded under FP 6 
01/03/2005 
28/02/2007 
http://www.ci2rco.org 
RDS - Ricerca di Sistema  Italian Research 
Programme - Funded 
by the Italian Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and 
Crafts 
Multiannual 
program 
active since 
2000 until 
2008 
http://www.ricercadisistema
.it/ 
TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure 
for the Power Grid 
US project – Funded 
by NSF, Dep. of 
Energy and Dep. of 
Homeland Security 
August 2005 
August 2010 
http://www.iti.uiuc.edu/tcip/ 
Table 1: Relevant projects and initiatives related to CRUTIAL research activity 
SAFEGUARD was among the first European projects to focus on Large Complex Critical 
Infrastructures (LCCIs), such as distributed electricity and telecommunication networks. Its 
main goal was to enhance the dependability and survivability of LCCIs, through a systemic 
conceptual framework and an integrated software toolkit, employed within an intelligent multi-
agent system. The scientific objective was to validate the applicability and efficacy of an 
intelligent agent organisation (and to develop related methodologies and methods) in support 
of LCCIs for ensuring their dependability and survivability. Technological objectives were the 
development of middleware for software agent components and their integration, applied to 
the project domain of interest.  
The IRRIIS project aims at increasing the dependability and resilience of Large Complex 
Critical Infrastructures by introducing appropriate Middleware Improved Technology (MIT) 
based on Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The focus of the project is 
highly related to that of CRUTIAL, being on electricity and telecommunications and especially 
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on the interdependencies between these infrastructures, analyzed through the development 
of a synthetic simulation environment (SYNTEX).  
The objective of GRID is to achieve consensus at the European level on the key issues 
involved by power systems vulnerabilities and the relevant defence methodologies, in view of 
the challenges driven by the transformation of the European power infrastructure. GRID 
wants to assess the needs of the EU power sector on these issues and achieve consensus 
among stakeholders and R&D institutions, so as to establish a roadmap for collaborative 
research in view of the forthcoming 7th framework programme. The focus is especially 
directed to: i) methods to assess reliability, security and risks affecting the power grid, and ii) 
management, control and protection schemes and the relevant architectures and devices. 
The main objective of the CI2RCO project is to create and coordinate a European Taskforce 
to i) encourage a co-ordinated Europe-wide approach for research and development on 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), and ii) to establish a European Research 
Area (ERA) on CIIP as part of the larger IST Strategic Objective to integrate and strengthen 
the ERA on Dependability and Security. CI2RCO will focus on activities across the EU-25 
and ACC2 that are essential to be carried out at European level and that require collaborative 
efforts involving the relevant players of research, research funding actors, policy-makers and 
CI-stakeholders. This is going to be accomplished by a set of coordination activities 
supporting the improvement of networking and coordination of national and European 
research policies, programmes and funding schemes. 
The Italian Research Programme RdS has been set-up within the frame of the Public Interest 
Energy and performs research and development activities aimed at improving the 
economics, security and quality of the Italian electric system. The objective is to devise 
solutions to practical problems, taking into account dynamic evolutions and sustaining the 
changes dictated by international agreements (Kyoto), and evaluating the scientific-
technological progresses. From 2000 to 2005 CESI (Centro Elettrotecnico Sperimentale 
Italiano) had been appointed to manage the funds assigned to the projects and its personnel 
(now moved in CESI RICERCA) were deeply involved in the development of the research 
activities. This Research Programme is structured in projects co-participated by the major 
research operators in the electrical field and academics, whose results are made public in 
form of reports or published papers (in Italian). More than 70 universities and research 
centres were involved in Italy and abroad. The Programme covers a wide-scope area of 
research in power generation, transmission and distribution grids, renewable and dispersed 
energy sources, also considering the physical hazards and environmental impact of these 
installations. Of specific interest for CRUTIAL are the activities in the area of power system 
regulation, control and automation including new control criteria for the power grids, 
probabilistic approaches to static and dynamic security assessment in the preventive 
control, ICT security analysis methodologies and robust ICT architectures that support the 
design and operation of networked automation applications, menaced by both accidental and 
malicious ICT faults. In particular, the hybrid model proposed in [Ciapessoni & Ferrarini 2005] 
to analyse hazards in the electrical power transmission system appears very interesting to 
CRUTIAL. This hybrid model combines: i) a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net to model the 
stochastic behaviour of the components of the electrical power transmission network (e.g., 
lines, busbars, transformers, switches and protections) and the propagation of the lightning 
among such components, and ii) a continuous part, based on the Kirchoff laws, in charge of 
the calculus of the electrical parameters (current and voltage), used to update the network 
topology. The dependability analysis of the electrical power transmission network has been 
carried out via simulation of the hybrid model. The software tool used for the construction of 
the hybrid model and for the simulation analysis is Modelica/Dymola 
(http://www.dynasim.com/index.htm). 
                                               
2
 ACC means: Acceding and Candidate Countries 
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The TCIP NSF Cyber Trust Center was created in August 2005 to address the challenge of 
how to protect the US power grid. TCIP is working to provide the fundamental science and 
technology needed to create an intelligent, adaptive power grid that can survive malicious 
adversaries, provide continuous delivery of power, and support dynamically varying trust 
requirements. The objective is to develop the necessary cyber building blocks and 
architecture, and the validation technology to quantify the amount of trust provided by the 
proposed approach. TCIP Focus Areas include: i) Reliable and Secure Computing Base; ii) 
Trustworthy Data Communications and Control; iii) Wide-area Trustworthy Information 
Exchange, and iv) Quantitative validation. 
The CRUTIAL consortium will promote fruitful cooperation with the above listed 
projects/initiatives, and possibly with others that will be set up during the project’s lifetime, 
mainly in terms of exchange of activity documents and participation to relevant events (such 
as thematic workshops organized by these projects). Some CRUTIAL partners are directly 
involved in a few of the mentioned initiatives: of course, they will act as a highly effective 
vehicle for cross-fertilization among related activities. Among the already established 
liaisons, the CRUTIAL consortium is part of the «IRRIIS Interest Group». 
4 THE CRUTIAL PRELIMINARY MODELLING APPROACH 
This Section provides preliminary directions about the approach followed in CRUTIAL for 
interdependencies modelling. Subsection 4.1 presents preliminary qualitative models for 
describing the typical failures that are characteristic of interdependent infrastructures, i.e., 
cascading, escalating and common-cause failures. The infrastructure interdependencies are 
modelled globally without explicitly describing their component behaviours. The detailed 
modelling of the infrastructures taking into account their internal structure is discussed in 
subsection 4.2 where a preliminary hierarchical modelling framework is presented based on 
the architectural descriptions and scenarios presented in [Brasca et al. 2006, 
CESI RICERCA 2006b, Leuven 2006]. The models discussed in Section 4.1. and Section 4.2 
provide two complementary views for addressing the interdependencies modelling problem 
at two different abstraction levels.  
4.1 Qualitative modelling of interdependencies 
The aim of this section is to provide preliminary qualitative models of two interdependent 
infrastructures: the information infrastructure and the electricity infrastructure. As stated 
earlier, the interdependencies of these two infrastructures are increasing due to a growing 
connection of the power grid networks to the global information infrastructure, as a 
consequence of market deregulation and opening. These interdependencies increase the 
risk of failures or disruptions.  
We focus on cascading, escalating outages and common-cause outages, which correspond 
the main causes of failures due to interdependencies as discussed in Section 2. Definitions 
for such events, when adopting outage and recuperation as generic terms, are reminded 
below: 
- a cascading outage occurs when an outage in one infrastructure causes an outage 
of one or more component(s) in a second infrastructure; 
- an escalating outage occurs when an existing outage in one infrastructure 
exacerbates an independent outage in another infrastructure, increasing its severity 
or the time for recuperation from this outage; 
- a common-cause outage occurs when two or more infrastructures exhibit the outage 
in concomitance, due to some common cause, either internal or external. 
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It is noteworthy that these classes of outages are not independent: e.g., common-cause 
outages can cause cascading outages [Krings & Oman 2003]. 
We model the infrastructures globally, not explicitly modelling their components. The models 
presented are qualitative ones. They are built based on assumption related to the behaviour 
of the infrastructures as resulting from their mutual interdependencies. Indeed, the models 
describe scenarios that are likely to take place when outages occur.  
In the remainder of this section, we will address outages in the electricity infrastructure and 
accidental outages in the information infrastructure and, considering the three classes of 
interdependencies, then we will illustrate briefly how malicious attacks can be addressed. 
For the sake of clarity, and in order to avoid any confusion between the two infrastructures, 
we use specialized terms for the two infrastructures states and events as indicated by 
Table 1. These specialized terms apply when considering both sources of failures (accidental 
failures and malicious attacks). The first four lines correspond to states and events of each 
infrastructure as resulting from its own outages and recuperation actions, while the last line 
corresponds to the state of an infrastructure as resulting from the constraints imposed by the 
other infrastructure (i.e., a disruption in the electricity infrastructure leads the information 
infrastructure to a lessened state and a failure of the information infrastructure leads the 
electricity infrastructure to a weakened state. More details on these states will be given in the 
next section. 
Table 1: States and events of the infrastructures 
Generic Information 
Infrastructure 
Electricity 
Infrastructure 
Normal operation Working Up 
Outage Failure, attack Disruption 
Dysfunction Partially Failed Partially Down, Lost 
Recuperation Recovery Restoration 
Constrained Lessened Weakened 
 
4.1.1 Accidental outages 
The aim is to model the infrastructures behaviour together taking into account the impact of 
accidental failures and disruptions, as well as their effects on both infrastructures. Modelling 
is carried out progressively: 
- First, we model cascading events by analysing the constraints one infrastructure 
puts on the other one, assuming that the latter was in a normal operating state when 
an event occurs in the former.  
- Then, we address cascading and escalating events considering successively: 
i) constraints of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure, 
ii) constraints both ways (of the information infrastructure on the electricity 
infrastructure and of the electricity infrastructure on the information 
infrastructure). 
- Finally, we address common-cause outages. 
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4.1.1.1 Modelling cascading outages 
We analyse the impact of accidental failures on the information and electricity infrastructures 
assuming that the latter is in an Up state, then the impact of disruptions on electricity and 
information infrastructures assuming that the latter is in a Working state, before considering 
the combined impact of failures and disruptions in the next section.  
Failures 
Accidental failures, hardware- or software-induced, affecting the information infrastructure 
can be: 
- masked failures, leading to latent errors, 
- signalled failures. 
Latent errors can be:  
- passive (i.e., without any action on the electricity infrastructure), but keeping the 
operators uninformed of possible disruptions occurring in the electricity 
infrastructure,  
- active, provoking configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure. 
After signalled failures, the information infrastructure is in partially failed states: the variety of 
functions and components of the information infrastructure, and its essential character of 
large network make unlikely total failure. Latent errors can accumulate, and signalled failures 
may take place when the information infrastructure is in latent error states. When the 
information infrastructure is in the partially failed state, recovery is necessary to bring it back 
to the working state. 
Figure 4-a gives the state machine model of the information infrastructure taking into account 
its own failures. States presented by several boxes correspond in reality to a group of 
different states that are considered as equivalent with respect to the classification given in 
Table 1. For example all states with only one busbar isolated can be considered as 
equivalent irrespective of which busbar is isolated. 
We assume that a failure in the information infrastructure puts some constraints on the 
electricity infrastructure (i.e., cascading outage), leading to a weakened electricity 
infrastructure (e.g., with a lower performance, unduly isolations, and unnecessary off-line 
trips of production plants or of transmission lines). From a Weakened state a configuration 
restoration leads the electricity infrastructure into an Up state. For the electricity 
infrastructure, the constraints may cause untimely configuration changes, leading to a Lost 
state (i.e., a blackout state), from which a restoration is required to bring back the electricity 
infrastructure into the Up state. Figure 4-b shows the constraint that the information 
infrastructure puts on the electricity infrastructure when the latter is in an Up state.  
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Figure 4: Impact of failures on infrastructures behaviour 
Disruptions 
We consider that disruptions lead the electricity infrastructure to be partially down, unless 
propagation within the infrastructure leads to loosing its control (e.g., a blackout of the power 
grid), because of an information infrastructure failure (this latter case corresponds to 
escalating events that will be covered in the next section). Figure 5-a gives the state machine 
model of the electricity infrastructure taking into account its own disruptions.  
Also disruptions may lead the information infrastructure to a lessened state in which parts of 
the information infrastructure can no longer implement their functions, although they are not 
failed, due to constraints originating from disruptions of the electricity infrastructure. Figure 5-
b shows the constraint that the electricity infrastructure puts on the information infrastructure 
assuming that the latter is in a working state. 
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Figure 5: Impact of disruptions on infrastructures behaviour 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the states and events of each infrastructure, taking into account 
cascading events, as described above.  
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Table 2: States and events of the information infrastructure 
Events 
Signalled failure Detected failure 
Masked failure Undetected failure 
Recovery Action for bringing back the information infrastructure in its normal 
functioning after failure(s) occurred 
States 
Working The information infrastructure ensures normal control of the electricity 
infrastructure 
Passive latent error Parts of the information infrastructure are failed, which prevents monitoring 
of the electricity infrastructure: disruptions may remain unnoticed 
Active latent error Parts of the information infrastructure are failed, that may lead to 
unnecessary, and unnoticed configuration changes 
Partially Failed Parts of the information infrastructure are knowingly failed. Partially failed 
conditions are considered: the variety of functions and of the components 
of the infrastructure, and its essential character of large network make 
unlikely total failure 
Lessened Parts of the information infrastructure can no longer implement their 
functions, although they are not failed, due to constraints originating from 
disruptions of the electricity infrastructure, e.g., shortage of electricity 
supply of unprotected parts 
 
Table 3: States and events of the electricity infrastructure  
Events 
Disruption Malfunctioning of elements of the power grid: production plants, 
transformers, transmission lines, breakers, etc.  
Configuration change Change of configuration of the power grid that are not immediate 
consequences of disruptions, e.g., off-line trips of production plants or of 
transmission lines 
Configuration restoration Act of bringing back the electricity infrastructure in its initial configuration, 
when configuration changes have taken place 
Restoration Actions for bringing back the electricity infrastructure in its normal 
functioning after disruption(s) occurred. Typically, restoration is a 
sequence of configuration change(s), repair(s), configuration restoration(s) 
States 
Up Electricity production, transmission and distribution are ensured in normal 
conditions 
Partially Down Due to disruption(s), electricity production, transmission and distribution 
are no longer ensured in normal conditions, they are however somehow 
ensured, in degraded conditions  
Lost Propagation of disruptions within the electricity infrastructure led to loosing 
its control, i.e., a blackout occurred. 
Weakened Electricity production, transmission and distribution are no longer ensured 
in normal conditions, due to failure(s) of the information infrastructure that 
constrain the functioning of the electricity infrastructure, although no 
disruption occurred in the latter. The capability of the electricity 
infrastructure is degraded: lower performance, configuration changes, 
possible manual control, etc. 
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4.1.1.2 Modelling cascading and escalating outages 
The global state machine model of the two infrastructures is built progressively: 
- considering, in a first step, only the constraints of the information infrastructure on 
the electricity infrastructure, 
- considering constraints of each infrastructure on the other. 
Figure 6 gives a state machine model of the infrastructures, taking into account, only the 
constraints of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure. The states are 
described in terms of the statuses of both infrastructures. Both cascading outages (states 3, 
4) and escalating ones are evidenced, with a distinction of consequences of the latter in 
terms of time to restoration (state 6) and of severity (state 7). Dependency of the electricity 
infrastructure upon the information infrastructure is illustrated by the need for both recovery 
and restoration from states 6 and 7. This figure does not consider accumulation of 
disruptions in the electricity infrastructure 
A noteworthy example of transitions from states 1 to 2, and from 2 to 7 relates to the August 
2003 blackout in the USA and Canada: the failure of the monitoring software was one of the 
immediate causes of the blackout, as it prevented confining the electrical line incident, before 
its propagation across the power grid [US-Canada 2004].  
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Figure 6: State Machine taking into account constraints of the information 
infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure 
 
A Petri net representation of the model of Figure 3 is given by Figure 7, where the cascading 
and escalating mechanisms are evidenced. Such mechanisms are, in Petri net terms, 
synchronizations between the individual events of the infrastructures. Table 4 gives the 
correspondence between the states and events of Figures 6 and 7. 
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Figure 7: Example of a high level Petri net associated to the state machine of Figure 3 
Table 4: Correspondence between states and events of the Petri net and Figure 3 model 
 
States Markings
1 P1, P5
2 P2,P5
3 P4,P5,P11
4 P3,P5,P8
5 P1,P6
6 P7
7 P9
        
State Machine 
Transitions
Petri Net 
Transitions
1  2 T1
1  3 T4 - τ1
1 ¼ 4 T2 - τ3
1 ¼ 5 T7 - τ10
2 ¼ 4 T3 - τ2
2 ¼ 7 T7 - τ10 - τ6
3 ¼ 4 T5 - τ9
3 ¼ 7 - config ch T8
3 ¼ 7 - disruption T7 - τ10 - τ7
4 ¼ 1 T6
4 ¼ 6 T7 - τ4
5 ¼ 1 T9
5 ¼ 6 T2 - τ5
5 ¼ 7 T1 - τ6 or T4 - τ8
6 ¼ 1 T10
7 ¼ 1 T11
 
 
This Petri net is very simple. In particular, it does not distinguish the individual states within a 
group of states represented by several boxes in Figure 6. For example, state 2 of Figure 6 
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that represents in reality a set of states is represented by a single state in the Petri net of 
Figure 7. The Petri net is given to illustrate how cascading and escalating events can be 
modelled in practice. 
Figure 8 gives a state machine model of the infrastructures, taking into account the 
constraints of the electricity infrastructure on the information infrastructure in addition to 
those of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure already considered in 
Figure 6. In addition, Figure 8 assumes possible accumulation of disruptions from states 5 to 
7 and from the escalation restoration state 6 to the escalation severity state 8.  
 
3
 
Active
latent error
2
4
6
5
7
Di
sr
u
pt
io
n Sig
naled
Failure
Up Weakened
R
e
st
o
ra
tio
n
D
is
ru
pt
io
n
D
is
ru
pt
io
n
Recovery and Configuration Restoration
Signaled Failure
Recov
ery an
d Res
toratio
n
Signaled
 Failure
MaskedFailure
Signaled Failure
Working PartiallyFailed
  
  
Electricity
infrastructure
status
Information
infrastructure
status
Ca
sc
a
de
Es
ca
la
tio
n
R
e
st
o
ra
tio
n
1
  
  
  
  
 
Passive
latent error
Up
 
Partially
Down
Working
  
Recovery
 and
Restoration
Partially
Failed
Partially
Down
 
D
isr
u
pt
io
n
Lost
Partially
Failed
Escalation
Severity
8
    
MaskedFailure
Co
n
fig
u
ra
tio
n
Ch
an
ge
Weakened
Maske
d
Failur
e
Ca
sc
a
de
Partially
Down
  
 
 
Lessened
  
Disruption
 
 
Recovery
 and
Restoration
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Ca
sc
a
de
Signaled Fai
lure
M
as
ke
d
Fa
ilu
re
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disruption
 
 
 
Disruption
 
 
Figure 8: State machine model of the two infrastructures  
when considering accidental failures 
4.1.1.3 Modelling common-cause outages  
Figure 9 gives a model with respect to common-cause outages that would occur when the 
infrastructures are in normal operation, bringing the infrastructures into states 6 or 8 of 
Figure 8, i.e., to escalation. Should such outages occur in other states of the infrastructures 
of Figure 8 model, they would also lead to states 6 or 8. 
Considering common-cause outages does not introduce additional states, they however add 
direct transitions from already existing states that do not exist when considering only 
cascading and escalating failures. The states of resulting model become almost totally 
interconnected.  
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Figure 9: Common-cause outages 
4.1.2 Malicious attacks  
We consider malicious attacks of the information infrastructure and their consequences on 
the electricity infrastructure. A distinction has to be performed for both infrastructures 
between their real status and their apparent status. For the electricity infrastructure, the 
apparent status is as reported by the information infrastructure. 
 
Attacks fall into two classes:  
- deceptive attacks that are provoking unperceived malfunctions, thus similar to the 
latent errors previously considered,  
- perceptible attacks creating detected damages. 
 
Deceptive attacks can be:  
- passive (i.e., without any direct action on the electricity infrastructure),  
- active, provoking configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure. 
 
Figure 10 gives the state machine model of the infrastructures. This model and the previous 
one are syntactically identical: they differ by the semantics of the states and of the inter-state 
transitions. Let us consider for example states 2 and 3. 
In state 2, the effects of the passive deceptive attack are: i) the information infrastructure 
looks like working while it is in a partially failed state due to the attack, ii) it informs wrongly 
the operator that the electricity infrastructure is partially down, and as consequence iii) the 
operator performs some configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure leading it to a 
weakened state. Accumulation of configuration changes by the operator may lead the 
electricity infrastructure into a lost state.  
In state 3, the effects of the active deceptive attack are: i) the information infrastructure looks 
like working while it is in a partially failed state due to the attack, ii) it performs some 
configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure leading it to a weakened state without 
informing the operator that the electricity infrastructure is partially down, for whom the 
electricity infrastructure appears if it were Up. Accumulation of configuration changes by the 
information infrastructure may lead the electricity infrastructure into a lost state. 
The difference between states 2 and 3 is that in state 2 the operator has made some actions 
on the electricity infrastructure and is aware of the weakened state, while in state 3 the 
operator is not aware of the actions performed by the information infrastructure on the 
electricity infrastructure.  
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Figure 10: State machine model of the two infrastructures when considering  
malicious attacks 
After detection of the attack, the apparent states of the infrastructures become identical to 
the real ones (state 4), in which Recovery and Configuration Restoration are necessary to 
bring back the infrastructures to their Working and Up states. 
States 5, 6 and 7 are very similar respectively to states 5, 6 and 7 of Figure 8, except that in 
state 6 the information infrastructure is partially failed following a perceptive attack in Figure 
10 and following a signalled failure in Figure 8. 
In Figure 10, state 8 corresponds to a Lost state but the operator is not aware, he/she has 
been informed wrongly by the partially failed information infrastructure that it is partially 
down. 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
In this section we have introduced qualitative models allowing the analysis of the behaviour 
of the information and electricity infrastructures taking into account the effect of outages of 
each infrastructure on the other one. These models describe at a high level scenarios that 
may occur when outages occur and the relationship between the states of the two 
infrastructures. 
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4.2 Preliminary framework for the interdependencies modelling and 
quantitative evaluation 
In this Section, an approach to a preliminary definition of the framework that could be used to 
characterize the interdependencies between the Electrical Infrastructure (EI) and its 
Information Technology based Control System (ITCS) is presented. Starting from the 
description of the EI and the ITCS, we have preliminarily characterized the state of the 
electrical infrastructure, the interdependencies between the two subsystems and identified 
the major modelling components, proposing a possible hierarchical composition approach. 
Section 4.2.1 contains the main abbreviations used in the presentation of the framework. In 
Section 4.2.2 we identify the main system elements to be considered in the framework, 
basing on [CESI RICERCA 2006a] and [CESI RICERCA 2006b]. Then, the concept of state 
is defined in Section 4.2.3, both for the Electrical Infrastructure and for the Information 
Technology based Control System. In particular, a hybrid state is defined for the EI, 
composed by a discrete part and a continuous one. In Section 4.2.4 we identify possible 
failure models, both within the EI and ITCS individually, and considering their 
interdependencies. Next Section 4.2.5 briefly sketches the dynamic behaviour of the 
electrical power system. Section 4.2.6 proposes some representative measures of interest, 
while the modelling and evaluation framework is sketched in Section 4.2.7, in which we 
summarize the required functionalities and we give an example of its application. 
4.2.1 Main abbreviations 
• EPS: Electrical Power System  
• EI: Electrical Infrastructure  
• ITCS: Information Technology based Control System  
• HG - LG: Huge Voltage - Medium and Low Voltage Generation plants  
• TG - DG: Transmission - Distribution Grid  
• HL – LL: Huge Voltage - Medium and Low Voltage Loads  
• LTS: Local Telecontrol System  
• RTS: Regional Telecontrol System  
• NTS: National Telecontrol System 
• LTC: Local Telecontrol Center 
• ATC: Area Telecontrol Center 
4.2.2 Logical scheme of the electrical power system 
The content of this Section has been derived from [CESI RICERCA 2006a] and 
[CESI RICERCA 2006b]. The electrical power system (EPS) is logically structured in two 
interacting parts: Electrical Infrastructure (EI) and Information Technology based Control 
System (ITCS). 
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4.2.2.1  The Electrical Infrastructure 
The EI represents the electrical infrastructure necessary to produce and to transport the 
electrical power towards the final users. It can be logically structured in different components, 
as shown in Figure 11: the transmission grid (TG), the distribution grid (DG), the huge 
voltage generation plants (HG), the medium and low voltage generation plants (LG), the 
huge voltage loads (HL), the medium and low voltage loads (LL).  
(a)    (b)     
Figure 11: General (a) and typical (b) scheme of the EI 
 
A typical scheme of EI is shown in Figure 11 where the components HL and LG are not 
present. Moreover, the distribution grid can be structured in two different medium and low 
voltage grids. 
From a topological point of view, TG and DG can be considered like a network, or a graph, 
as shown in the example of Figure 12. The nodes of the graph represent the substations, 
while the arcs represent the power lines. The generators and the loads are nodes connected 
by arcs (power lines) to the nodes of the grid. Some nodes of the grid can be connected to 
nodes of the contiguous grid. 
 
(a)     (b)     
Figure 12: Example of meshed graph (a) and logical graph (b) for a dummy 
transmission grid 
 
From the scheme of Figure 12 (a), the new logical scheme of Figure 12 (b) can be derived.  
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 49  
The logical schemes of the components NG, NL, NS and AL (not shown, for brevity) are 
obtained by grouping the main electrical equipments (transformer, bus-bar, breaker, switch, 
power line and protection) following an approach that has the advantage to simplify the 
logical representation.  
The component NS represents the parts common to all substations (e.g., the bus-bar). 
Breakers, switches, transformers and protection logics, which are physically part of a 
substation, are now included in the scheme for the new logical component AL. In this way, 
only a few types of different AL have to be considered. NG and NL represent a generation 
plant and a load, respectively. 
 
(a)     (b)     
(c)     
 
Figure 13: Example of scheme for a substation and the connected power lines: 
physical scheme (a), low level (b) and high level (c) logical schemes 
 
In Figure 13 an example of physical and logical scheme for a substation and the connected 
power lines is shown, where two different types of component AL are considered: AB,L and 
AT,L. 
4.2.2.2 The Information Technology Based Control System 
ITCS implements the control system based on information technology. As shown in Figure 
14, The main logical components of the ITCS are:  
• the protection system (PS),  
• the frequency regulation system (FRS),  
• the voltage regulation system (VRS),  
• the teleoperation (or telecontrol) system of the transmission grid (TTOS),  
• the teleoperation (or telecontrol) system of the distribution grid (DTOS),  
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• the TSO transmission network (TSOcommNetw) and the DSO transmission network 
(DSOcommNetw). 
 
Figure 14: Logical scheme of the ITCS 
 
The protection system is composed by a set of independent (or loosely connected) local 
protections. We can consider one local protection for each breaker of the EI. FRS has the 
goal to regulate the frequency of the single generators and along the transmission. It can 
receive information on the state of the grid from TTOS. VRS has the goal to guarantee that 
values of the voltages remain as constant as possible along the transmission grid in order to 
supply to the customers a voltage with good quality without interruptions.  
At the current stage, the detailed logical structure of these components and that of the other 
subsystems involved in the ITCS system are not addressed, and the following discussion will 
only be limited to the TTOS and DTOS subsystems. In Figure 15 we depict a possible logical 
structure of TTOS and DTOS, where the components LTS, RTS and NTS of TTOS, and the 
components LTC and ATC of DTOS differ for their criticality and for the locality of their 
decisions.  
 
 
Figure 15: Logical scheme of TTOS and DTOS 
 
The transmission and distribution grids are divided in homogeneous regions and areas, 
respectively. LTS and LTC guarantee the correct operation of substation equipment and 
reconfigures the substation in case of breakdown of some apparatus. They include the 
acquisition and control equipment (sensors and actuators). RTS and ATC monitors their 
region and area, respectively, in order to diagnose faults on the power lines. In case of 
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breakdowns, they choose the more suitable corrective actions to restore the functionality of 
the grid. Since the RTS and ATC were not directly connected to the substations, the 
corrective actions to adopt are communicated to the LTS or ATC of reference. NTS has the 
main function of supervising the entire grid and handling the planning of medium and long-
term operations. NTS also assists the RTS (and ATC) to localize breakdowns on the power 
lines situated between two regions (two areas). LTS and LTC, such as RTS and ATC, 
cooperate to decide operation of load sheddings. 
4.2.3 State definition for EI and ITCS 
The state of the Electrical Infrastructure (EI) is an hybrid-state composed by a discrete part 
and a continuous one. It can be defined as a 7-tuple (T, V, F, I, A, P, Q), where:  
• T represents the topology of the grid, i.e., the components NS, NG, NL and AL and their 
connections (as shown for example in Figure (b)). T could also include information on 
the direction of the current flow on each power line.  
This information is used to reconfigure the topology of the grid. Therefore, T can be 
described as an oriented graph where NS, NG and NL are nodes and AL are arcs.  
• V, F, I, A, P and Q are the voltage, the frequency, the current flow, the angle, the 
active and reactive power associated to the components NS, NG, NL and AL (if 
applicable).  
T represents the discrete part of the EI states, whereas V, F, I, A, P and Q represent the 
continuous part of the EI states [CESI RICERCA 2006a].  
Following the state model as in  [CESI RICERCA 2006a] (see Section 2.1.4), each state 
NORMAL, ALERT, EMERGENCY, IN EXTREMIS and RESTORATIVE of the EI can be 
described with different combinations of values of the 7-upla (T, V, F, I, A, P, Q). 
For what concerns the ITCS state, we envision that such state to be discrete, in the sense 
that it is only composed by discrete values. Some possible states are “Working”, “Passive 
latent”, “Omission Failure”, etc. Its definition will be detailed during the project. 
4.2.4 Failure model of EPS and Interdependencies 
The failure model of the Electrical Power System (EPS) is presented in three steps. First, the 
failure model of the Electrical Infrastructure (EI) is sketched. Then, the failure model of the 
Information Technology based Control System is discussed. The third step consists of the 
ITCS-EI failure model, where the reciprocal impact of ITCS failures and of EI disruptions is 
analysed. Therefore, the model assumed for the disruptions of the EI and for the failures of 
the ITCS is based on their effects on the state of the EI. 
Failure model of EI: 
A disruption (or disturbance or contingency) is the unexpected failure or outage of a EI 
component, such as generator, power line, circuit breaker, bus-bar, or other electrical 
components. The main (electrical) disruptions, based on their effects on (single o multiple) 
components NS, NG, NL and AL, could be summarized in: 
1) Transient or permanent disconnection of a component AL, NS, NG, or NL with the 
consequent separation of one or more components from the grid.  
2) Transient or permanent failed disconnection of a component AL, NS, NG, or NL without 
isolation from the grid.  
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3) Transient or permanent overloads of AL, NS, NG, or NL.  
4) Unexpected reduction of production of NG.  
5) Unexpected increase or reduction of demand of NL.  
6) Voltage collapse.  
7) Underfrequency and loss of synchronism.  
The disruptions listed at points from 3) to 7) represent changes of the electrical parameters 
of the components of the grid NS, NG, NL and AL.  
The disruptions listed at points 1) and 7) represent changes of the topology of the grid T.  
After the change of T, at least one or a combination of the values for V, F, I, A, P and Q will 
change. Whereas, when V, F, I, A, P and Q change, the topology T does not change. 
Failure model of ITCS: 
The failures of the ITCS components can be summarized in: 
• (transient and permanent) omission failure,  
• time failure, 
• value failure and  
• byzantine failure.  
Here the focus is on the failures and not on their causes (internal HW/SW faults, malicious 
attacks, etc.). 
ITCS-EI Failure model (interdependencies): 
First, the impact of ITCS failures on EI is analysed. Failures in the ITCS impact on the state 
of the EI (i.e., on the topology T and on the values of V, F, I, A, P and Q), depending on the 
logical components affected by the failures, and obviously on the type of the failures. 
For example, consequences of a failure of the component LTS associated to a component 
NS, NG, NL and AL can be:  
• Omission failure of LTS, fail silent LTS. No (reconfiguration) actions are performed on 
the components NS or AL.  
• Time failure of LTS. The above (reconfiguration) actions on the components NS or AL 
are performed after a certain delay (or before the instant of time they are required).  
• Value failure of LTS. Incorrect closing or opening of the power lines AL directly 
connected to the component is performed. These events can occur both when the 
state of EI requires an action from ITCS (which is incorrect), and when the state of EI 
is normal and no action from ITCS is actually required.  
Failures of the component LTS can also impact on the input values that the components RTS 
receive from LTS. These values can be omitted, delayed (or anticipated) or erroneous. Since 
reconfigurations required by RTS (or NTS) are actuated by the associated component LTS, a 
failure of a component LTS can also impact on the reconfigurations required by RTS (or 
NTS).  
The failure of the component RTS (or NTS) corresponds to an erroneous (request of) 
reconfiguration of the state of the EI (including an unneeded reconfiguration) affecting one or 
more components of the controlled region. The effect of the failure of RTS (or NTS) on a 
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component N is the same as the failure of the component LTS associated to the component 
N. In the case of Byzantine failure these effects can be different for each component N.  
In general, the failure of the components LTS, RTS and NTS may depend on the failures of 
the components connected to them through a (public or corporate) communication network.  
Disruptions of EI on ITCS constitute a physical interdependency. Disruptions of the EI 
infrastructure impact on (parts of) the ITCS system by lessening its functionalities (till 
complete failure in the extreme case the disruption is a total blackout of the power grid). For 
example, a disruption may cause a partial blackout, that reduces the performance of the 
private or public network used by the ITCS. Then, the communication times degrade, leading 
to timing failures of the ITCS. 
4.2.5 Dynamic behaviour of EPS 
The hybrid-state of EI changes when the topology T of the system or the values for V, F, I, A, 
P and Q change, i.e., when one of the following events occurs:  
- disruption (including failure of a local protection),  
- activation of a protection local to the EI,  
- voltage or frequency regulation or reconfiguration action by ITCS (including 
erroneous, delayed or not required action),  
- maintenance actions on the EI.  
Therefore, the state of EI can also change due to actions by the ITCS. These actions can be 
correctly activated by an event in the EI, or can be erroneously activated by a failure of the 
ITCS. 
The discrete-state of ITCS can change when one of the following events occurs:  
- failure of a component of the ITCS,  
- disruption of the EI,  
- recovery. 
4.2.6 Measures of interest for the EPS 
Dependability analysis of EPS based on a stochastic approach requires the definition of 
measures of performability, which is a unified measure proposed to simultaneously deal with 
performance and dependability. A set of measures specific for the EPS can be based on the 
following reward structure where costs and rewards are considered with respect to the point 
of the view of the power producers and distributors:  
- To each generator a cost is associated, depending on: the generated power P, the 
type of generator, the economic loss implied by a breakdown of the generator.  
- To each load a positive reward is associated, depending on: the consumed power, 
the criticality of the load.  
- To each interruption of service supply a cost is associated, depending on: the 
difference between the required power and the available power for each load, the 
number of loads which will be powered off, the criticality of loads which will be 
powered off, duration of the interruption.  
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Generally, reconfigurations of EI impact on the performability measures, e.g., when loads are 
switched off/on or when consumed or generated power are modified. 
4.2.7 Prominent Aspects of the EPS modelling framework 
To model and evaluate the performability of EPS we first define a model representing the 
behaviour of the system at the needed level of detail, and then we solve it by simulation or 
analytically. 
To represent and model the behaviour of EI and ITCS and their interactions, the following 
aspects should be considered. 
Structural aspects:  
• The system has a natural hierarchical structure, as shown in the examples of logical 
schemes of Section 4.2.2.  
• At a certain level of detail, the system is composed by many similar components 
having the same logical structure, as shown, for example, in Figure 11(b) for the 
logical components NS, NG, NL and AL. In effect, these components can be grouped 
based on similar sub-components. All similar components can be considered non 
anonymous replicas having the same structure and different parameter values for the 
activities and the events represented.  
• The topology of the grid and the electrical values associated to each component of 
the grid are part of the state of the EI. 
Behavioural aspects:  
• The time to disruptions of the components NS, NG, NL and AL depends also on the 
value of the electrical parameters associated to the components. A disruption of a 
component can propagate to contiguous components.  
• The propagation time of a disruption should not be considered instantaneous.  
• Protections can stop the propagation of a disruption by isolating from the grid the 
component affected by a disruption. The activation time of a protection should not be 
considered instantaneous. The correct activation of a protection depends also on the 
strength of the disruption and on the value of the electrical parameters associated to 
the protection component.  
• The reaction time (with respect to the occurrence of a disruption), the failure time and 
erroneous activation time (when no disruptions have occurred) of a component (e.g., 
LTS, RTS and NTS) should be considered.  
• The functions that implement the reconfiguration and regulation algorithms should be 
considered. These functions activate when EI is not in equilibrium; in such conditions, 
they receive as input the 7-tupla (Ti, Vi, Fi, Ci, Ai, Pi, Qi) where the EI is not in 
equilibrium and produce as outputs the new 7-tupla (Te, Ve, Fe, Ce, Ae, Pe, Qe) which 
allows the equilibrium condition to be restored (that is, EI is back to the NORMAL 
state), if possible. If needed, the system’s behaviour could be organized in phases, 
following the system state model shown in Figure 3. 
To capture the above discussed structural and behavioural aspects, the modelling and 
evaluation framework should possess the following major characteristics, grouped into three 
categories: modelling power aspects (the basic modelling mechanisms required to build the 
EPS model), the modelling efficiency aspects (the advanced modelling mechanisms required 
to build the EPS model more efficiently), and the solution power aspects. 
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Modelling power:  
• Different formalisms for different sub-models.  
• Representation of continuous, discrete and hybrid state.  
• Time distributions, probability distributions and conditions enabling the time 
consuming events which depend on the discrete or continuous state.  
• The call to the function which implements the reconfiguration and regulation 
algorithms.  
• Definition of performability measures. 
Modelling efficiency:  
• Hierarchical composition of the model.  
• Possible organization in phases of the model (if needed).  
• Composition of different sub-models.  
• Replication of (anonymous and non anonymous) sub-models.  
• Replicated and composed models can share part of state (common state).  
• Duplication of a model (to make a copy of a model).  
• Representation of discrete state.  
• Compact representation for the topology of the grid (for T), for example, describing a 
part of the state of the system in terms of a matrix (incidence matrix [nodes x arcs]).  
• Compact representation of continuous state (for V, F, I, A, P and Q), for example, 
describing a part of the state of the system in term of arrays, associating to each 
component of the EI grid (nodes and arcs) the values of V, F, I, A, P and Q (if any). 
Solution power: 
Analytical solution of the overall model (if possible). Problems could be: the explosion of the 
states of the model; an analytical solution method could not exist for the class of model 
considered, depending on the considered time distributions; the stiffness.  
• Analytical solution of sub-models.  
• Separate evaluation of different sub-models and combination of the results.  
• Simulation (by existing automatic tools or ad hoc simulation software). 
4.2.7.1 On the construction of the overall EPS model 
In this Section we address the problem of building the overall model for the entire EPS, 
considering the logical scheme of the electrical grid as shown in Figure 12 (b). 
The model construction should consist of the following steps:  
1. Define the models MN and MA for each generic component N (representing a node of 
the grid, with N= NS, NG, NL) and for A=AL (representing an arc of the grid). To simplify 
the example we do not consider different schemes for each component.  
2. Duplicate MN and MA for each specific component N and A, and set its individual 
parameters.  
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3. On the basis of the topology T, connect manually, the models MN and MA,  by using a 
composition operator the models MN and MA, for each node N connected to an arc A.  
When the number of components N and A is high, the construction of the model based on 
the above approach can be very expensive in terms of time and very error prone. The above 
process could be automated, defining a function which receives in input a incidence matrix 
describing the topology T of the grid and generates the composed model representing T.  
Alternatively, a model describing a topology can be defined by using a compact approach 
based on replication and possibility to define part of the state of a system with an array (for 
the incidence matrix [nodes x arcs]). In this case, to construct a model representing a 
topology like that shown in Figure 12 (b), the following steps should be required, for m nodes 
N and n arcs A: 
1. Define the model MN and MA for each generic component N (representing a node of 
the grid, with N= NS, NG, NL) and for A=AL.  
2. Define a part of the state of MN and MA by using a matrix m x n T[i,j] of binary values 
(0,1), where T[i,j]=1 if the component i-th is connected to the component j-th, otherwise 
T[i,j]=0 (the values 1 and -1 can be used if it is needed to represent also the direction 
of the arc, i.e., if T is an oriented graph). The time distributions and the conditions in 
the model MN can depend on the values of T. In particular, the i-th replica of MN (or the 
j-th replica of MA) can be defined as a function of T[i,j], and can modify T[i,j] (see 
below).  
3. Define a hierarchical model by automatically replicating m times the model MN, by 
assigning to each replica a different index, from 1 to m. The state defined with matrix T 
is common to all the replicated sub-models MN. The parameters of the i-th replica can 
depend on the values of T[i,j].  
4. Define a hierarchical model by automatically replicating n times the model MA, by 
assigning at each replica a different index, from 1 to n. The state defined with matrix T 
is common to all the replicated sub-models MA. The replica j-th can depend by the 
values of the element T[i,j].  
Thus, it is possible to model a sub-system without constructing (or duplicating) manually the 
models for each single component N and A of the grid and without connecting each specific 
couple of models manually to obtain the required topology.  
Following the same compact approach it is also possible to define the parameters of the 
replicas of the model MN (or MA) as a function of continuous state and to model fault 
propagation. 
4.2.7.2 Discussion 
We have discussed the major characteristics of the modelling and evaluation framework to 
properly assess the impact of interdependencies in EPS systems. Given the complexity of 
the system under analysis and of the steps required to implement the approach identified 
above, support by automatic tools is mandatory. The stochastic activity network (SAN) 
[Sanders & Meyer 2001] formalism and the framework of the tool Möbius [Daly et al. 2000] 
seem very suitable means to support the main characteristics described above. In fact, 
extended places having associated array of real numbers can be defined, thus allowing the 
definition of both discrete and continuous aspects of the system states. Moreover input 
gates, output gates, and parameters in the activities can be defined as a function of the 
extended places. 
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We are currently progressing in this work by investigating how to implement basic modelling 
characteristics of EPS in the Möbius environment. This would go in the direction of devising 
template models, to be combined together to represent the whole complex system under 
evaluation. Of course, detailed studies of the solution aspects need to be addressed too, to 
come out with a complete modelling and evaluation framework, suitable to quantitative 
assessment of interdependencies impact in electrical power systems. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This deliverable focused on the modelling and analysis of interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures, considering in particular two interdependent infrastructures studied in the 
context of CRUTIAL: the electric power infrastructure and the information infrastructures 
supporting management, control and maintenance functionality. Modelling activities are 
aimed at providing to the different actors involved in the development, operation, 
management and control of the infrastructures, and to the end users useful insights that will 
allow them: i) to understand how such interdependencies might impact the dependability and 
resilience of the delivered services, and  ii) to assess the capabilities of the corresponding 
infrastructures and investigated architectural solutions to deal with the types of  failures 
characteristic of such interdependencies, i.e., cascading, escalating and common cause 
failures, taking into account accidental faults as well as malicious threats.   
This deliverable addressed three main goals. The first goal was to summarise the main 
challenges to be investigated for the analysis and modelling of interdependencies. The 
second goal was to review existing modelling approaches, techniques and tools that can be 
used to address these challenges, and to summarize related work and cooperative projects 
dealing with the modelling and evaluation of interdependent critical infrastructures in general, 
and power system infrastructures, in particular.  
In the presentation of the state of knowledge, we have firstly presented the different types of 
models that are traditionally used to support dependability analysis and evaluation activities, 
emphasizing in particular the state-based modelling approaches that are well suited to 
address the challenges explored in the context of CRUTIAL. We have presented a detailed 
review of modelling approaches aimed at mastering the largeness of state-space models at 
the construction and the solution levels, and the available tools that can support the 
dependability evaluation activity. In addition, a particular attention has been focussed on the 
investigation of modelling techniques that can be used in the context of CRUTIAL to address 
other important challenging issues, such as the need to take into account timing constraints, 
to describe different types of uncertainties concerning the system dynamics and behaviour, 
or to model both discrete and continuous variables. Moreover, as malicious faults represent a 
serious threat to the dependability and resilience of critical infrastructures, a detailed 
discussion of existing modelling and evaluation approaches taking into account these faults 
is also presented. In the discussion of related work, we have also investigated the various 
works that have been carried out recently for modelling cascading failures, mainly in the 
context of power systems infrastructures. Such models are still at a preliminary stage and do 
not take into account the inherent characteristics of the infrastructures and the 
interdependencies between the power infrastructure and the corresponding information and 
control infrastructures. This is one of the objectives followed by CRUTIAL. 
The  third goal of this deliverable was to present preliminary directions about the approach 
followed in CRUTIAL for interdependencies modelling. Two main contributions have been 
obtained so far. Firstly, we have developed preliminary qualitative models for describing the 
typical failures that are characteristic of interdependent infrastructures, i.e., cascading, 
escalating and common-cause failures. The infrastructure interdependencies are modelled 
globally without explicitly describing their component behaviours. The second contribution 
concerns the development of a preliminary hierarchical model framework aimed at the 
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detailed modelling of the infrastructures taking into account their internal structure. The 
proposed model is based on the architectural descriptions and scenarios discussed in 
Workpackage 1.  
The preliminary results obtained so far will be consolidated and extended in the future work. 
Besides progressing towards the implementation of the basic building blocks needed to 
describe the different subsystems of the infrastructures under study, and the definition of 
efficient means for the composition of the submodels corresponding to these building blocks, 
attention will be focused on the definition of a comprehensive modelling approach that will 
allow us to take into account both accidental and malicious faults in an integrated way. In 
addition detailed studies of the solution aspects need to be addressed too, to come out with 
a complete modelling and evaluation framework, suitable to quantitative assessment of 
interdependencies impact in electrical power systems.  
 
 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 59  
 
REFERENCES 
[Adler et al. 1994]  R. Adler, S. Daniel, C. Heising, M. Lauby, R. Ludorf and T. White, “An IEEE Survey 
of US and Canadian Overhead Transmission outages at 230kV and above”, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, 9 (1), pp.21-39, January 1994. 
[Adve et al. 2000]  V. S. Adve, R. Bagrodia, J. C. Browne, E. Deelman, A. Dube, E. Houstis, J. Rice, 
R. Sakellariou, D. Sundaram-Stukel, P. J. Teller and M. K. Vernon, “Poems: End-to-end performance 
design of large parallel adaptive computational systems”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 
Special Section of invited papers from the WOSP '98 Workshop, 26 (11), pp.1027-1048, 2000. 
[Ajmone Marsan et al. 1989]  M. Ajmone Marsan, G. Balbo, A. Bobbio, G. Chiola, G. Conte and A. 
Cumani, “The Effect of Execution Policies on the Semantics and Analysis of Stochastic Petri Nets”, 
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 15 (7), pp.832-846, July 1989. 
[Ajmone Marsan et al. 1995]  M. Ajmone Marsan, G. Balbo, G. Conte, S. Donatelli and F. G., 
Modelling with Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets, John Wiley, 1995. 
[Ajmone Marsan & Chiola 1987]  M. Ajmone Marsan and G. Chiola, “On Petri nets with deterministic 
and exponentially distributed firing times”, LNCS 266, pp.132-145, Springer-Verlag, 1987. 
[Alata et al. 2006]  E. Alata, V. Nicomette, M. Kaâniche, M. Dacier and M. Herrb, “Lessons Learned 
from the Deployment of a High-Interaction Honeypot”, in Sixth European Dependable Computing 
Conference (EDCC-6), (Coimbra, Portugal), pp.39-44, IEEE Computer Society, 2006. 
[Albert & Barabasi 2002a]  Albert, R. and A.-L. Barabasi, “Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks”, 
Review of Modern Physics, 74, pp.47-97, 2002a. 
[Albert & Barabasi 2002b]  R. Albert and A.-L. Barabasi, “Statistical mechanics of complex networks”, 
Review Modern Physics, 74 (47-97) 2002b. 
[Alla & David 1998]  H. Alla and R. David, “Continuous and Hybrid Petri Nets”, Journal of Systems 
Circuits and Computers, 8 (1), pp.159-188, 1998. 
[Allan et al. 1999]  R. N. Allan, R. Billinton, A. M. Breipohl and C. H. Grigg, “Bibliography on the 
Application of Methods in Power System Reliability Evaluation 1992-1996”, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, 14 (1), pp.51-57, 1999. 
[Alur et al. 1995]  A. Alur, C. Courcoubetis, N. Halbwachs, T. A. Henzinger, P.-H. Ho, X. Nicollin, A. 
Olivero, J. Sifakis and S. Yovine, “The Algorithmic Analysis of Hybrid Systems”, Theoretical Computer 
Science 138 (1), pp.3-34, 1995. 
[Alur et al. 1996]  A. Alur, T. A. Henzinger and P.-H. Ho, “Automatic symbolic verification of embedded 
systems”, IEEE Transaction Software Engineering, 22 (181-201) 1996. 
[Alur & Dill 1990]  R. Alur and D. L. Dill, “Automata for modelling real-time systems”, 17th International 
Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 443, pp.322-335, 1990. 
[Alur & Dill 1994]  R. Alur and D. L. Dill, “A Theory of Timed Automata”, Theoretical Computer Science, 
126 (2), pp.183-235, 1994. 
[Amin 2005]  M. Amin, “Scanning the Technology—Energy Infrastructure Defense Systems”, 
Proceedings of the IEEE, 93 (5), pp.861-75, 2005. 
[Ammar & Rezaul Islam 1989]  H. H. Ammar and S. M. Rezaul Islam, “Time scale decomposition of a 
class of generalized stochastic Petri net models”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 15 (6), 
pp.809-820, 1989. 
[Anghel et al. 2007]  M. Anghel, K. A. Werly and A. E. Motter, “Stochastic Model for Power Grid 
Dynamics”, in 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, (Big Island, Hawaii), 2007. 
[Avizienis et al. 2004]  A. Avizienis, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell and C. Landwehr, “Basic Concepts and 
Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing”, IEEE Transactions On Dependable And Secure 
Computing, 1 (1), pp.11-33, January-March 2004. 
[Bae & Thorp 1999]  K. Bae and J. D. Thorp, “A Stochastic Study of Hidden Failures in Power System 
Protection”, Decision Support Systems, 24, pp.259-268, 1999. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 60  
[Bailey et al. 2005]  M. Bailey, E. Cooke, F. Jahanian and J. Nazario, “The Internet Motion Sensor - A 
Distributed Blackhole Monitoring System”, in Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium 
(NDSS-2005), (San Diego, CA, USA), 2005. 
[Bak et al. 1987]  P. Bak, C. Tang and K. Wiesenfeld, “Self-organized Criticality: an explanation of 1/f 
noise”, Physical Review Letters, 59 (4), pp.381-384, 1987. 
[Balakrishnan & Trivedi 1995]  M. Balakrishnan and K. S. Trivedi, “Componentwise Decomposition for 
an Efficient Reliability Computation of Systems with Repairable Components”, in 25th Int. Symposium 
on Fault-Tolerant Computing (FTCS-25), (Pasadena, CA, USA), pp.259-268, IEEE Computer Society 
Press, 1995. 
[Balan & Traldi 2003]  A. O. Balan and L. Traldi, “Preprocessing minpaths for sum of disjoint products”, 
IEEE Transaction on Reliability, 52 (3), pp.289-295, September 2003. 
[Balbo 1995]  G. Balbo, “On the success of stochastic Petri nets”, in 6th International Workshop on 
Petri Nets and Performance Models (PNPM'95), (Durham, NC, USA), pp.2-9, IEEE Computer Society, 
1995. 
[Balbo et al. 1986]  G. Balbo, S. C. Bruell and S. Ghanta, “Combining Queuing Networks and 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Net Models for the Analysis of some Software Blocking Phenomena”, 
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-12, pp.561-576, 1986. 
[Ballarini et al. 2000]  S. Ballarini, S. Donatelli and G. Franceschinis, “Parametric Stochastic Well-
Formed Nets and Compositional Modelling”, in 21st International Conference on Application and 
Theory of Petri Nets, (Aarhus, Denmark), Springer Verlag, 2000. 
[Balsamo et al. 2004]  S. Balsamo, A. Di Marci, P. Inverardi and S. Simeoni, “Model-based 
performance prediction in software development: A survey”, IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, 30 (5), pp.295-310, 2004. 
[Balzarotti et al. 2006]  D. Balzarotti, M. Monga and S. Sicari, “Assessing the Risk of Using Vulnerable 
Components”, in Quality of Protection: Security Measurements and Metrics (D. Gollmann, M. 
Massacci and A. Yautsiukhin, Eds.), pp.65-78, Springer, 2006. 
[Bansal et al. 2002]  R. C. Bansal, T. S. Bhatti and D. P. Khotari, “Discussion of “Bibliography on the 
Application of Probability Methods in Power Methods in Power System Reliability Evaluation”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 17 (3), p.924, 2002. 
[Baskett et al. 1975]  F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz and F. G. Palacios, “Open, closed, and 
mixed networks with different classes of customers”, Journal of the ACM, 22 (2), pp.248-260, April 
1975. 
[Bause et al. 1998]  F. Bause, P. Buchholz and P. Kemper, “A toolbox for functional and quantitative 
analysis of deds”, in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (N. N. S. R. Puigjaner, and B. Serra, Ed.), 
LNCS 1469, pp.356-359, Springer-Verlag, 1998. 
[Bechta-Dugan et al. 1992]  J. Bechta-Dugan, S. J. Bavuso and M. A. Boyd, “Dynamic fault-tree 
models for fault-tolerant computer systems”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 41, pp.363-377, 1992. 
[Bellman 1957]  R. E. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957. 
[Béounes et al. 1993]  C. Béounes, M. Aguéra, J. Arlat, C. Bourdeau, J.-E. Doucet, K. Kanoun, J.-C. 
Laprie, S. Metge, J. Moreira de Souza, D. Powell and P. Spiesser, “SURF-2: A Program for 
Dependability Evaluation of Complex Hardware and Software Systems”, in 23rd IEEE Int. Symposium 
on Fault-Tolerant Computing (FTCS-23), (Toulouse, France), pp.668-673, IEEE Computer Society 
Press, 1993. 
[Bernardi 2003]  S. Bernardi, Building Stochastic Petri Net models for the Verification of Complex 
Software Systems, PhD, Universita di Torino, 2003. 
[Bernardi & Donatelli 2003]  S. Bernardi and S. Donatelli, “Building Petri Net Scenarios for Dependable 
Automation Systems”, in 10th International Workshop for Petri Nets and Performance Models 
(PNPM'2003), (Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA), pp.72-81, IEEE Computer Society, 2003. 
[Bernardi et al. 2001]  S. Bernardi, S. Donatelli and A. Horváth, “Special section on the practical use of 
high-level Petri nets: Implementing compositionality for stochastic Petri nets. ” Journal of Software 
Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT). pp.417-430, 2001. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 61  
[Bernardi et al. 2002]  S. Bernardi, S. Donatelli and J. Merseguer, “From UML sequence diagrams and 
statecharts to analyzable Petri net models”, in 3rd Workshop Software and Performance (WOSP'02), 
pp.35-45, ACM Press, 2002. 
[Bernardi & Merseguer 2006]  S. Bernardi and J. Merseguer, “QoS Assessment via Stochastic 
Analysis”, IEEE Internet Computing (May-June), pp.32-42, 2006. 
[Bernardi & Merseguer 2007]  S. Bernardi and J. Merseguer, “A UML Profile for Dependability Analysis 
of Real-Time Systems”, in Accepted for publication in the Workshop Software and Performance 
WOSP’07, 2007. 
[Berthomieu & Diaz 1991]  B. Berthomieu and M. Diaz, “Modeling and Verification of Time Dependent 
Systems Using Time Petri Nets”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 17 (3), pp.259-273, 
1991. 
[Berthomieu & Vernadat 2003]  B. Berthomieu and F. Vernadat, “State class constructions for 
branching analysis of time Petri nets”, in 9th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the 
Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS 2003), (Warsaw, Poland), pp.442-457, Springer-
Verlag, 2003. 
[Best et al. 1992]  E. Best, R. Devillers and J. Hall, “The Petri box calculus: a new causal algebra with 
multilabel communication. In  editor, Advances in Petri Nets, volume 609 of  LNCS, pages 21-69. 
Springer Verlag, 1992.” in Advances in Petri Nets (G. Rozenberg, Ed.), LNCS 609, pp.21-69, 
Springer-Verlag, 1992. 
[Betous-Almeida & Kanoun 2004a]  C. Betous-Almeida and K. Kanoun, “Construction and Stepwise 
Refinement of Dependability Models”, Performance Evaluation, 56, pp.277-306, 2004a. 
[Betous-Almeida & Kanoun 2004b]  C. Betous-Almeida and K. Kanoun, “Dependability modelling of 
Intsrumentation and Control Systems: A Comparison of Competing Architectures”, Safety Science, 42, 
pp.457-480, 2004b. 
[Billinton et al. 2001]  R. Billinton, M. Fotuhu-Firuzabad and L. Bertling, “Bibliography on the 
Application of Methods in Power System Reliability Evaluation 1996-1999”, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, 16 (4), pp.595-602, 2001. 
[Bobbio & Codetta Raiteri 2004]  A. Bobbio and D. Codetta Raiteri, “Parametric Fault-Trees with 
Dynamic Gates and Repair Boxes”, in Annual Reliablity and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS ‘04), 
(Los-Angeles, CA, USA), pp.459-465, 2004. 
[Bobbio et al. 2006]  A. Bobbio, C. Ferraris and R. Terrugia, “New Challenges in Network Reliability 
Analysis”, in International Workshop on Complex Network and Infrastructure Protection (CNIP'2006), 
(Rome, Italy), 2006. 
[Bobbio et al. 2003]  A. Bobbio, G. Franceschinis, R. Gaeta and L. Portinale, “Parametric Fault-Tree 
for the Dependability Analysis of Redundant Systems and its High Level Petri Net Semantics”, IEEE 
Transactions Software Engineering, 29 (270-287) 2003. 
[Bobbio & Horváth 2001]  A. Bobbio and A. Horváth, “Petri nets with discrete phase timing: A bridge 
between stochastic and functional analysis”, in Second International Workshop on Models for Time-
Critical Systems (MTCS 2001), (Amsterdam, Nethetherlands), pp.22-38, 2001. 
[Bobbio et al. 2001]  A. Bobbio, L. Portinale, M. Minichino and E. Ciancamerla, “Improving the analysis 
of dependable systems by mapping fault trees into bayesian networks”, Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 71, pp.249-260, 2001. 
[Bobbio et al. 2000]  A. Bobbio, A. Puliafito and M. Telek, “A modeling framework to implement 
preemption policies in non-Markovian SPN”, IEEE Transactions Software Engineering, 26, pp.36-54, 
2000. 
[Bobbio et al. 1998]  A. Bobbio, A. Puliafito, M. Telek and K. Trivedi, “Recent developments in non-
Markovian stochastic Petri nets”, Journal of Systems Circuits and Computers, 8 (1), pp.119-158, 1998. 
[Bobbio & Trivedi 1986]  A. Bobbio and K. Trivedi, “An Aggregation Technique for the Transient 
Analysis of Stiff Markov Chains”, IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35 (9), pp.803-814, August 
1986. 
[Boccaletti et al. 2006]  S. Boccaletti, V. Latora, M. Chavez and D. Hwang, “Complex networks: 
structure and dynamics”, Physics Reports, 424, pp.175-308, 2006. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 62  
[Bondavalli & Filippini 2004]  A. Bondavalli and R. Filippini, “Modeling and Analysis of a Scheduled 
Maintenance System: a DSPN Approach”, The Computer Journal, 47 (6), pp.634-650, 2004. 
[Bondavalli et al. 1999a]  A. Bondavalli, I. Majzik and I. Mura, “Automatic Dependability Analysis for 
supporting design decisions in UML”, in 4th IEEE International  High Assurance System Engineering 
Symposium (HASE'99), (A. Williams, Ed.), IEEE Computer Society Press, 1999a. 
[Bondavalli et al. 2000]  A. Bondavalli, I. Mura, S. Chiaradonna, R. Filippini, S. Poli and F. Sandrini, 
“DEEM: a tool for the dependability modeling and evaluation of multiple phased systems”, in Int. 
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN2000), (New York, USA), pp.231-236, IEEE 
Computer Society, 2000. 
[Bondavalli et al. 1999b]  A. Bondavalli, I. Mura and K. S. Trivedi, “Dependability Modelling and 
Sensitivity Analysis of Scheduled Maintenance Systems”, in 3rd European Dependable Computing 
Conference (EDCC-3), (A. Pataricza, J. Hlavicka and E. Maehle, Eds.), (Prague, Czech Republic), 
pp.7-23, Springer, 1999b. 
[Bondavalli et al. 2001]  A. Bondavalli, M. Nelli, L. Simoncini and G. Mongardi, “Hierarchical Modelling 
of Complex Control Systems: Dependability Analysis of a Railway Interlocking”, Journal of Computer 
Systems Science and Engineering, 16 (4), pp.249-261, 2001. 
[Boucherie 1993]  R. J. Boucherie, “A characterization of independence for competing Markov chains 
with application to stochastic Petri nets”, in 5th International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance 
Models, (Toulouse, France), pp.117-126, IEEE Computer Society, 1993. 
[Brasca et al. 2006]  C. Brasca, G. Dondossola and F. Garrone, Control System Scenarios with 
Interdependencies, CESI RICERCA S.p.A., October 2006 2006. 
[Brocklehurst et al. 1994]  S. Brocklehurst, T. Olovsson, B. Littlewood and E. Jonsson, “On 
Measurement of Operational Security”, IEEE Aerospace and Electronics Magazine, 9 (10) October 
1994. 
[Bryant 1986]  R. E. Bryant, “Graph-based algorithms for Boolean function manipulation”, IEEE 
Transactions on Computers, 35, pp.677-691, 1986. 
[Bucci & Vicario 1995]  G. Bucci and E. Vicario, “Compositional validation of time-critical systems 
using communicating time Petri nets”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 21, pp.969-992, 
1995. 
[Buchholz 1994]  P. Buchholz, “Exact and Ordinary Lumpability in finite Markov Chains”, Journal of 
Applied Probabilities (31), pp.59-74, 1994. 
[Buchholz 1995a]  P. Buchholz, “A Notion of Equivalence for Stochastic Petri Nets”, in 16th 
International Conference on Application and Theory of Petri Nets, (Torino, Italy), pp.161-180, 1995a. 
[Buchholz 1995b]  P. Buchholz, “Equivalence relations for stochastic automata networks”, in 
Computation with Markov Chains (W. J. Stewart and (ed.), Eds.), Kluwer 
Int. Publishers, 1995b. 
[Buchholz 1995c]  P. Buchholz, “Hierarchical Markovian Models: Symmetries and Reduction”, 
Performance Evaluation, 22 (1), pp.93-110, 1995c. 
[Buchholz et al. 2000]  P. Buchholz, G. Ciardo, S. Donatelli and P. Kemper, “Kronecker Operations 
and Sparse Matrices with Applications to the Solution of Markov Models”, INFORMS Journal on 
Computing, 12 (3), pp.203-222, 2000. 
[Byres et al. 2004]  E. J. Byres, M. Franz and D. Miller, “The Use of Attack Trees in Assessing 
Vulnerabilities in SCADA Systems”, in International Infrastructure Survivability Workshop (IISW'04), 
(Lisbon, Portugal), 2004. 
[CAIDA]  CAIDA, “Home Page of the CAIDA project: http://www.caida.org”. 
[Carreras et al. 2002]  B. A. Carreras, N. E. Lynch, I. Dobson and D. E. Newman, “Critical Points and 
Transitions in an Electric Power Transmission Model for Cascading Failure Blackouts”, Chaos, 12 (4), 
pp.985-994, 2002. 
[Carreras et al. 2004a]  B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch, D. E. Newman and I. Dobson, “Dynamical and 
Probabilistic Approaches to the Study of Blackout Vulnerability of the Power Transmission Grid”, in 
37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, (Hawaii), IEEE Computer Society, 2004a. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 63  
[Carreras et al. 2004b]  B. A. Carreras, D. E. Newman, I. Dobson and B. Poole, “Evidence for Self-
Organized Criticality in a Time Series of Electric Power System Blackouts Power Transmission Grid”, 
IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems, 51 (9), pp.1733-1740, September 2004b. 
[CC 2006]  CC, Common Criteria Portal Home page, available online at 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/, last visited in May 2006, 2006. 
[CCIB 1998]  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 2.0, Part 1: 
Introduction and General Model (CCIB-98-026); Part 2:  Security Functional Requirements (CCIB-98-
027); Part 3:  Security Assurance Requirements (CCIB-98-028), Common Criteria Implementation 
Board, 1998. 
[CESI RICERCA 2006a]  CESI RICERCA, Control system scenarios with interdependencies.  INPUT 
to CRUTIAL WP1 rev 0 - Draft, CESI RICERCA S.p.A., Grid and Infrastructures Department, August 
2006a. 
[CESI RICERCA 2006b]  CESI RICERCA, Description of Hierarchical Control Schema for the Power 
Systems and Critical Aspects of their Evaluation. Input to CRUTIAL WP1, CESI RICERCA S.p.A., 
Network and Infrastructures Department, May 2006b. 
[Chandy et al. 1975]  K. M. Chandy, U. Herzog and L. Woo, “Parametric Analysis of Queueing 
Networks”, IBM Journal of Research and Development, 19 (1), pp.36-42, January 1975. 
[Chassin & Posse 2005]  D. P. Chassin and C. Posse, “Evaluating North American Electric Grid 
Reliability Using the Barabasi-Albert Network Model”, Physica A 2005. 
[Chen et al. 2002]  D. Chen, D. Selvamuthu, D. Chen, L. Li, R. Some, A. P. Nikora and K. S. Trivedi, 
“Reliability and Availability Analysis for the JPL Remote exploration and Experimentation System ”, in 
Int Conf. on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN-02), pp.337-344, 2002. 
[Chen et al. 2001]  D. Chen, J. S. Thorp and M. Prashar, “Analysis of Electric Power System 
Disturbance Data”, in 34th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, (Hawaii), 2001. 
[Chen & Thorp 2002]  J. Chen and J. D. Thorp, “A Reliability Study of Transmission System Protection 
via a Hidden Failure DC Load Flow Model”, in IEEE Fifth International Conference on Power System 
Management and Control, pp.384-389, 2002. 
[Chen et al. 2005]  J. Chen, J. D. Thorp and I. Dobson, “Cascading  Dynamics and Mitigation 
Assessment in Power System Disturbances via a Hidden Failure Model”, International Journal of 
Electrical Power and Electrical Power and Energy Systems 27 (4), pp.318-326, 2005. 
[Chen et al. 2006]  Q. Chen, C. Jiang, W. Qiu and J. D. McCalley, “Probability Models for Estimating 
the Probabilities of Cascading Outages in High-Voltage Transmission Network”, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, 21 (3), pp.1423-1431, August 2006. 
[Chen & McCalley 2004]  Q. Chen and J. D. McCalley, “A Cluster Distribution as a Model for 
Estimating High-Order Event Probabilities in Power Systems”, in 8th International Conference on 
Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, (Ames, Iowa, USA), pp.622-628, 2004. 
[Chiola et al. 1995]  G. Chiola, G. Franceschinis, R. Gaeta and M. Ribaudo, “Greatspn 1.7: Graphical 
editor and analyzer for timed and stochastic Petri nets”, Performance Evaluation, 24 (1-2), pp.47-68, 
1995. 
[Choi et al. 1994]  H. Choi, V. Kulkarni and K. Trivedi, “Markov regenerative stochastic Petri nets.  
Performance Evaluation”, Performance Evaluation, 20, pp.337-357, 1994. 
[Ciapessoni & Ferrarini 2005]  E. Ciapessoni and L. Ferrarini, Indagine sulla sicurezza funzionale del 
sistema di automazione delle reti elettriche, Progetto - NORME, RdS Programme, 
http://www.ricercadisistema.it/Documenti/SintesiDoc.aspx?idN=1360&idD=312616., December 2005. 
[Ciardo 1995]  G. Ciardo, “Discrete-time markovian stochastic Petri nets”, in 2nd International 
Workshop on Numerical Solution of Markov Chains, pp.339-358, 1995. 
[Ciardo et al. 1994]  G. Ciardo, R. German and C. Lindemann, “A characterization of the stochastic 
process underlying a stochastic Petri net”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 20, pp.506-
515, 1994. 
[Ciardo & Miner 1999]  G. Ciardo and A. Miner, “A Data Structure for the Efficient Kroneker Solution of 
GSPNs”, in 8th Int. Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance Models, (Zaragoza, Spain), pp.22-31, 
IEEE Computer Society Press, 1999. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 64  
[Ciardo & Miner 1996]  G. Ciardo and A. S. Miner, “Smart: Simulation and markovian analyzer for 
reliability and timing”, in IEEE International Computer Performance and Dependability Symposium 
(IPDS'96), (Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA), p.60, IEEE Computer Society Society, 1996. 
[Ciardo & Trivedi 1993]  G. Ciardo and K. S. Trivedi, “Decomposition Approach to Stochastic Reward 
Net Models”, Performance Evaluation, 18 (1), pp.37-59, 1993. 
[Codetta Raiteri et al. 2004]  D. Codetta Raiteri, G. Franceschini, M. Iacono and V. Vittorini, 
“Repairable Fault Tree for the automatic evaluation of repair policies”, in International Conference on 
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN ‘04), (Florence, Italy), pp.659-668, IEEE Computer Society, 
2004. 
[Codetta Raiteri et al. 2006]  D. Codetta Raiteri, G. Franceschinis and M. Gribaudo, “Defining 
Formalisms and Models in the Draw-Net Modeling System”, in Fourth Workshop on Modelling of 
Objects, Components and Agents (MOCA2006), (Turku, Finland), 2006. 
[Coleman 1993]  J. L. Coleman, “Algorithms for product form stochastic Petri nets - a new approach”, 
in 5th International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance Models  (PNPM-95), (Toulouse, France), 
pp.108-116, IEEE Computer Society, 1993. 
[Cortelessa & Pompei 2004]  V. Cortelessa and A. Pompei, “Towards a UML Profile for QoS: a 
contribution in the reliability domain”, in 4th International Workshop on Software and Performance 
(WOSP'04), pp.197-206, 2004. 
[Cortelessa et al. 2002]  V. Cortelessa, H. Singh and B. Cukic, “Early reliability assessment of UML 
based software models”, in 3rd International Workshop on Software and Performance, (Rome, Italy), 
pp.302-309, 2002. 
[Courtois 1977]  P. J. Courtois, Decomposability - Queueing and Computer System Applications, ACM 
Monograph Series, Academic Press, New York, 1977. 
[Cox 1955]  D. R. Cox, “The Analysis of Non Markovian Stochastic Processes by the Inclusion of 
Supplementary Variables”, Proc. of the Cambridge Phylosophical Society, 51, pp.433-440, 1955. 
[Crucitti et al. 2004a]  P. Crucitti, V. Latora and M. Marchiori, “Model for Cascading Failures in 
Complex Networks”, Physical Review E, 69 (045104) 2004a. 
[Crucitti et al. 2003]  P. Crucitti, V. Latora, M. Marchiori and A. Rapisarda, “Efficiency of Scale Free 
Networks: Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks”, Physica A, 320, pp.622-642, 2003. 
[Crucitti et al. 2004b]  P. Crucitti, V. Latora, M. Marchiori and A. Rapisarda, “Error and Attack 
Tolerance of Complex Networks”, Physical A, 340 (1-3), pp.388-394, September 2004b. 
[CSEGC 1993]  CSEGC, The Canadian Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria, Version 3.0e, 
Communications Security Establishment Government of Canada, Canadian System Security Centre, 
1993. 
[Cumani 1985]  A. Cumani, “Esp - A package for the evaluation of stochastic Petri nets with phase-
type distributed transition times”, in International Workshop Timed Petri Nets, (Torino, Italy), pp.144-
151, IEEE Computer Society, 1985. 
[Cuppens & Miege 2002]  F. Cuppens and A. Miege, “Alert Correlation in a Cooperative Intrusion 
Detection Framework”, in 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, (Oakland, CA, USA), 
pp.202-215, 2002. 
[Cymru 2004]  Cymru, “Team Cymru: The Darknet Project. http://www.cymru.com/Darknet”,  2004. 
[Dacier & Deswarte 1994]  M. Dacier and Y. Deswarte, “The Privilege Graph: an Extension to the 
Typed Access Matrix Model”, in European Symposium in Computer Security (ESORICS'94), (D. 
Gollman, Ed.), (Brighton, UK), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 875, pp.319-334, Springer-Verlag, 
1994. 
[Daly 2001]  D. Daly, Analysis of connection as a decomposition technique, Master Thesis, Univ. of 
Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Illinois, USA, 2001. 
[Daly et al. 2004]  D. Daly, P. Buchholz and W. H. Sanders, An approach for bounding Reward 
Measures in Markov Models Using Aggregation, Univ. of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Coordinated 
Science Lab, July 2004. 
[Daly et al. 2000]  D. Daly, D. D. Deavours, P. G. Webster and W. H. Sanders, “Möbius: An extensible 
tool for performance and dependability modeling”, in 11th International Conference, TOOLS 2000, (H. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 65  
C. B. B. R. Haverkort, and C. U. Smith, Ed.), (Schaumburg, IL, USA), pp.332-336, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, 2000. 
[Daly & Sanders 2001]  D. Daly and W. H. Sanders, “A connection formalism for the solution of large 
and stiff models”, in 34th Annual Simulation Symposium, pp.258-265, 2001. 
[Delamare et al. 2003]  C. Delamare, Y. Gardan and P. Moreaux, “Performance evaluation with 
asynchronously decomposable SWN: implementation and case study”, in 10th Int. Workshop on Petri 
nets and performance models (PNPM03), (Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA), pp.20-29, IEEE Computer 
Society Press, 2003. 
[Derisavi et al. 2003]  S. Derisavi, H. Hermanns and W. H. Sanders, “Optimal State space lumping in 
Markov Chains”, Information Processing Letters, 87 (6), pp.309-315, 2003. 
[Dobson & Carreras 2005]  I. Dobson and B. A. Carreras, Risk Analysis of Critical Loading and 
Blackouts with Cascading Events, Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS), 
2005, http://eceserv0.ece.wisc.edu/~dobson/home.html. 
[Dobson et al. 2001]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, N. E. Lynch and D. E. Newman, “An initial model for 
complex dynamics in electric power system blackouts”, in 34th Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences (HICSS-34), (Maui, Hawaii), IEEE Computer Society, 2001, 
http://eceserv0.ece.wisc.edu/~dobson/home.html. 
[Dobson et al. 2004a]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch and D. E. Newman, “Complex Systems 
Analysis of Series of Blackouts: Cascading Failure, Criticality, and Self-organization”, in IREP 
Symposium on Bulk Power Systems and Control - VI, (Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy), pp.438-451, 2004a. 
[Dobson et al. 2005a]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch, B. Nkei and D. E. Newman, “A Loading-
dependent Model of Probabilistic Cascading Failure”, Probability in the Engineering and Informational 
Sciences, 19, pp.475-488, September 2005a. 
[Dobson et al. 2003]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras and D. E. Newman, “A Probabilistic Loading-
dependent Model of Cascading Failure and Possible Implications for Blackouts”, 36th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences 2003. 
[Dobson et al. 2004b]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras and D. E. Newman, “A Branching Process 
Approximation to Cascading Load-dependent System Failure”, in 37th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, (Hawaii), IEEE Computer Society, 2004b. 
[Dobson et al. 2005b]  I. Dobson, B. A. Carreras and D. E. Newman, “Branching Process Models for 
the Exponentially Increasing Portions of Cascading Failure Blackouts”, in 38th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, (Hawaii), IEEE Computer Society, 2005b. 
[Dobson et al. 2006]  I. Dobson, K. R. Wierzbicki, B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch and D. E. Newman, “An 
Estimator of Propagation of Cascading Failure”, in 39th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, (Kauai, Hawaii), IEEE Computer Society, 2006. 
[Donatelli 1993]  S. Donatelli, “Superposed Stochastic Automata: a class of stochastic Petri nets with 
parallel solution and distributed state space”, Performance Evaluation, 18 (1), pp.21-36, 1993. 
[Donatelli 1994]  S. Donatelli, “Superposed Generalized Stochastic Petri net: definition and efficient 
solution”, in 15th Int. Conf. on Applications and Theory of Petri Nets, (R. Valette, Ed.), pp.258-277, 
Springer-Verlag, 1994, Introduction des réseaux de Petri stochastiques généralisés superposés. 
Présentation du solution basée sur la décomposition et l'algèbre de Kronecker pour leur résolution. 
[Donatelli & Franceschinis 1996]  S. Donatelli and G. Franceschinis, “The PSR methodology: 
integrating hardware and software models”, in 17th  International Conference in Application and 
Theory of Petri Nets, ICATPN '96, (Osaka, Japan), Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
[Dondossola & Lamquet 2006]  G. Dondossola and O. Lamquet, “Cyber Risk Assessment in the 
Electric Power Industry”, Electra (224) February 2006. 
[Dondossola et al. 2004]  G. Dondossola, O. Lamquet and M. Masera, “Emerging standards and 
methodological issues for the security analysis of the Power System information infrastructures”, 
Securing critical infrastructures, 2nd International Conference on Critical Infrastructures (CRIS-2004),  
Grenoble, France, 2004. 
[Dorogovtsev & Mendes 2002]  S. N. Dorogovtsev and J. F. F. Mendes, “Evolution of networks”, 
Advances in Physics, 51, pp.1079-1187, 2002. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 66  
[DShield]  DShield, “Home page of the DShield.org Distributed Intrusion Detection System: 
http://www.dshield.org. ” 
[Ealata et al. 2005]  E. Ealata, M. Dacier, Y. Deswarte, K. Kortchinsky, V. Nicomette and V.-H. Pham, 
F., “Collection and analysis of attack data based on honeypots deployed on the Internet”, in 1st 
Workshop on Quality of Protection (QOP 2005), (co-located with ESORICS and METRICS), (F. M. D. 
Gollmann, A. Yautsiukhin, Ed.), (Milan, Italy), pp.79-92, Springer, 2005. 
[Fink & Carlsen 1978]  L. H. Fink and K. Carlsen, “Operating Under Stress and Strain”, IEEE Spectrum 
(March), pp.48-53, 1978. 
[Fota et al. 1999]  N. Fota, M. Kâaniche and K. Kanoun, “Incremental Approach for Building Stochastic 
Petri Nets for Dependability Modeling”, in Statistical and Probabilistic Models in Reliability (D. C. 
Ionescu and N. Limnios, Eds.), pp.321-335, Birkhäuser, 1999. 
[Franceschinis et al. 2002]  G. Franceschinis, M. Gribaudo, M. Iacono, N. Mazzocca and V. Vittorini, 
“Drawnet++: Model objects to support performance analysis and simulation of complex systems”, in 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS 2324, pp.233-238, Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[Fricks et al. 1997]  R. Fricks, C. Hirel, S. Wells and K. Trivedi, “The development of an integrated 
modeling environment”, in World Congress on Systems Simulation (WCSS '97), (Singapore), pp.471-
476, 1997. 
[Gao 2004]  Gao, Critical Infrastructure Protections: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control 
Systems, Government Accountability Office, N°GAO-04-354, 2004, 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf. 
[Garetto et al. 2003]  M. Garetto, W. Gong and D. Towsley, “Modeling Malware Spreading Dynamics”, 
in INFOCOM'2003, (San Francisco, CA, USA), 2003. 
[German et al. 1995a]  R. German, C. Kelling, A. Zimmermann and G. Hommel, “Timenet: A toolkit for 
evaluating non-markovian stochastic petri-nets”, Performance Evaluation, 24, pp.69-87, 1995a. 
[German & Lindemann 1994]  R. German and C. Lindemann, “Analysis of Stochastic Petri Nets by the 
Method of Supplementary Variables”, Performance Evaluation, 20, pp.317-335, 1994. 
[German et al. 1995b]  R. German, D. Logothetis and K. Trivedi, “Transient analysis of Markov 
Regenerative Stochastic Petri Nets: a comparison of approaches”, 6-th International Conference on 
Petri Nets and Performance Models (PNPM95), pp.103-112, 1995b. 
[Gribaudo & Horváth 2002]  M. Gribaudo and A. Horváth, “Fluid stochastic petri nets augmented with 
flush-out arcs: A transient analysis technique”, IEEE Transactions On Software Engineering, 28 (10), 
pp.944-955, 2002. 
[Gribaudo et al. 2003]  M. Gribaudo, A. Horváth, A. Bobbio, E. Tronci, E. Ciancamerla and M. 
Minichino, “Fluid Petri nets and hybrid model-checking: A comparative case study”, Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 81 (3), pp.239-257, 2003. 
[Gribaudo et al. 2005]  M. Gribaudo, N. Mazzocca, F. Moscato and V. Vittorini, “Multisolution of 
Complex Performability Models in the OsMoSys/DrawNet Framework 
”, in 2nd Int. Conf. on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST2005), (Torino, Italy), pp.85-94, 
IEEE Computer Society  Press, 2005. 
[Gribaudo & Sereno 2000]  M. Gribaudo and M. Sereno, “Simulation of Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets”, in 
Eighth International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer and 
Telecommunication Systems (MASCOTS 2000) (San Francisco, CA,USA), pp.231-239, 2000. 
[Gribaudo et al. 2001]  M. Gribaudo, M. Sereno, A. Horváth and A. Bobbio, “Fluid stochastic Petri nets 
augmented with flush-out arcs: Modelling and analysis”, Discrete Event Dynamic Systems, 11 (1-2), 
pp.97-117, January 2001. 
[Gupta et al. 2003]  V. Gupta, V. V. Lam, H. V. Ramasamy, W. H. Sanders and S. Singh, 
“Dependability and Performance Evaluation of Intrusion Tolerant-Server Architectures”, in First Latin-
American Symposium on Dependable Computing (LADC 2003), (Sao-Paulo, Brazil), pp.81-101, IEEE 
Computer Society, 2003. 
[Haddad & Moreaux 1995]  S. Haddad and P. Moreaux, “Evaluation of High-level Petri nets by means 
of aggregation and decomposition”, in Sixth International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance 
Models, (Durham, NC, USA.), pp.11-20, IEEE Computer Society Press 1995. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 67  
[Haddad & Moreaux 1996]  S. Haddad and P. Moreaux, “Asynchronous Composition of High-level 
Petri nets : a quantitative approach”, in 17th International Conference on Application and Theory of 
Petri nets, (Osaka, Japan), pp.192-211, 1996. 
[Haddad & Moreaux 2004]  S. Haddad and P. Moreaux, “Approximate Analysis of Non-Markovian 
Stochastic Systems with Multiple Time Scale Delays”, in 12th Annual Meeting of the IEEE International 
Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation of  Computer and Telecommunication Systems 
(MASCOTS) (Volendam, The Netherlands), 2004. 
[Haddad et al. 2005]  S. Haddad, P. Moreaux, M. Sereno and M. Silva, “Product-form and stochastic 
Petri nets: a structural approach”, Performance Evaluation, 59, pp.313-336, 2005. 
[Hardy et al. 2005]  G. Hardy, C. Lucet and N. Limnios, “Computing all-terminal reliability of stochastic 
networks by Binary Decision Diagrams”, in Applied Stochastic Modeling and Data Analysis 
(ASMDA'2005), 2005. 
[Heckermann et al. 1995]  D. Heckermann, Wellman and Mandani, “Real-world applications of 
Bayesian Networks”, Communications of the ACM, 38 (3) 1995. 
[Heindl & German 1997]  A. Heindl and R. German, “A fourth-order algorithm with automatic stepsize 
control for the transient analysis of DSPNs”, in 7-th International Conference on Petri Nets and 
Performance Models (PNPM'97), pp.60-69, IEEE Computer Society, 1997. 
[Henderson et al. 1989]  W. Henderson, D. Lucic and P. G. Taylor, “A net level performance analysis 
of stochastic Petri nets”, Journal of Australian Mathematical Society, Ser. B (31), pp.176-187, 1989. 
[Henzinger et al. 1995]  T. A. Henzinger, P.-H. Ho and H. Wong-Toi, “A user guide to HyTech”, in 1st 
Workshop Tools and Algorithms for the  Construction and Analysis of Systems  (TACAS), pp.41-71, 
Springer Verlag, 1995. 
[Hines et al. 2006]  P. Hines, J. Apt, H. Liao and S. N. Talukdar, “The Frequency of Large Blackouts in 
the United States Electrical Transmisson System: An Empirical Study”, in 2nd Annual Carnegie Mellon 
University Conferenec on Electric Power Systems: Monitoring, Sensing, Software and Its Valuation for 
the Changing Electric Power Industry, (Carnegie Mellon, USA), 2006, 
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~electricityconference/hines_blackout_frequencies_final.pdf. 
[HiQPN]  HiQPN, “The HiQPN Software.web link: http://ls4-www.informatik.uni-dortmund.de/QPN.” 
[Horton et al. 1998]  G. Horton, V. Kulkarni, D. M. Nicol and K. Trivedi, “Fluid stochastic Petri nets: 
Theory, application and solution techniques”, European Journal of Operational Research, 105 (1), 
pp.184-201, 1998. 
[Horváth 2005]  A. Horváth, “Steady state solution for models with geometric and finite support activity 
duration”, in 2nd International Conference on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST), (Torino, 
Italy), 2005. 
[Horváth & Gribaudo 2002]  A. Horváth and M. Gribaudo, “Matrix geometric solution of fluid stochastic 
petri nets”, in 4th International Conference on Matrix-Analytic Methods in Stochastic models, 
(Adelaide, Australia), 2002. 
[Howard 1960]  R. A. Howard, Dynamic Probabilistic Systems  and Markov Models, 576p., the MIT 
Press, 1960. 
[Illié et al. 2004]  J. M. Illié, S. Baarir, M. Beccuti, C. Delamare, S. Donatelli, C. Dutheillet, G. 
Franceschinis, R. Gaeta and P. Moreaux, “Extended SWN solvers in GreatSPN”, in 1st International 
Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST), (Enschede, The Netherlands), IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 2004. 
[ITSEC 1991]  ITSEC, Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, June 1991. 
[Jacobson & Lazowska 1981]  P. A. Jacobson and E. D. Lazowska, “The Method of Surrogate Delays: 
Simultaneous Resource Possession in Analytic Models of Computer Systems”, in The ACM 
SIGMETRICS Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, (Las Vegas, USA), 
pp.165-174, 1981. 
[Jajodia et al. 2003]  S. Jajodia, S. Noel and B. O'Berry, “Topological Analysis of Network Attack 
Vulnerability ”, in Managing Cyber Threats: Issues, Approaches and Challenges (S. S. V. Kumar, A. 
Lazarevic, Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2003, 2003. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 68  
[JCSEC 1992]  JCSEC, The Japanese Computer Security Evaluation Criteria - Functionality 
Requirements, Draft V 1.0, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1992. 
[Jonsson & Olovsson 1997]  E. Jonsson and T. Olovsson, “A Quantitative Model of the Security 
Intrusion Process Based on Attacker Behavior”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 23 (4), 
pp.235-245, April 1997. 
[Jungnitz & Desrochers 1991]  H. Jungnitz and A. Desrochers, “Flow equivalent nets for the 
performance analysis of flexible manufacturing systems”, in 1991 IEEE Robotics and Automation 
Conference, pp.122-127, 1991. 
[Kaâniche et al. 2006]  M. Kaâniche, E. Alata, V. Nicomette, Y. Deswarte and M. Dacier, “Empirical 
Analysis and Statistical Modeling of Attack Processes based on Honeypots”, in WEEDS 2006 - 
workshop on empirical evaluation of dependability and security (in conjunction with the international 
conference on dependable systems and networks, (DSN2006), pp.119-124, 2006. 
[Kaâniche et al. 2003]  M. Kaâniche, K. Kanoun and M. Rabah, “Multi-level modelling approach for the 
availability assessment of e-business applications”, Software: Practice and Experience, 33 (14), 
pp.1323-1341, 2003. 
[Kanoun & Borrel 2000]  K. Kanoun and M. Borrel, “Fault-Tolerant System Dependability — Explicit 
Modeling of Hardware and Software Component-Interactions”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 49 
(4), pp.363-376, December 2000. 
[Kanoun et al. 1999]  K. Kanoun, M. Borrel, T. Moreteveille and A. Peytavin, “Modeling the 
Dependability of CAUTRA, a Subset of the French Air Traffic Control System”, IEEE Transactions on 
Computers, 48 (5), pp.528-535, 1999. 
[Kemeny & Snell 1959]  J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell, Finite Markov Chains, Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand, 1959. 
[Kemper 1996]  P. Kemper, “Numerical analysis of superposed GSPNs”, IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, 22 (4), pp.615-628, 1996. 
[Kinney et al. 2005]  R. Kinney, P. Crucitti, R. Albert and V. Latora, “Modeling Cascading Failures in 
the North American Power Grid”, The European Physical Journal B, 46 (1), pp.101-107, 2005. 
[Krings & Oman 2003]  A. Krings and P. Oman, “A simple GSPN for modeling common-mode failures 
in critical infrastructures”, in 36th Hawai Int. Conf. on System Sciences, p.10, 2003. 
[Kwiatkowska & Sproston 2003]  M. Kwiatkowska and J. Sproston, “Probabilistic Model Checking of 
Deadline Propeties in the IEEE 1394 FireWire Protocol”, Formal Aspects of Computing, 14 (3), 
pp.295-318, 2003. 
[Lanus et al. 2003]  M. Lanus, L. Yin and K. S. Trivedi, “Hierarchical Composition and Aggregation of 
State-based Availability and Performability Models”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 52 (1), pp.44-52, 
2003. 
[Lazar & Robertazzi 1987]  A. A. Lazar and T. G. Robertazzi, “Markovian Petri net protocols with 
product form solution”, in IEEE INFOCOM '87, (San Francisco, CA., USA), pp.1054-1062, 1987. 
[Lee et al. 2004]  E. E. Lee, J. E. Mitchell and W. A. Wallace, “Assessing Vulnerability of Proposed 
Designs for Interdependent Infrastructure Systems”, 37th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences,  IEEE Computer Society, Hawaii, 2004. 
[Leurré.com] Leurré.com, “Leurré.com project. Publications web page : 
http://www.leurrecom.org/paper.htm”. 
[Leuven 2006]  K. U. Leuven, Description of a Distributed Control Scheme for Distributed Generation, 
K.U. Leuven, ESAT/ELECTA April 2006 2006. 
[Lindemann et al. 1999]  C. Lindemann, A. Reuys and A. Thümmler, “The dspnexpress 2.000 
performance and dependability modeling environment”, in 29th Annual Int. Symp. on Fault-Tolerant 
Computing (FTCS-29), (Madison, Wisconsin, USA), pp.228-231, IEEE Computer Society, 1999. 
[Littlewood et al. 1993]  B. Littlewood, S. Brocklehurst, N. Fenton, P. Mellor, S. Page, D. Wright, J. 
Dobson, J. McDermid and D. Gollmann, “Towards Operational Measures of Computer Security”, 
Journal of Computer Security, 2, pp.211-229, 1993. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 69  
[Lollini 2005]  P. Lollini, On the modelling and solution of complex systems: from two domain-specific 
case-studies towards the definition of a more general framework, PhD, University of Florence, Italy, 
December 2005, http://rcl.dsi.unifi.it/theses/TesiLollini.pdf  
[Lollini et al. 2005]  P. Lollini, A. Bondavalli and F. Di Giandomenico, “A modeling methodology for 
hierarchical control systems and its application”, Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society, 10 (3), 
pp.57-69, 2005. 
[Luo & Trivedi 1998]  T. Luo and K. Trivedi, “An improved algorithm for coherent-system reliability, 
IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 47, 73-78, 1998”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 47, pp.73-78, 
1998. 
[Lye & Wing 2005]  K.-w. Lye and J. M. Wing, “Game strategies in network security”, International 
Journal on Information Security, 4 (1-2), pp.71-86, 2005. 
[Madan et al. 2002]  B. B. Madan, K. Goseva-Popstojanova, K. Vaidyanathan and K. Trivedi, 
“Modeling and Quantification of Security Attributes of Software Systems”, in IEEE International 
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2002), (Wahsington, DC, USA), pp.505-514, 
IEEE computer Society, 2002. 
[Majzik et al. 2003]  I. Majzik, A. Pataricza and A. Bondavalli, “Stochastic Dependability Analysis of 
System Architecture Based on UML Models”, in Architecting Dependable Systems (C. G. R. De 
Lemos, and A. Romanovsky, Ed.), LNCS 2677, pp.219-244, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York, 2003. 
[Marie 1979]  R. Marie, “An approximate analytical method for general queueing networks”, IEEE 
Transaction on Software engineering, SE-5, pp.530-538, 1979. 
[Masera 2002]  M. Masera, “An Approach to the Understanding of Interdependencies”, Power 
Systems and Communications Infrastructures for the Future (CRIS'2002),  Beijing, China, 2002. 
[Merlin & Faber 1976]  P. M. Merlin and D. J. Faber, “Recoverability of communication protocols - 
Implication of a theoretical study”, IEEE Transactions on Communication, 24, pp.1036-1043, 1976. 
[Meyer & Sanders 1993]  J. F. Meyer and W. H. Sanders, “Specification and Construction of 
Performability Models”, in Int. Workshop on Performability Modeling of Computer and Communication 
Systems, (Mont Saint Michel, France), pp.1-32, 1993. 
[Milner 1989]  R. Milner, Communication and Concurrency, Prentice Hall, 1989. 
[Miner & Parker 2004]  A. S. Miner and D. Parker, “Symbolic Representations and Analysis of large 
probabilistic systems”, in Validation of Stochastic Systems LNCS 2925, Springer, 2004. 
[Montani et al. 2005]  S. Montani, L. Portinale and A. Bobbio, “Dynamic bayesian networks for 
modeling advanced fault tree features in dependability analysis”, in Proc. ESREL 2005, (Tri City), 
p.June, 2005. 
[Motter & Lai 2002]  A. E. Motter and Y. C. Lai, “Cascade-based Attacks on Complex Networks”, 
Physics Review E, 66 (065102) 2002. 
[Muppala et al. 1992]  J. K. Muppala, A. Sathaye, R. Howe and K. S. Trivedi, “Dependability Modeling 
of a Heterogeneous VAX-cluster System Using Stochastic Reward Nets”, in Hardware and Software 
Fault Tolerance in Parallel Computing Systems (D. R. Avresky, Ed.), pp.33-59, 1992. 
[Mura & Bondavalli 2001]  I. Mura and A. Bondavalli, “Markov Regenerative Stochastic Petri Nets to 
Model and Evaluate the Dependability of Phased Missions”, IEEE Transactions on Computers, 50 
(12), pp.1337-1351, 2001. 
[Mura et al. 1999]  I. Mura, A. Bondavalli, X. Zang and K. Trivedi, “Dependability Modelling and 
Evaluation of Phased Mission Systems: a DSPN Approach”, in 7th IFIP Int. Conference on 
Dependable Computing for Critical Applications (DCCA-7), (San Jose, CA, USA), IEEE Computer 
Society, 1999. 
[Nedic 2003]  D. P. Nedic, Simulation of Large System Disturbances, PhD, The University of 
Manchester -UMIST, Manchester, United Kingdom, 2003. 
[Nelli et al. 1996]  M. Nelli, A. Bondavalli and L. Simoncini, “Dependability Modelling and Analysis of 
Complex Control Systems: an Application to Railway Interlocking”, in European Dependable 
Computing Conference (EDCC-2), (Taormina, Italy), pp.93-110, Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 70  
[NERC]  NERC, Information on Blackouts in North America, Disturbance Analysis Working Group 
(DAWG), http://www.nerc.com/~dawg/databas.html. 
[Newman 2003]  M. E. Newman, “The structure and function of complex networks”, SIAM Review, 45 
(167-256) 2003. 
[Nicol et al. 2004]  D. M. Nicol, W. H. Sanders and K. S. Trivedi, “Model-based Evaluation: From 
Dependability to Security”, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,, 1 (1), pp.48-
65, 2004. 
[Ning et al. 2002]  P. Ning, Y. Cui and D. S. Reeves, “Constructing Attack Scenarios Through 
Correlation of Intrusion Alerts”, in 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security 
(CCS'02), (Washington DC, USA), pp.245-254, 2002. 
[Obal 1998]  W. D. Obal, Measure-Adaptive State-Space Construction Methods, PhD, University of 
Arizona, 1998. 
[Ortalo et al. 1999]  R. Ortalo, Y. Deswarte and M. Kaâniche, “Experimenting with Quantitative 
Evaluation Tools for Monitoring Operational Security”, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 25 
(5), pp.633-650, 1999. 
[Page & Perry 1988]  L. B. Page and J. E. Perry, “A practical implementation of the factoring theorem 
for network reliability”, A practical implementation of the factoring theorem for network reliability, 37, 
pp.259-267, 1988. 
[Pederson et al. 2006]  P. Pederson, D. Dudenhoeffer, S. Hartley and M. Permann, Critical 
Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of U.S. and International Research, Idaho National 
Laboratory, USA, August 2006. 
[Phillips & Swiler 1998]  C. Phillips and L. Swiler, “A Graph-based System for Network Vulnerability 
Analysis”, in New Security Paradigm Workshop, (Charlottesville, VA, USA), 1998. 
[Plateau 1985]  B. Plateau, “On the stochastic structure of parallelism and synchronisation models for 
distributed algorithms”, in 1985 ACM SIGMETRICS Conference on Measurement and Modeling of 
Computer Systems, (Austin, TX, USA), pp.147-153, 1985. 
[Pooley 1991]  R. J. Pooley, “The integrated modelling support environment: A new generation of 
performance modelling tools”, in 5th International Conference in Computer Performance Evaluation: 
Modelling Techniques and Tools, (G. B. a. G. Serazzi, Ed.), (Torino, Italy), pp.1-15, 1991. 
[Pothamsetty & Franz 2005]  V. Pothamsetty and M. Franz, “SCADA HoneyNet Project: Building 
Honeypots for Industrial Networks (http://scadahoneynet.sourceforge.net/)”,  (November 2006), 2005. 
[Pourbeik et al. 2006]  P. Pourbeik, P. S. Kundur and C. W. Taylor, “The Anatomy of a Power Grid 
Blackout”, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine (September/october), pp.22-29, 2006. 
[Puterman 2005]  M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes. Discrete Stochastic Dynamic 
Programming, Wiley, 2005. 
[Rabah & Kanoun 2003]  M. Rabah and K. Kanoun, “Performability evaluation of multipurpose 
multiprocessor systems: the "separation of concerns" approach”, IEEE transactions on Computers, 52 
(2), pp.223-236, 2003. 
[Rahman & Besnosov 2006]  H. A. Rahman and K. Besnosov, “Identification of sources of failures and 
their propgation in critical infrastructures from 12 Years of public failure reports”, in CRIS'2006, Third 
International Conference on critical Infrastructures, (Allessandria, VA, USA), 2006. 
[Rinaldi 2004]  S. M. Rinaldi, “Modeling and Simulating Critical Infrastructures and Their  
Interdependencies”, 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,  (5-8 January), IEEE 
Computer Society, Hawaii, 2004. 
[Rinaldi et al. 2001]  S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom and T. K. Kelly, “Identifying, Understanding, and 
Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies”, IEEE Control Systems Magazine (December), 
pp.11-25, 2001. 
[Rios et al. 2002]  M. A. Rios, D. S. Kirschen, D. Jayaweera, D. P. Nedic and R. N. Allan, “Value of 
security: Modeling time- dependent phenomena and weather conditions”, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, 17 (3), pp.543-548, 2002. 
[Rojas 1996]  I. Rojas, “Compositional Construction of SWN Models”, The Computer Journal, 38 (7), 
pp.612-621, 1996. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 71  
[Rugina et al. 2006]  A. E. Rugina, K. Kanoun and M. Kaâniche, “An architecture-based dependability 
modeling framework using AADL ”, in 10th IASTED International Conference on Software Engineering 
and Applications (SEA'2006), (Dallas, USA), pp.222-225, 2006. 
[Sahner et al. 1996]  R. A. Sahner, K. Trivedi and A. Puliafito, Performance and Reliability Analysis of 
Computer Systems: An Example-based Approach Using the SHARPE Software Package, 404p., 
Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1996. 
[Sahner & Trivedi 1987]  R. A. Sahner and K. S. Trivedi, “Reliability modeling using SHARPE”, IEEE 
Transactions on Reliability, R-36 (2), pp.186-193, 1987. 
[Sallhammar et al. 2006]  K. Sallhammar, B. E. Helvik and S. J. Knapskog, “A Game-theoretic 
Approach to Stochastic Security and Dependability Evaluation”, in 2nd IEEE International Symposium 
on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC'06), (Indianapolis, USA), 2006. 
[Sallhammar et al. 2005]  K. Sallhammar, S. J. Knapskog and B. E. Helvik, “Using Stochastic Game 
Theory to Compute the Expected Behavior of Attackers”, in The 2005 Symposium on Applications and 
the Internet Workshops (SAINT-W'05), pp.102-105, 2005. 
[Sanders 1999]  W. H. Sanders, “Integrated frameworks for multi-level and multi-formalism modeling”, 
in 8th International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance Models (PNPM'99), (Saragoza, Spain), 
pp.2-9, 1999. 
[Sanders & Meyer 2001]  W. H. Sanders and J. F. Meyer, “Stochastic activity networks: Formal 
definitions and concepts”, in Lectures on Formal Methods and Performance Analysis. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 2090, pp.315-343, Springer-Verlag, 2001. 
[Sanders et al. 1995]  W. H. Sanders, W. D. Obal II, M. A. Qureshi and F. K. Widjanarko, “The 
UltraSAN Modeling Environment”, Performance Evaluation, 21 (special "Performance Evaluation 
Tools") 1995. 
[Scarpa & Bobbio 1998]  M. Scarpa and A. Bobbio, “Kronecker representation of stochastic Petri nets 
with discrete PH distributions”, in International Computer Performance and Dependability Symposium  
(IPDS'98), (Durham, NC, USA), pp.52-61, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998. 
[Schainker et al. 2006]  R. Schainker, J. Douglas and T. Kropp, “Electric Utility Reponses to Grid 
Security Issues”, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine (March/April), pp.30-37, 2006. 
[Schneier 1999]  B. Schneier, “Modeling Security Threats”, Mr Dobb's Journal December 1999. 
[Sereno & Balbo 1993]  M. Sereno and G. Balbo, “Computational Algorithms for Product Form 
Soultion Stochastic Petri Nets”, in 5th International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance Models 
(PNPM-95), (Toulouse, France), pp.98-107, IEEE Computer Society, 1993. 
[Sheyner et al. 2002]  O. Sheyner, J. Haines, S. Jha, R. Lippmann and J. M. Wing, “Automated 
Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs”, in 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
Oakland, CA, USA, 2002. 
[Song et al. 2000]  H. Song, C.-C. Liu and R. W. Dahlgren, “Optimal Electricity Supply Bidding by 
Markov Decision Processes”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 15 (2), pp.618-624, 2000. 
[Staniford et al. 2002]  S. Staniford, V. Pawson and N. Weaver, “How to Own the Internet in your 
Spare Time”, in USENIX Security Symposium, pp.149-167, 2002. 
[Sun 2005]  K. Sun, “Complex Networks Theory: A New Method of Research in Power Grid”, in 
Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition: Asia and Pacific, 2005 IEEE/PES, (Dalian, 
China), pp.1-6, 2005. 
[Talukdar et al. 2003]  S. N. Talukdar, J. Apt, M. Ilic, L. B. Lave and M. G. Morgan, “Cascading 
Failures: Survival versus Prevention”, The Electricity Journal November 2003. 
[TCSEC 1985]  TCSEC, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, Department of Defense, USA, 
1985. 
[Thorp et al. 1998]  J. D. Thorp, A. G. Phadke, S. H. Horowitz and S. Tamronglak, “Anatomy of Power 
System Disturbances: Importance Sampling”, Electric Power and Energy Systems, 20 (2), pp.147-152, 
1998. 
[Trivedi 2002]  K. Trivedi, “Sharpe 2002: symbolic hierarchical automated reliability and performance 
evaluator”, in IEEE Int. Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2002), (Washington, 
DC, USA), p.544, IEEE Computer Society, 2002. 
Methodologies Synthesis  Page 72  
[Trivedi & Kulkarni 1993]  K. Trivedi and V. Kulkarni, “FSPNs: Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets”, in 
International Conference on Application and Theory of Petri Nets (ICATPN-93), pp.24-31, Springer-
Verlag, 1993. 
[Tuffin et al. 2001]  B. Tuffin, D. S. Chen and K. Trivedi, “Comparison of hybrid systems and fluid 
stochastic Petri nets”, Discrete Event Dynamic Systems, 11 (1-2), pp.77-95, January 2001. 
[US-Canada 2004]  US-Canada, Power System Outage Task Force — Final Report on the August 14, 
2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, April 2004 2004. 
[van Moorsel & Huang 1998]  A. P. A. van Moorsel and Y. Huang, “Reusable software components for 
performability tools, and their utilization for web-based configuration tools”, in 10th International 
Conference in Computer Performance Evaluation: Modelling Techniques and Tools, (N. N. S. R. 
Puigjaner, and B. Serra, Ed.), (Palma de Mallorca, Spain), pp.37-50, 1998. 
[Vicario 2001]  E. Vicario, “Static analysis and dynamic steering of time dependent systems”, IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, 27 (8), pp.728-748, 2001. 
[Wang et al. 2003]  D. Wang, B. B. Madan and K. Trivedi, “Security Analysis of SITAR Intrusion-
Tolerant System”, in ACM Workshop Survivable and Self-Regenerative Systems, pp.23-32, 2003. 
[Watts 2002]  Watts, D.J., “A Simple Model of Global Cascades on Random Networks”, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Science USA, 99, pp.5766-5771, 2002. 
[Wenger et al. 2004]  A. Wenger, J. Metzger, M. Dunn and I. Wigert, Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection — International CIIP Handbook 2004, ETH the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2004. 
[Weron & Simonsen 2006]  R. Weron and I. Simonsen, “Blackouts, risk and Fat-tailed Distributions”, in 
Practical Fruits of Econophysics (H. Takayasu, Ed.), pp.215-219, Springer-Tokyo, Tokyo, 2006. 
[Woodside et al. 1995]  C. M. Woodside, J. E. Neilson, D. C. Petriu and S. Mahumdar, “The Stochastic 
Rendezvous Network Model for Performance of Synchronous Client-Server-like Distributed Software”, 
IEEE Transactions on Computers, 44 (1), pp.20-34, 1995. 
[Zaho et al. 2004]  L. Zaho, K. Park and Y. C. Lai, “Attack vulnerability of scale-free networks due to 
cascading breakdown”, Physical Review E, 70 (035101), pp.1-4, 2004. 
[Zou et al. 2002]  C. C. Zou, W. Gong and D. Towsley, “Code Red Worm Propagation Modeling and 
Analysis”, in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security CCS’02, (Washington DC, 
USA), 2002. 
[Zou et al. 2005]  C. C. Zou, W. Gong, D. Towsley and L. Gao, “The Monitoring and Early Detection of 
Internet Worms”, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 13 (5), pp.961-974, October 2005. 
 
 
